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PAKISTAN

The Problem of India

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Shaukatullah Ansari

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SHAUKATULLAH ANSARI

THE MAN AND HIS TIMES

Twentieth Century heralded a revolutionary awakening in India. Indian freedom movement that even otherwise was not parochial, intensified its traditions of international contacts. Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari Medical Mission to Turkey belongs to this category; he was uncle of Shaukat, the author of present book. Gandhiji, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Ali Brothers and many more among Indians and Khalida Adib Khanum and Rauf Be the revolutionary Turks, besides a number of other Europeans, were family friends of the Ansaris. It is an interesting fact that his uncle never hindered personal or intellectual development of Shaukat; In fact his uncle was actively involved, like Sir J.C. Bose the scientist, in getting proscribed literature from Europe safely into India as he was personal physician to a number of Nawabs and Rajas and was frequently going to Europe with them with complete Princely immunity. This fact very few know. This was the atmosphere of nationalism and internationalism at home in which Shaukat grew up and had his primary education.

Shaukat went to Europe for schooling and higher education at a time when Europe was also in ferment. European intellectual atmosphere was surcharged with socialism and anti-Facist struggles. Second World War was Knocking at the doors of Europe. It was in this atmosphere that Shaukat met a number of Indians then studying in Europe and began working not only for Indian freedom but also against Facism and for socialism.

Being educated in Paris, Shaukat Knew the French movement and movement of French colonial independence better. Almost all the future leaders of French colonies were known to him personally from his Paris days. The dye was already cast; Shaukat was committed to socialism before his return to India.

After his return to India in 1937 Shaukat began organising a medical mission to China where anti-Japanees war was going on. Such Missions were family tradition. He could not lead this Mission;

Dr. Atal led it in 1938.

Young Shaukat began practicing medicine in Delhi of 1937 with his Dispensary in Chandni Chowk next to Fountain. His professional and personal friends were individuals like Dr. Joshi and Dr. Sen who are yet a legend among old Delhi families.

After the sudden and untimely death of his uncle in 1938 the ancestral house of Shaukat, *Dar-as-Salam* at No. 1 Daryaganj, had to be sold to meet various national commitments. He then shifted to a rented accommodation at 41-Rajpur Road where he lived till the holocaust of 1947.

41-Rajpur Road was no ordinary house. It was the refuge of not only of Progressive Writers who then needed help, but a beehive of political activity. Many a founder of the CPI in Delhi, if they yet remember, should be able to recall the man and the house. Among the progressive poets Majaz is one example; Nirala is another. One need not mention political visitors of the left. They had a Right of Passage as in the house of Sarojini Naidu. Is it any wonder then to have no less a person than the General Secretary of the CPI in 1945 telling Gandhiji that "If you have yet doubts and in any case, (about the finances of the then CPI) I give you some references which should meet all your doubts. The following know quite a lot about who gives us cash, how and where we spend it, and that the Government does not pay us a pie: Iftikharduddin and his Begum; Shaukat Ansari and Zohra (daughter of Dr. M.A. Ansari, his wife); N.M. Joshi" (Letter from P.C. Joshi to Gandhiji dated 14.6.1944; Correspondence Between Mahatma Gandhi & P.C. Joshi, PPH, 1945, p. 9-10), Shaukat and his whole family, including Basit Ansari of Bombay Chronicle, was that deeply involved not only with nationalism, *i.e.* Congress of which he was member, but with internationalism, *i.e.*, CPI and the Communist Movement of those days even if it is ignored today.

Support to Pakistan by the CPI was the first flash point of difference; even this could not create a gulf. CPI abused him by name; he did not.

In 1939 when Pakistan demand surfaced, opposition also began. Muslims in the beginning were against Pakistan. With Nehru vacillating under pressure from the right-wing, the dye in this respect was already cast; opposition to Pakistan was a losing battle. Shaukat fought this losing battle by organising the Nationalist Muslims in

Azad Muslim Board of which he was President. This organisation had such outstanding Muslim leaders as Hafiz Ibrahim, Syed Abdullah Barailwi, Abdul Qayyum, Maulana Ahmed Saeed, Maulana Asad Madani, and Mufti Kifayatullah (Sajjad Zaheer, *Muslim League Aur Azadi*, PPH, 1944, p. 35). Delhi yet, it is hoped, remembers their sons fighting against Pakistan. Shaukat was General Secretary of this organisation. Sajjad Zaheer, his lifelong friend and outspoken supporter of CPI support to Pakistan, had long discussions with him on this count. I am a witness to the fact that political differences among any or all of the above never hindered their personal relations or mutual respect. CPI then was fundamentally different in this respect from what it is now.

It is this Shaukat Ansari who is author of the book in hand; It was he who had to save his life and run away from Delhi to Bombay to survive with the help of his south Indian friends after independence in 1947 when his house in Delhi was attacked and looted. He had predicted it in this book in 1944. Hindu and Sikh friends rescued from 41-Rajpur Road whatever could be saved. There were such persons then; even Zakir Husain owed his life to such chance saving by a Sikh during those times. Shaukat escaped to Bombay. His dog found him even at such a distance.

It was this man CPI did its best to defeat in 1957 Lok Sabha elections as they were enervated with their anti-congressism and were planning hotch-potch governments. Pantji evolved an interesting formula; all those who had left leanings among Muslims were shifted from their earlier seats to face Communist friends. His logic was simple; if they win, Communists loose; if they do not; problems are reduced within Congress. CPI defeated him with the help of their new found friends—Jana Sangh.

At this juncture Nehru decided to appoint him Chairman of UN Commission for Laos and Viet Nam where Indian position was repeatedly under attack. His contribution under very adverse conditions is a matter of record. So are on record his efforts to consolidate Indian relations with emerging Black Africa.

Shaukat is buried in Jamia Millia near his uncle. How Jamia, Delhi and the Congress care for this legacy can be seen from the grave; forgotten, tattered and uncared for.

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PAKISTAN, NATIONALIST MUSLIMS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA

It is a well known fact of recent history that Pakistan was strongly opposed by a large section of Muslim intelligentsia. However, gradually this demand gained support of the Muslims masses, especially in the Hindi belt, which later spread to other regions among which last to join were the areas where Pakistan was to be created. Reasons for this change in the mood of those who had defeated League in 1935 elections everywhere, even in Muslim Majority areas, have been discussed elsewhere.¹

In order to present Pakistan as a non-communal demand League needed secular support; This support came from CPI. Support from the position of Marxism, a very popular movement then among intelligentsia and nationalists, not only confused large sections of Muslim and other masses but in fact hindered opposition to Pakistan from the rationalist sections of the nationalists who otherwise agreed with the CPI on most policy issues. This support also seriously weakened anti-imperialist unity in India; Without this support League demand for Pakistan would have been seen in its true communal and pro-imperialist colour.

It is a fact that not only the *Ulema* but also other nationalist and rational sections among Muslim intelligentsia had serious misgivings about the applicability of the Soviet conceptual framework on national question to Pakistan demand as proposed by the CPI. These sections could clearly see not only what was done in the USSR but also when and how of these steps that the CPI had totally ignored in its enthusiasm for Pakistan. These *Ulema* and other nationalist opponents of the CPI position on Pakistan could see that the Leninist logic of "Prison of Nationalities" was not at all applicable to the totally alien historical reality of India.² Shaukat Ansari disagreed with the CPI primarily on this count as the logic of the CPI perception of Pakistan

turned India into a "Prison of Nationalities" within which, according to this logic, the nationalities living in various territories *viz.* Malayalis, Tamils, Telegus, Kannars, Marahtas, Gujaratis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis, Pathans, Bengalis, Kashmiris, Orias etc. were historically oppressed by aliens in the manner of central Asia and Black Sea regions under the Tzars. This was the logic of CPI position of support to Pakistan. Hence, it was natural for CPI to assume that aspirations of these nationalities in India were to have their own homeland *i.e.* right of these national states even to secede and have independent existence without any let or hinderence *i.e.* for the CPI this right was absolute and time-space independent. In other words, freedom of India for the CPI meant complete political freedom of all nationalities living in the multinational Indian space *i.e.* the CPI visualised fractionation of India into totally independent national territories; CPI could not visualize multinational, multiethnic political space of Hindustan. Only this can explain the logic of CPI demand for seventeen Constituent Assemblies and right for each of them to have total independence first and only then either join Indian Union, or Pakistan, or have a union of their own, or to opt for any other solution as put forward in the Manifesto of the CPI for the Constituent Assembly. This is what CPI understood by freedom from British rule. Consequently Pakistan, as well as Khalistan, for the CPI was a direct, logical, and justified implication of the Freedom Pledge taken on the banks of Ravi in 1921 as without this total freedom to all nationalities within Indian geographical space as a matter of absolute right there could be no democratic content to Indian freedom³. The vehemence, perseverance, extent, and ideological persistency of CPI support to Pakistan and Khalistan those days could not be understood except through this conceptualization of ideological understanding as the CPI did not support Two Nation Theory overtly but nevertheless supported League and Akalis in their respective communal demands in concrete geographical terms. It seems this conceptual convulation was necessary because the logic of CPI understanding of the national question in India virtually coincided with the RSS-Jana Sangh understanding of Indian history; both visualised Indian reality as "prison of nationalities". However, as the paradigm of CPI was overtly defferent from that of the RSS, the CPI had no option but to plead for a different but flexible criteria applied in a diffused manner that in ultimate analysis meant

the same what Akalis and League were demanding. This position of the CPI regarding Pakistan in fact also converged with Clara Zetkin on Jewish question in Europe with which Lenin had vehemently disagreed in the Second Congress of the Comintern and till his death.

It was this CPI understanding of the national question that Dr. Ansari argued against in this book by pointing out that the problems faced by the Muslims in India were not due to their being a nation but due to their peculiar historico-cultural and social background that does not amount to nationhood. This approach to Muslim problem in India places this book of Dr. Ansari in alignment with certain other happenings within the CPI which fact is underlined by the year of its publication—1944.

Earliest voice of Marxist opposition to Pakistan by Communist intellectuals was raised as early as in 1940 *i.e.* within less than one year of the demand for Pakistan as an independent entity on the basis of Two Nation Theory. This opposition to Pakistan was initiated by Dr. K.M. Ashraf⁴. Articulated organizational support to Pakistan by the CPI can be firmly dated to 1942 CC resolution. After extension of ideological and organizational support to Pakistan, inner-Party discussion on the issue must have been stifled. However, within one year of open CPI support to Pakistan *i.e.* in 1943, Dr. Ashraf submitted a detailed document arguing against Pakistan and Two Nation Theory⁵. This document not only was never discussed at any level within the Party out, on the contrary, the CPI went a step further and in 1944 called upon the Congressmen and the Akalis in Punjab to support Muslim League after the Unionist Party had badly mauled the League in the elections to the state assemble. A call was given by the CPI to help “build Muslim League” and cadre of the CPI was asked to join the league⁶. In this situation rational argument against Pakistan could not find any outlet within the party and large sections of Indian intelligentsia could not get exposed to the Marxist opinion against Pakistan. This book in fact filled this void. Its major thrust is identical with the formulations given in the above mentioned note of Dr. K.M. Ashraf submitted to CPI in 1943.

In all probability pointed attack on this book by Dr. Adhikari in 1945 was due to the identity of positions as in his attack Dr. Adhikari criticises Dr. Ansari by name but avoids naming Dr. Ashraf

even when he argues against all points raised by him in his note of 1943. This attack on Dr. Ansari from the side of the CPI seems to have stimulated Dr. Ashraf to submit yet another and still more detailed document to CPI in 1945 which, needless to say, was also never discussed at any level within the party⁷. Obviously this sharp criticism of Dr. Ansari by Dr. Adhikari was primarily meant to stop counter opinion from growing and getting articulated within the CPI and among Marxists In general who obviously were not happy with CPI policy on Pakistan; Criticism of Dr. Ansari in fact was a proxy war with opponents of Pakistan within the Party itself.

1945, saw CPI supporting independent "Sikh Homeland" or Khalistan⁸. The grounds for support of the CPI to this new cause were identical with those given for Pakistan. Khalistan also had active League support.

Last Efforts For Congress-Communist Understanding

By the time Congress leaders came out of jail, Quit India was not the only bone of contention between the CPI and the congress. From 1942 onwards support to Pakistan was also there. Congress was deeply perturbed about CPI Pakistan policy as Communists then were not only members of Congress but were holding important organisational posts at various levels. Congress did not want to disrupt this position and break the then existing National Front against Imperialism. However, at the same time they also did not want organisational positions to be used for opposing Congress policies from within as was done by the CPI during Quit India Movement⁹.

It was in this background that in June 1945 CPI leader Dr. Ahmed met Nehru shortly after his release from Ahmednagar and had a long political discussion for the first time after a big gap full of serious events. During this discussion Dr. Ahmed tried to justify CPI position on 1942 and Pakistan. However, Nehru after some comments on CPI position regarding Quit India and disagreement with the CPI Pakistan policy pointedly concluded to Dr. Ahmed that past in any case was past and should not be allowed to hinder future mutual relations; further course of interaction between Congress and CPI, according to Nehru, was to be determined by contemporary problems *i.e.* Pakistan, as there was nothing else

hindering normal Congress-CPI relations if 1942 could be set aside as Congress had by then agreed to the right of self-determination of all nationalities if only Indian unity could be maintained¹⁰. It is obvious from the discussion between Nehru and Dr. Ahmed that Nehru was simply articulating the unanimous decision of the Congress leadership to the CPI¹¹. The above facts give credence to a message sent to the CPI General Secretary P.C. Joshi by Sardar Patel through a personal messenger in 1945 which in sum and substance stated that Congress anger about CPI position on Quit India shall be totally set aside if CPI stopped supporting Pakistan demand as an independent and separate entity. CPI summarily rejected this proposal¹². On the basis of Ahmed-Nehru interview one can surmise that the message from Sardar Patel to CPI General Secretary was no freak; it was part of the Congress understanding of the prevailing situation in 1945 which both Nehru and Sardar articulated for the CPI in order to underline complete unanimity about Congress attitude towards CPI and to remove probable CPI apprehensions about differences in Congress on this count especially from the section that Sardar used to represent. Various 1946 documents of the CPI *viz.* "Sikh Homeland" by Dr. Adhikari for example, were published six months after Ahmed-Nehru interview in June 1945 that was duly reported to the CPI top leadership and less than this span after the message from Sardar. All Congress efforts were to no avail.

It is this background of Congress desire to establish some sort of understanding with CPI that makes intervention of Sardar during RIN mutiny in Bombay understandable. Let us recall that CPI General Secretary asked for it; Sardar only positively responded. In all probability Sardar did so in the hope of achieving better understanding with the CPI on the most distasteful question of those days—CPI support to Pakistan.

By 1945 Congress-CPI gulf had become unbridgable primarily due to CPI position on Pakistan. Above facts to some extent make the bitterness of Sardar towards CPI understandable as the deeply staunch nationalist was touched by the CPI position on the raw. This also explains later Nehru-CPI relations as these were cordial till 1945. Nehru-Ahmed meeting seems to be the last discussion on political issues that, according to the text of the report sent by Dr. Ahmed, had no element of bitterness about it; only realisation of grim seriousness was there on part of Nehru but not on part of the

CPI. On part of Dr. Ahmed, as the text shows, there was only confidence in the correctness of CPI policy towards Pakistan. No wonder Communist members of AICC had to resign in the Bombay AICC session of 1945; even otherwise they were to be removed altogether from Congress primary membership.

CPI And CPGB Openly Disagree On Pakistan

In 1946 Cabinet Mission came to India and Rajni Palme Dutt (RPD) also visited India to cover the event for the CPGB organ "Daily Worker". While in India he had extensive discussions with various CPI leaders on the most topical issue *i.e.* Pakistan.

On his return RPD published a long article and a pamphlet both overtly critical of the CPI support to Pakistan. Through these writings RPD underlined the fact that he could achieve no understanding on Pakistan with the CPI. His pamphlet *Freedom For India* though critical of Pakistan demand, and CPI support to it, was indirect and mild; his article in Labour Monthly was not so¹³. These writings were one of the very very rare occasions when two Communist Parties *i.e.* CPI and CPGB disagreed with each other publicly in print.

CPI while ignoring the pamphlet took very serious note of the article in Labour Monthly and went to the extent of devoting a whole issue of *Party Letter* to it. Through *Party Letter* members and sympathizers were told how to counter its influence among intellectuals as RPD opposition was a very serious setback to CPI Pakistan policy that so far had seen only dumb and mute submission and "self-discipline". In *Party Life* CPI leadership justified support to Pakistan; in polite words CPI in fact expressed resentment on account of this *open* opposition from RPD and explicitly asserted that they know India better¹⁴.

This disagreement between CPI and International Communist Movement on account of Pakistan was much later underlined to CPI leaders by no less a person than Stalin in his meeting with CPI delegation visiting Moscow in 1948. It may be noted that this instance underlines the fact that in so far as Pakistan was concerned CPI was not at all influenced by any one including the Soviet Union; It was CPI decision, well considered and informed, about situations that the CPI knew best.

Memorandum submitted by the CPI to Cabinet Mission during the Simla Conference in 1946 and various other documents explaining CPI position on the constitution of Indian Republic and the Constituent Assembly of 1946-1947 simply reiterated earlier positions taking Pakistan and Khalistan as models for other provinces to follow. This fact underlines that CPI policy on national question remained unchanged inspite of all efforts.

Second (Calcutta) Congress of The CPI And Pakistan

Second Congress changed the entire political line; it replaced the General Secretary and majority of the CC members. Pakistan policy also came up for criticism. However, because of the basic understanding that without socialism national question can not be tackled, this criticism of Pakistan Policy could only be in secondary or organizational terms without touching the basics of the theoretical postulates or framework on national question; Criticism involved USSR and Lenin. Hence, for Calcutta Congress, silence was better part of valor in so far as national question was concerned. However, position taken on Kashmir by the Calcutta Congress viz. full and unconditional freedom for Kashmir at the moment of partition and First Pakistani armed attack of 1947-1948, to the extent of complete freedom, is a pointer showing that there was continuity of policy and conceptual framework on National Question even after the Calcutta Congress¹⁵. In other words, Second Congress agreed with the past that (a) the experience of the USSR and Leninist concept of "Prison of Nationalities" was applicable to India and (b) the consequent demand for seventeen Constituent Assemblies was also justified. In spite of organizational changes taking place in Calcutta, ideological continuity of the essence of Pakistan policy of 1942-1947 is observable even after Calcutta Congress.

This strong hesitation to discuss and clarify ideologicoconceptual aspects lying at the root of CPI position on Pakistan and consequent open, persistent and bitter opposition to Congress which by now has developed into part of CPI faith *per se*, brought its first post-Independence harvest when in 1957 CPI joined hands with Jana Sangh to have Rotation Formula for Mayorship in Delhi and further developed this understanding into VD governments all over Hindi belt giving political respectability to Jana Sangh for the first time

after Gandhi Murder *i.e.* theoretical foundations of support to Pakistan resulted a decade later into a totally new understanding of communal question in Indian. Later unconditional support of CPI to various minority agitations and on minority characters of Aligarh University etc. is the other side of the same coin. These attitudes yet continue.

This book is of considerable interest for evaluating CPI Congress relations before and after partition and independence in which CPI support to Pakistan obviously played an important role.

First and foremost this book is a cry in the political wilderness of 1940s asking Indians to ponder rationally about Pakistan demand and its grim consequences for all sections. For this end Dr. Ansari painstakingly analyses Pakistan from various angles to show how Pakistan shall harm Muslims more than anyone else. Through this book Dr. Ansari was also appealing to Communists to realise the consequences of their policy positions. Secondly, this book articulates the position of non-*Ulema* Nationalist Muslims. Significance of this aspect is enhanced by the fact that the text not only does not root itself in religion but forecasts on secular grounds a number of consequences of partition; That each one of them without exception has come true underscored the correctness of the vision of those rationally thinking during 1940-1947. However, due to strong opposition from both *i.e.* right wing of the Congress and the CPI, the role of this book in articulating the rational argument against Pakistan not only failed then but yet remains unrecognised. Even today its contemporary significance can be seen in its formulations. As a matter of fact today the book is more significant than earlier.

Struggle for and against Pakistan is part of recent history. This book fills an important gap in our understanding of the given period so full of trials and tribulations. It is unfortunate that not only the Communists but even the Congress has done its best to gloss over this resistance to partition on the side of Nationalist Muslims; Lip-service is all that one hears today on all sides.

Notes And Bibliography

1. K.M. Ashraf, 1962, *Hindustani Muslim Siyasat*, New Delhi. P. 42-44. also see f.n.2 infra.
2. Tufail Ahmed Manglori, (Tr. & Ed. Ali Ashraf), 1994, *Towards A Common Destiny: A Nationalist Manifesto*, PPH, New Delhi, pp. 384-385. (English

translation of Urdu book *Muslamanoon Ka Roshan Mustaqbil* first published in 1937. Its last revised and enlarged edition in India was published in 1945. *Inter alia* the author points out that, "It is said that in Soviet Russia different republics have the right of secession. But the proposed Pakistan is to be separated from India on the basis of religion, whereas Lenin has categorically stated that the state should have nothing to do with religion. Religious groups should not be identified with state. Moreover, the republics there were granted the right of secession after twenty years of communist propaganda and inculcation of the teachings of communist principles when the domination of capitalists, religious leaders, landlords had been brought to an end. This right was not granted at the time when these reactionary classes were demanding the right of separation for their nationalities (emphasis added).

And even after the right was conceded, no republic has so far seceded. In contrast the demand of the Muslim League is for the separation of Pakistan from India from the very beginning and that too under conditions when one wing is in the north and the other in the east at a distance of one thousand miles from each other." Dr. Ansari in this book agrees with this argument.

3. Lucid presentations of CPI position and the reasons for support to Pakistan are given in *Party Letter* of May, 1946 answering Rajni Palme Dutt's criticism of CPI position published in *Labor Monthly* of March, 1946. Other major elucidations are given in G.D. Adhikari, 1942, *Pakistan And National Unity*, PPH, Bombay; *Declaration on Pakistan And Unity of India (to be adopted by the Indian National Congress)*, p.12-13; Syed Sajjad Zaheer, 1944, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, PPH, Bombay, p. 38-39; This position of Sajjad Zaheer reflects the CC resolution dated 19th September, 1942 titled *On Pakistan And National Uhity*, published in G.D. Adhikari; 1943, *Pakistan And National Unity : The Communist Solution*, p. 30-32, PPH, Bombay. For the text of the first 1942 support resolution see T.G Jacob, 1988, *National Question in India : CPI Documents 1942-1947*, p. 29-32.
4. K.M. Ashraf (Ed.), 1940, *Pakistn*. Today it is not easily available in various collections including those of CPI, CPM and the Congress. It was published in Lahore and has contributions from different Marxist authors. The sociological context in which Dr. Ansari refers to Dr. Ashraf is also given in K.M. Ashraf, 1939, *Hamare Desh Mein Samajik Sangathan*, Mathura.
5. K.M. Ashraf, 1943, *Hindu-Muslim Question And our Freedom Movement: 1857-1943*. MSS. It is a note of about 300 single spaced foolscap typed pages submitted to the CPI in 1943. It yet remains unpublished. Major thrust of the argument in case of Dr. Ansari is the same as given in this document.
6. For organizational support of CPI to League see f.n. 3 *supra*; that this call to build League was not just theoretical but the CPI had asked its young cadre to join and build League is clearly mentioned in the Interview of Dr.K.M. Ashraf in Horst Kruger (Ed.), 1969, *Kunwar Mohammad Ashraf: An*

Indian Scholar And Revolutionary; 1903-1962, PPH, p. 419; It is also obvious from the fact of such leading Progressive Writers of Urdu as Majaz, Kaifi Azmi, Josh Malihabadi, Makhdoom and others strongly campaigning for Pakistan viz. Poem by Majaz, *Pakistan ka Trana*; poem by Kaifi titled *Ab Agli Id Ek Azad Pakistan Main Hogi* and Josh Malihabadi's epic poem projecting Mother India addressing Congress, League and the Communist Party. Sending cadre to League and building League was strongly criticized by B.T. Randive and Bhowani Sen in the Second Congress of the CPI viz. *Opening Report by Comrade B.T. Randive On The Draft Political Thesis and Comrade Bhowani Sen's Speech On The Resolution on Pakistan*, 1st March, 1948, compiled in *Second Congress of the Communist Party of India*, 1948, p.26-40. This point has also been confirmed in K.M. Ashraf, 1962, *Hindustani Muslim Siyasat*, New Delhi, p. 70.

7. K.M. Ashraf, 1945, *Historical Background To Muslim Question In India: 1725-1945*. It is a note of more than 300 foolscap single spaced typed pages submitted to CPI; it yet remains unpublished. It is now in Nehru Memorial Museum, New Delhi as Part of Ashraf Papers. Indira Gandhi had agreed that it should be published by AICC as a historical document even if critical of Congress in general and of Nehru in particular. She could not do so because of the objections raised by some Muslim leftist MPs. CPI had the MSS with them for 15 years and then refused to publish it for obvious reasons.
8. G.D. Adhikari, 1945, *Sikh Homeland*, PPH, Bombay, p. 19-20 concludes as following, "Once the awakened masses and the common people solve the present antagonism... the road would be open to reunite the Punjabi speaking Punjab on the basis of autonomy to Sikh homelands... ", The same point is mentioned in Sajjad Zaheer, 1944, *Light On League-Unionist Conflict*, PPH, p. 39.
9. See f.n. 10, p. 3. Nehru wanted Dr. Ahmed to resign from the secretaryship of UP PC giving policy differences as reason, "I asked you to say in your letter that there were certain honest differences of opinion . . . and if the Congress decided to launch direct action you would not be able to discharge your responsibilities. . . ." Dr. Ahmed did not resign in 1942.
10. *Ahmed's Talk with Jawaharlal Nehru*, MSS, dated June, 1945, P.C. Joshi Papers, ac. No.9/1945, Archives of Contemporary India, JNU. This is a 17 Page foolscap double space typed document; it is copy of the original now in RPD Papers, British Museum, London. This interview took place on June 27th and 28th, 1945. Dr. Ahmed in his report to CPI states that, "I give below a verbatim report of the talk I had with him (Nehru) on the 28th." On 27th, there could be no discussion as, "On the first day I avoided political discussion, since Kriplani, Feroze (Gandhi) and few other Congressmen were present at the time. I however asked Panditji to give me appointment when I could talk to him separately. He readily agreed

and said, "Of course we must meet and discuss certain question". He asked me to see him again the next day at 9 o'clock in the morning. I give below a verbatim report of the talk I had with him on the 28th." (p. 1). On p. 11 Nehru is quoted by Ahmed as saying, "...But I do not want to worry about what happened in the past. I am concerned with the present and the future. No doubt certain events have to be clarified, but I also realise that we have passed through a most abnormal period in which political feelings and passions on all sides ran high and every one did what he thought right....Therefore I do not attach much importance to what people said and did in the last three years. The new period is bringing its own problems and the mutual relations of Communists and Congressmen would be governed largely by the measure in which their policies in regard to the new problems agree or disagree with each other." The context of this comment is 1942. That 1942 and the CPI position on this count was no more a serious problem is born out by the following statement of Nehru; "I do not mean that you identified yourself with the (British) government. What I mean was that at a critical time when there was a clash between the government and the national movement, you were not on the side of the national movement. It is a different question whether at that time the course taken by the national movement was right or wrong. The fact however remains that you were not giving your support to the national forces in whatever they were doing. This is all that I wanted to say. I do not mean to convey the impression that you were helping or supporting the government in the execution of its repressive policy ...I may tell you this, but do not convey it to anyone else that some time before August 1942 Gandhiji gave in to me and me and others on this question of non-violence. You can imagine what it must have meant for him. But he realised that he would not be able to achieve his larger objective if he stuck to non-violence. He therefore virtually surrendered on this issue. My differences with Gandhiji are less today than they were before...." p. 2-3. Nehru did not discuss 1942 any further with Ahmed according to this report. During the discussion Nehru made it clear that, "...The Congress has virtually accepted the right of self-determination. The problem could be worked out further and more concretelyWe could also lay down that while recognizing the right of separation, for a period of time we should try to work together, may for 10 years, and after that if the Pakistan areas still want to separate they would have the freedom to do so" (p. 8) At this moment Dr. Ahmed tries to convince Nehru that "we often fail to see the rapidity with which progressive popular forces are growing within the League.... The desire for a settlement with the Congress is strong and widespread and the old separatist and reactionary trends are being isolated...." (p. 9). Rajaji formula contains the above recognition by the Congress. These points are not reported so clearly in most of the published and available document.

11. *Ahmed's Talk with Nehru*, p. 3-4. *inter alia* mentions Nehru as saying, "...Later on we also learnt about your policy with regard to League and the problem of Congress-League settlement. There is one thing which I want to tell you and which you should convey; During our stay in Ahmednagar Fort we hardly ever discussed political questions in an organized manner. This may sound strange but we did not think it worthwhile since we were totally isolated from the political life of the country. But towards the end of our stay there, when we were informed that we would be transferred to our respective provinces, we thought it necessary to discuss certain issues and come to common understanding. Since there was a possibility of our being released individually by instalments we considered it essential that on release all of us should speak the same language. Thus for fifteen day we discussed all the major political problems. The policies and activities of the Communist Party were also discussed.... Besides, there was a general resentment against you on account of your stand vis a vis the League....(emphasis added). On p. 11 Nehru concludes this particular discussion by telling Ahmed that, " But I don't want to worry much about what happened in the past. I am concerned about the present and the future. No doubt, certain past events have to be clarified, but I also realise that we have passed through a most abnormal period in which political feelings and passions on all sides ran high and everyone did what he thought right....Wherefore I do not attach much importance to what people said and did in the last three years. The new period is bringing its own problems and the mutual relations of the Communists and Congressmen would be governed largely by the measures in which their policies in regard to the new problems agree or disagree with their policies in regard to the new problems agree or disagree with each other." Under given circumstances Nehru could neither be more candid or explicit.
12. I was personally told about this message from Sardar sent during summer of 1945 by P.C. Joshi in a discussion on various aspects related to Pakistan. Joshi did not name the emissary. All published materials are silent about it. However, f.n.10 supra gives credence to it as the message from Sardar was identical with what Dr. Ahmed reported from Nehru to CPI.
13. Rajni Palme Dutt, 1946, *India And Pakistan*, Labour Monthly, March 1946. The article is critically referred to in *Party Letter*, No. 4, 12th May, 1946 pp. 1-19; also see R.P.Dutt, 1946, *Freedom For India*, CPGB, pp. 30.
14. *Party Letter*, No.4, 1946 *inter alia* states that, "Comrades are asking: is not Palme Dutt putting across a line about the Muslim League which is at variance with the line of the Indian Party on the question? ...While appreciating our Party's work in the cause of Congress-League Unity, is he not suggesting that in 1944 we so underplayed the separatist and undemocratic of the Pakistan demand as to create the impression that we

supported the League demand in toto and thus intensified our isolation from the Congress ?..." (p. 1) These are the same apprehensions as in Nehru-Ahmed interview. The Letter recognizes that the article has caused "a good deal of confused discussion on the question in the party ranks, which was inevitable considering that Comrade Dutt is the authorized spokesman of our brother British PartyLet us get this clear that Palme Dutt is not attempting to correct our policy by this article ...Let Indians solve their own differences on Pakistan ... Comrade Dutt's references in the article to the resignation of "certain leading officials" from the congress to join the League as well as to the resignation of the Communists as a body from the Congress, are couched in such language as would give the impression that he does not agree with these steps."

"In his reference to the Communist Party slogan of seventeen Constituent Assemblies, he talks of alleged nationalities and in referring to the constructive character of the contribution of the Indian Communists to the problem of the Indian national unity in relation to the multi-national character of the Indian people, he remarks parenthetically "exaggerations apart". These remarks cannot but give the readers the impression that Dutt does not quite agree with the enumeration of the seventeen nationalities nor with all that the Indian Communist Party has been doing for forging Indian national unity.... This article is an example of how a correct analysis of the Hindu-Muslim question explained with a wrong approach and emphasis vis a vis the Congress and the League can produce opposite results....." (p. 5-7). It may also be recalled that in a meeting with CPI delegation to Moscow in 1948 led by Rajeshwara Rao Stalin while conceding the right to decide its own position on Pakistan criticized CPI on position regarding Quit India Movement of 1942. His opinion about Pakistan was similar to RPD.

15. *Second Congress of The Communist Party of India*, 1948, PPH, Bombay, p. 24. The document states that "Earlier we also made a wrong differentiation between Indian Union and Pakistan with regard to accession by the States, tending to the view that the Indian Union was progressive and Pakistan reactionary... This landed us in the Kashmir muddle—when logically we had to take the position of supporting the armies of Indian Union who were protecting the Maharaja and the feudal chiefs. We failed to understand that both Governments were reactionary. It was only when the question was referred to UNO that we woke up to the reality..." Bhowani Sen while speaking on Pakistan's resolution (p. 35) made the above point of BTR quite clear by saying, "This posing the question of accession or no accession is weapon by which reaction seeks to divert popular energy from the real direction, from the revolutionary direction. We must not enter this trap. For there is no question of accession. Such accession will only lead to forging of alliances between the governments of Indian Union or

Pakistan with the Princely autocracy. There can be no question of accession before the complete victory of the democratic revolution has been achieved....”

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1. INTRODUCTION

For the last four years a great deal of controversy has raged over the Pakistan issue. Conferences have been held in all parts of the country both in favour of and against the partition of India, and the people on both sides have been fully worked up. Several persons have written for and against Pakistan, but unhappily, more as partisans than otherwise. Arguments on both sides have been more in the nature of assertions than logical reasons. In this atmosphere of strife and increasing bitterness it is of the utmost importance that the Muslims of India should dispassionately consider the merits and demerits of the Pakistan scheme and arrive at a well considered decision and abide by it. Just as some Muslims have come to passionately advocate Pakistan, and have made it an article of faith which cannot be questioned or criticized; in the same way some non-Muslims, as a matter of sentiment, have recoiled at the very suggestion of the partition of India, and refused to discuss the Pakistan Scheme as a possible solution of the minority problem in India. What is required is a full and free discussion, and a comprehensive statement of the case from both points of views. This pamphlet is an attempt to encourage discussion, dispassionately to examine the proposal for the partition of India and to place the issue before the Muslims of India in clear and comprehensive terms. It is proposed to examine first the reasons of the present state of antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims, and then to describe the genesis of the Pakistan Scheme before analysing the two-nation theory on which it is based. Thereafter, both the case for and against Pakistan would be stated as completely as possible within the scope of this pamphlet.

2. GENESIS OF PAKISTAN

The generally accepted view is that the theory of two nations and the demand for separate and independent Muslim States took birth in the philosophical speculations of Dr. Iqbal. It is said that he started with the premise that on account of their religion and culture Muslims were radically different from Hindus and they could not possibly co-operate with each other either politically or economically and in view of this the only solution was the creation of a Muslim State as distinct from a Hindu State. Therefore, in 1930, Dr. Iqbal, while presiding over the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League, said: "I would like to see the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of the North-West India."

The truth of the matter is that it is not correct to say that Dr. Iqbal either sponsored the idea of two nations or evolved what is now known as the Pakistan scheme. It is clear from the rest of his speech that he was not contemplating a separate sovereign Muslim State, but was only referring to the consolidation of the Muslim North-West in one political unit of an all India federation. With reference to the "Consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State", he added that "the proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy State." The Nehru Report refers to this proposal as the creation of a new 'province,' of course within India as is clear from Dr. Iqbal's own words when he said: "We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die.....the Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, *i.e.*, the communal problem.....thus possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India; the unity of the Indian nation must be sought not in the negation but in the mutual harmony

and co-operation of the manycommunalism in its higher aspect then is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India.¹

The fact is that Dr. Iqbal was not advocating partition and by autonomy he did not mean full independence. He was thinking primarily of Muslim consolidation. But he did not propose that the Muslim State should break away from the rest of India. It was to be done of several similarly constituted States which would be linked together in a loose all India federation. Dr. Iqbal's proposal, therefore, did not amount to anything more than a general readjustment of provincial boundaries to consolidate provinces in the North-West to form a powerful unit of an Indian Federation and thereby safeguard Muslim rights. This view is confirmed by the fact that in 1931 at the Punjab Nationalist Muslim Conference held at Lahore, Malik Barkat Ali, Chairman of the Reception Committee, said: "The conception of a divided India, which Sir Mohammad Iqbal put forward recently in the course of his presidential utterance from the platform of the League, at a time when that body had virtually become extinct and ceased to represent free Islam—I am glad to be able to say that Sir Mohammad Iqbal has since recanted it—must not therefore delude anybody into thinking that is Islam's conception of the India to be. Even if Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal had not recanted it as something which could not be put forward by any sane person, I should have emphatically and unhesitatingly repudiated it as something foreign to the genius and the spirit of the rising generation of Islam, and I really deem it a proud duty to affirm today that not only must there be no division of India into communal provinces but that both Islam and Hinduism must run coterminously with the boundaries of India and must not be cribbed, cabined and confined within any shorter bounds."² This statement is confirmed by the fact that when Edward Thompson attributed the genesis of Pakistan to Dr. Iqbal, the poet promptly corrected him. "Iqbal was a friend," writes Edward Thompson, "and he set my misconception right. After speaking of his own despondency at the chaos he saw coming 'on my vast, undisciplined and starving land,' he went on to say that he thought the Pakistan plan would be disastrous to the British Government, disastrous to the Hindu community, disastrous to the Muslim community. But I am the president of the Muslim League and it is therefore my duty to

support it.”³ In 1930 the view put forward by Dr. Iqbal was regarded as the innocent fancy of a poet who had strayed into the political arena, so much so that the Subjects Committee of the League did not consider it worth while to adopt it in the form of a resolution, and for the time being it hardly made any impression on the public life of the country.⁴ Actually, hardly anyone took the Pakistan suggestion seriously in India until after Dr. Iqbal’s death. Those who attributed the scheme to him did so with the obvious intention of utilizing his name, popularity and authority as the great poet of Islam, to bolster up their own views.

In 1930-31, the Reforms were on the anvil and at the First and Second Round Table Conferences the Muslims appeared committed to the establishment of an Indian Federation. J. Coatman, C.I.E., writing in 1932 at the time of the Third Round Table Conference, said: “The creation of a strong, united India, including the whole of British India and the Indian States and the borderland in the North-West, whose inclusion in India is one of the first and most fundamental conditions of her nationhood, is, day by day, being made impossible, and (in its place it seems that there may be brought into being a powerful Mohammadan State in the north and north-west, with its eyes definitely turned away from India, towards the rest of the Moslem world of which it forms the fringe, whilst away to the south and east there will be what? A Hindu India, homogeneous and united ? Perhaps ! Or a vast area divided between warring princes and the fighting races of old Hindustan as it has been in the past, and may easily be so again in the future? Very likely!.....”⁵

The seed found a fertile soil in the minds of some young Muslims who were opposed to the All-India Federation and believed that the safeguards which were being provided in the Constitution were useless, and “our brave but voiceless nation is being crucified on the altar of Hindu nationalism.” In 1933 for the first time the Muslims, hitherto called a minority community were called “a nation”⁶ by a Punjabi Muslim, Choudhary Rahmat Ali (an undergraduate of Cambridge), who gave the movement a shape and a form. He propounded the idea that the Punjab, N.W.F.P., (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan, should be formed into a separate Muslim State called Pakistan.⁷ This proposal was different from that of Dr. Iqbal in that while Dr. Iqbal proposed the

amalgamation of those provinces into a single State forming a unit of the All-India Federation, Choudhary Rahmat Ali proposed that these provinces should have an independent federation of their own.⁸ Leaflets advocating Pakistan were distributed by Choudhary Rahmat Ali to the Members of Parliament and the Members of the Round Table Conference, but no Indian, Hindu or Muslim, took any interest in them. Muslim witnesses described the Pakistan scheme in August 1933 to the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee as follows:

A Yusuf Ali : "As far as I know it is only a student scheme: no responsible people have put it forward"

Ch. Zafrulla Khan : "So far as we have considered it, we have considered it chimerical and impracticable"

Dr. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din : "Perhaps it will be enough to say that no such scheme has been considered by any representative gentleman or association so far."

It is significant that questions about Pakistan were asked at this Conference. It is still more significant that the initiative came from the British—they seem, from the record, to have pressed their questions while the Indian (Muslim) delegates seem uninterested and anxious to pass on to the next point.

At the time it was generally believed among Indian students at Cambridge that Choudhary Rahmat Ali, who was not pursuing any specific course of studies and had no ostensible means of support, but at the same time had ample funds for his somewhat luxurious entertainment of celebrities and propagandist activities, derived his inspiration and funds from the India Office. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that although in India no one had heard of or talked of Pakistan and the Muslim Delegation showed no interest in it, yet the Diehard Press and the Churchill-Lord Lloyd group of the Conservative Party vaxed eloquent over it and saw in it a suggestion of the gravest import with the result that questions were asked in the Houses of Parliament on several occasions.

✓ 1916-24 was an era of close co-operation between the League and the Congress on the basis of the Lucknow Pact. While the Congress supported the Khilafat agitation, the League supported the Swaraj agitation. In 1927, as a challenge to the British Government, the Congress issued the Nehru Report, a liberal constitution for

India of which it demanded acceptance within a year, under penalty of Civil Disobedience. The Nehru Report was the apple of discord between the Hindus and the Muslims and it clearly showed that the Congress since 1924 had come under the influence of Hindu communalists and the Mahasabha. It proposed to take away from the Muslims safeguards such as separate electorates and one-third of seats in the Central Legislature, both of which had been conceded by the Congress in 1916. Assertion of the Muslims felt apprehensive and suspicious of the intentions of the Congress towards the Muslims in a self-governing India, The Muslim League split into two on the issue of the acceptance of the Nehru Report and non-co-operation with the Simon Commission. The Leaguers led by Sir Mohammad Shafi repudiated both, but they were in a small minority as compared to those led by Mr. Jinnah who were prepared to co-operate with the Congress provided they were reassured by the acceptance of five amendments to the Nehru Report. Mahasabha elements in the Congress rejected all the five proposals to amend the Nehru Report and this began the alienation of a considerable number of Muslims from the Congress.

Throughout 1930 and 1935, the period of gestation of the Government of India Act, 1935, Muslim thought was guided by the All-India Muslim Conference, founded in January 1929, led and controlled by Mian Fazl-i-Husain. The policy of the Conference in the main was to ensure the provision of adequate safeguards for Muslims in the new Constitution. The Congress opposed some of the proposed safeguards at the Round Table Conference and intensified bitterness between the two communities. The Co-operation of a large number of Congressmen with the Mahasabhaites to agitate against the Communal Award confirmed all doubts in the minds of the Muslims who had receded from the Congress and they felt convinced that it was a vain hope to expect justice from the Congress. The Pakistan view of Muslim politics, however, remained confined to a handful of young Muslim students, and Choudhary Rahmat Ali did nothing further except that in July 1935 he circulated a four -page leaflet from another Cambridge address.

The Muslims managed to have most of their important demands incorporated as safeguards in the Government of India Act, 1935, and thereafter felt fairly secure to take part in democratic politics under the newly granted provincial autonomy. In February 1936, at

a meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference, Mian Fazl-i-Husain inaugurated a noncommunal economic programme and reorganised the National Unionist Party in the Punjab. Mr. Jinnah, newly elected President of the All-India Muslim League, on the other hand, started reorganizing Muslims on an inter-provincial scale as a distinct and separate communal identity, setting up committees throughout the country and intensifying League propaganda on an unprecedented scale. Mian Fazl-i-Husain and Mr. Jinnah, therefore, came into sharp conflict with each other, and the former successfully opposed the formation of a purely communal party in the Punjab,⁹ but when Mian Fazl-i-Husain suddenly died in July 1936 the field for the activities of Mr. Jinnah was clear.¹⁰

At the Lucknow Session (October 1937), the League attacked the Congress plan for attaining self-government (in which it was alleged Muslims would not have their due share), its demand for a Constituent Assembly (in which it was alleged no special provision was made for Muslims), its attempt at establishing contact with the Muslim masses (by which it was alleged it was intended to sabotage the League), and consequently decided that "no settlement with the majority is possible." The elections of 1937 showed the strong hold the Congress had on the general public mind and it made Mr. Jinnah and other leaders of the Muslims realize that unless they reorganized and closed up their ranks still further and came under the banner of one political body and chalked out a programme that would make an appeal, not only to the educated few—aspirants after seats, jobs and ministerships—but also to the Muslim masses to whom franchise had been extended recently, the Congress might succeed in winning over the Muslim masses through its economic programme and the policy of mass contacts. The acceptance of office by the Congress where it wielded a majority deprived the Muslims in those provinces of the temporary advantages they had gained by the formation of interim ministries, in which Muslims occupied a most important position, as a matter of fact most of the interim Premiers were Muslims. The loss of office and power was felt all the more keenly on account of the understanding that the Governors would ordinarily refrain from exercising their special powers, because this was understood to mean the safeguard provided in the constitution for the protection of minority rights. Fairplay for the minorities, it was said, was more a matter of day-to-day

administration than of 'major questions' or 'serious disagreements', and it was just those minor issues regarding which it seemed to be agreed that Governors and Ministers should not come to an open breach. The refusal of the Congress to form coalition ministries with the League and their insistence on signing the Congress pledge hurt them. This was aggravated by their failure to capture power in any of the four Muslim majority provinces and the formation in those provinces of non-communal parties and coalition ministries, which showed clearly that League Raj had no chance whatever except in a separate state. As it happened the Congress regime in various provinces and the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha provided sufficient material for propagandist activities against the majority community. The official celebration of Gandhi Jayanti and Tilak Day, the hoisting of the Congress Tricolour on public buildings and schools, the singing of Bande Mataram, the Vidya Mandir Scheme of C.P. Government, and the Wardha Scheme of education were said to be attacks on Muslim culture. The use of criminal law for the prevention of cow slaughter by a Congress Government could not be defended and the unsatisfactory attitude of the Congress Government against the Hindus who wanted to implicate innocent Muslims in the Chandur Biswa Murder case, roused the indignation of Muslims all over the country. Last but not least the unitarian policy and the control exercised by the Congress High Command over the Congress Ministers and members of legislatures in all Congress Provinces, and the discipline enforced in non-Congress Provinces where Congressmen refused to join coalition Governments, and finally the possibility of the Congress obtaining control of the Centre, foreshadowed by the agitation for responsible government in the States, incited and supported by the Congress High Command, made the Muslims feel that when full self-government was established at the Centre and in so far as the Congress obtained control of it, Provincial Autonomy might be undermined by the Congress. A series of publications, such as the Pirpur Report, the Sahreef Report, Fazl-ul-Haq's "Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule", and Kamal Yar Jung Education Committee Report further roused the anger of the Muslims. This gave birth to uncompromising separation, a separatism conceived in a spirit of anger, of fear and of revenge. Out of this defeatist mentality arose the notion of two nations and Pakistan as a cry of despair of a

people retaliating with their back against the wall.

On October 1933, the Sind Provincial Muslim League, presided over by Mr. Jinnah, resolved: "It is absolutely essential in the interests of abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, that India may be divided into two federations, viz., Federation of Muslim States and Federation of non-Muslim States." In September 1939, the Working Committee of the League explained the innovation of the two-nation theory and partition by saying: "The developments that have taken place, especially since the inauguration of the provincial constitution based on the so-called democratic parliamentary system of government and the recent experience of over two years, have established beyond any doubt that it has resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination by the Hindus over the Muslim minorities, whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress Governments in various provinces. While Muslim India stands against exploitation of the people of India and has repeatedly declared in favour of 'a free India', it is equally opposed to domination by the Hindu majority over the Musalmans and other minorities and vassalisation of Muslim India, and is irrevocably opposed to any federal objective which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and parliamentary system of government. Such a constitution is totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of the country, which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state".

Hitherto the Muslim demand had always been for effective safeguards for the protection of the Muslim community's religious, cultural and other rights; now a section of the Muslims began to question the very basis of democracy and declared that Western democracy in the sense of rule by majority was unsuitable for India. This was developed in the summer of 1940 into a demand for partition on the ground that Muslims constituted an integral nation and not a minority in the Indian population. The Muslims, it was believed, were doomed to perpetual opposition and permanent denial of a share in all those provinces, and at the Centre, where

they were in a minority. The only solution was partition, the formation of separate Muslim States in the West and East and no Government at the Centre at all. At Lahore the famous resolution of March 26, 1940, said: "It is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. Adequate, affective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the Constitution for them and other minorities, for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them. This session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a Scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."

At the Annual Session of the League held in Madras in 1941, the Constitution of the League was altered to conform to the Lahore Resolution, referring to which Mr. Jinnah said: "We do not want under any circumstances a constitution of an All-India character with one Government at the Centre. The ideology of the League is based on the fundamental principle that the Muslims of India are an independent nationality and that any attempt to get them to merge their national and political identity and ideology will be resisted."

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The Indian Annual Register—1930: Volume II, pages 337-45.
2. The Indian Annual Register—1931: Volume II, pages 234-35.
3. *Enlist India for Freedom*—Edward Thompson 1940: page 58.
4. *Two Punjabee Musalmans*—Ahmad Shafi—August 1942, *The Indian Review*.
5. *Years of Destiny*, 1932, pages 238-240.
6. Khan A. Ahmad writing in *The Founder of Pakistan*, say: This is amply borne out by their (Muslims') political literature published up to the year 1933, when the Pakistan National Movement was founded. If you examine the Daily Press, the periodicals and the books of the pre-Pakistan period, while you will find therein overwhelming evidence of the grip on Muslims, of Indian spirit, of Indian thought, and of Indian phraseology, you will hardly find in it a trace of Milli political philosophy, or Milli political ideology, or of Milli political language to inspire them as a people."
7. In an appeal "Now or Never", dated the 28th January 1933, Choudhary Rahmat Ali for the first time put forward his scheme of Pakistan.
8. "First, whereas Iqbal prefers to amalgamate four Muslim provinces into a single State; Ali plans to maintain the individuality of each of the five provinces covered by his scheme of Pakistan; secondly, whereas Iqbal keeps the amalgamated provinces within India and conceives a State within a State; Ali condemns the existing inclusion of Muslim provinces into "India" and calls for their immediate separation from "India", christens the five provinces Pakistan, and demands its recognition as a new country and sovereign State outside India; thirdly, whereas, in face of the then contemplated All India Federation, Iqbal reduced the number of Muslim majority lands from six to two and thereby, even for the purposes of the Federation, made the Muslim position worse than before; Ali, in view of the dangers of the Federation, strengthened and saved Muslim position by this scheme, first for the creation of a separate and sovereign Federation of Pakistan and then for the recognition of the independent nationhood of Bengal and of the sovereignty of Usmanistan; and lastly, whereas, on second thoughts, Iqbal himself, describing his idea as dangerous to Muslims, recanted and withdrew it; Ali, defining his scheme as the only means of political salvation of Muslims, defied all opposition—British, Hindu and Muslim devoted himself to its propagation and succeeded in converting to it the whole Millat, including even Iqbal, in 1937, and the All-India Muslim League, in 1940." (*The Founder of Pakistan*, Khan A. Ahmad 1942, page 29).
9. That on account of this opposition Mr. Jinnah failed to achieve his object is clear from the fact that in the general elections in 1937 Muslim League candidates were returned to the Provincial Assemblies in a microscopic minority. The league had no members in Bihar, C.P., N.-W.F.P., Orissa and Sind. While Muslim voters were 7,319,445 Muslim League got only 321,772 or 4.4 per cent of the total. Congress contested only 58 seats and won 26. In the Punjab in a House of 175 there was only one Muslim Leaguer.

10. After the death of Mian Fazl-i-Husain there was no outstanding Muslim leader who could stand for his policy. There had been an epidemic of death among Muslim leaders of an All-India stature. The death of Hakim Ajmal Khan had been followed by that of Maulana Muhammad Ali; then came Dr. Ansari and the moderate Sir Muhammad Shafi. Those who remained could not assume All-India leadership. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was by nature a savant and a recluse. Sir Sikander Hyat was a comparatively unknown factor incapable of rising to an All-India status, and Mr. Fazl-ul-Haq was much too preoccupied with local politics to think of All-India politics.

3. THE TWO-NATION THEORY

The theory that India is inhabited by two nations, Hindus and Muslims, may appear far-fetched but its far-reaching consequences should not be minimized, because the world of today is amazed how Nazi leaders built up within a very short time their power on a absurd theory of the superiority of the Aryan race, and how one of the most advanced nations of Europe meekly accepted the leadership of Hitler and have espoused ideas which educated persons thought ridiculous in 1923. Modern means of propaganda, unscrupulously applied, can produce extraordinary short term results such as Nazi Germany has amply shown. But there are dangers, grave dangers in making through propaganda unreal distinctions a reality and disrupting the whole life of a people. Nazi Germany is now faced with a catastrophic crisis and if the two-nation theory is allowed to develop in India, this country would be confronted very soon with a crisis of an equal gravity.

The basis of the Pakistan Scheme and indeed of all schemes for the partition of India is the notion that the Muslims are not a minority community in India but a nation, separate and distinct, and therefore they must have a national state of their own. Religion, it is said, is the only basis of nationality and there is nothing which is of a greater cohesive force, and it is the difference of religion which makes Hindus and Muslims two different nations. Hitherto the Muslims were deluded because they always used the words "community" and "minority", while they should have used the word "nation". "The reference to minorities", said Mr. Jinnah, (in the Congress proposals) "is a pure deception. For one thing, they (the Congress) presume to speak of the 90,000,000 Muslims as a mere numerical minority like other small groups in the country; whereas Muslims claim and rightly claim to be a nation".¹ For centuries Indian Muslims have given no signs of nationhood, but now, for a variety of reasons, have developed national consciousness, which seeks to forthwith assert its separate sovereign self. The Muslims have developed the psychological inability of nations to

coalesce which makes it necessary for them to lead a separate independent existence.

On the basis of deep historical, racial, linguistic, cultural, religious, social, economic, psychological and temperamental differences which divide them from other peoples, especially the caste-Hindus, the Muslims feel themselves to be a separate social and political entity with a destiny of their own. The Hindus and the Muslims have never formed one nation and 'never the twain shall meet'. There is in India no ethnic unity, or linguistic unity, or religious unity, or unity of historical experience. The sacred places of some people are situated outside India, therefore the concept of India as a national state cannot be based upon any common sentiment of 'Holy-land'.

"India is not one country, it is a sub-continent, its area exceeds 1,750,000 square miles, and its extremities are nearly 2000 miles apart. It is larger than Europe without Russia and contains one-fifth of the human race".² Today Europe shows great racial and linguistic diversity, but in India the diversity of race and language is far greater than it is, or at any time was, in Europe. Europe is twenty-five-nation States. Is India one nation? Like Europe India holds within its boundaries a number of distinct nation-states, the most important being Hindu and Muslim. The only thing which is common to the two communities is India, which by mistake is supposed to be one country and not a sub-continent containing many countries. On account of the fact that it is so vast and extensive, the mutual understanding which could develop among a people inhabiting a smaller country cannot develop here. Had the country been much smaller and less diversified all communities may have been united into one nation. The conception of India as one country is a fiction. The disunion of the Hindu Rajas of the past is notorious. Modern means of communications and consequent increased intercourse among various provinces have united the Hindus and Muslims not into one people but as separate nations. India never thought in terms of nationalism during pre-British days. The Arya-Varta did not extend beyond the boundaries of the Punjab, Bharat-Varsha never crossed the barriers of the Vindhies, and Magadha Desha was not India. During the Muslim period, it was divided into Ind, Sind and Dakhan. India is a sub-continent and is inhabited by a congeries of nations. What is common between the Punjab and

Bengal, Rajputana and Maharashtra, Dravid-Desha and Arya-Varta. Indian States and British India, Hindus and Muslims except the common administrative link of the British Government? The present day political unity of India and the conception of geographical unity is entirely the creation of the British, who hold it as one administrative unit by a system of bureaucratic Government whose ultimate sanction is the sword and not the will or the sanction of the people behind the government so established. If Nepal, Bhutan, Ceylon and Burma can be separated, there is no reason why the predominant Muslim areas in the North-West and North-East which are self-sufficient and geographically well-defined should not be separated.

In the East religion is considered not merely religion in the strict sense as understood in the West, but a complete social order which affects all the activities of life. In Islam and Hinduism, religion is the motive-spring of all actions in life. In countries where the allegiance of people is divided on the basis of religion, the idea of territorial nationalism has never succeeded, such as between Jews and Christians in Germany, Muslims and Christians in Spain, Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, etc. Islamic society and attitude to life is fundamentally different from those of Hindus. The conception of Indian Muslims as a nation may not be ethnically correct, but socially it is correct. The differences are not physical but cultural. It is the outcome of two sharply contrasted religious and social systems; and the ways of life and thought they have inspired. "Hinduism has its primeval roots in a land of rivers and forests. Islam in the desert. Hindus worship many gods, Muslims only one; the temple, with its luxuriance of sculptured effigies, confronts the mosque, declaring by its bare simplicity that idolatry is sin. Hinduism maintain a rigid caste system; Islam proclaims the equal brotherhood of all believers. The classic language of Hindus is Sanskrit, of Muslims Arabic and Persian; the distinctive daily speech of the one is the Hindi, of the other the Urdu variant of Hindustani. The contrast lends itself to a wealth of illustration; but perhaps its most striking feature is the fact that, though Hindus and Muslims live side by side all over India, often in the same village, and though happily in normal times they are good enough neighbours, yet the natural ties of kinship are completely lacking, since both the Quran and the Hindu laws of caste prohibit inter-marriage; nor may an orthodox Hindu share his table with a Muslim."³ The present

President of the Central Assembly, Sir Abdur Rahim, once complained that, whereas Indian Muslims felt quite at home in the Muslim countries of Asia, "in India we find ourselves in all social matters total aliens when we cross the street and enter that part of the town where our Hindu Fellow-townsmen live."⁴ This schism is daily growing and not decreasing. For example, in matters of language in recent years there has been a strong tendency to make Hindi more Sanskritized and Urdu more Persianized while some time ago the two were not widely different except in script. As regards script the recognition by the Congress of both the scripts is a recognition of the existence of two nations.

At the annual session of All-India Muslim League in 1940, Mr. Jinnah said : "Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is only a dream that Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality. This misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time." National feeling, says Dr. Ambedkar, is a double-edged feeling for one's own kith and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one's own kith, and since Muslims have this feeling they are a separate nation. The two communities can never forget or obliterate their past, because their past is imbedded in their religion, for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. Bhai Permanand wrote in *The Hindu National Movement*: "In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj, Pratap, Shivaji and Baragi Bir, who fought for the honour and freedom of this land (against the Muslims), while Muhammadans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad bin Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb as their national heroes." In the religious field the Hindus draw their inspiration from the Ramayana, Mahabharata and the Geeta. The Mussalmans, on the other hand, derive their inspiration from the Quran and Hadis. Thus, the things that divide are far more vital than the things which unite.

Had the Hindus and the Muslims not been two separate nations, after 200 years of rule by an outside power, they would not have stood further apart than they did when there was a Moghul Emperor on the throne of Delhi. The antagonism between the two nations is not merely the outcome of the British policy of 'divide and rule'

British economic and military pressure has not promoted unity, which would have been the case had Indians been one nation. "At no stage of Indian history have the Hindus and Muslims become economically and politically one or developed a homogeneous society. Today after a century of political evolution on modern lines the Muslim and the non-Muslim interests are brought into sharp antagonism in every walk of life. In the spheres of public service, commerce and industry the two communities are practising increasing discrimination against each other. There has grown a desire for an exceeding uneconomic "economic self-sufficiency." Hindus and Muslims cannot be called one nation because of certain similarities, which have not created in them a feeling of belonging to each other. The common features are not the result of a conscious attempt to adopt or adapt each other's ways and manners to bring about social fusion. Common features are the result of incomplete conventions and common environment, and a period of religious amalgamation between Hindus and Muslims inaugurated by Akbar. Finally, it is said that for several years the Hindu Mahasabha has been propagating "Hinduttva", "Ram Raj", and "Hindu-Pad-Padshahi"; and Savarkar claims that "a Hindu is a synonym for an India", while Dr. Moonje is of the view that "a nation must have only one religion, one language and one culture". As against this the Muslims have no alternative but to seek an escape from Hindu domination, political, cultural, religious and social, by raising the cry of a separate nation.

These, in short, are the main arguments put forward in support of the two-nation theory. There are equally strong, if not overwhelmingly strong, arguments against this theory. To take them in the same order as the arguments for it, it may be pointed out that the conception of Hindus and Muslims as two nations was never heard of in India before 1938 and till then the Muslims implicitly believed what Sir Syed Ahmad had always preached, namely : "Those who live in any particular country constitute a nation,....Hindu and Muslim are religious terms. Hindus and Muslims and Christians who live in this country constitute one nation...the time has passed when inhabitants of a country professing different religions were considered separate nations."⁵ In fact till October 1937, Mr. Jinnah himself talked of Muslims as a minority community and not as 'a nation'. At the Lucknow Session of the League he said : "The All-

India Muslim League certainly and definitely stands to safeguard the rights and interests of Mussalmans and other minorities effectively". And again : "In order to strengthen the solidarity of the Muslim community and to secure for the Muslims their proper and effective share in the Provincial Governments, it is essential that the Muslims should organize themselves as one party". This matter of terminology in English is largely academic because only one per cent of the Muslim population speaks English. The word in Urdu which was used by Sir Syed and has hitherto been current is (nation), without the implications of what the word "nation" is supposed to convey now by the League. There is no suitable equivalent in Urdu of the word "community". The word 'nation' has been used but this has reference to all followers of Islam in all countries of the world, and is opposed to the idea of territorial nationalism implied in the word "nation". The two nation theory is, therefore, only five years old and has arisen out of the peculiar mechanics of recent political conflict and turmoil and has no roots in the life of the people of this country and will disappear when the present political impasse is solved, and the only thing to do now is not to allow this theory to distort the vision of the masses of India and to increase bitterness among the Hindus and the Muslims.

It has been said that no matter what the arguments may be, it is a fact that the Muslims feel that they are a nation, different and distinct from non-Muslims inhabiting India, and this feeling is sufficient to entitle them to recognition as a separate entity. The fact is that the feeling in question is not the feeling of nationalism and the feeling which is noticeable is not shared by Muslims as a whole. In spite of intensive propaganda for the last five years and desperate attempts to inculcate hatred among the different communities, the feelings which have been awakened in a small section of the middle classes are no more than feelings of resentment and anger against a section of the Hindu middle classes who have till recently dominated public services, finance and industry etc. Nationalism cannot be founded on class differences and rivalries of the kind which exist among Hindus and Muslims. The psychology of the recent differences between the League and non-Muslim political organizations reveals that the differences are exaggerated by interested parties, are not irreconcilable and do not penetrate deep down into the life of the people. Mass propaganda has no doubt created a

certain enthusiasm among a section of the middle classes, but to found the theory of two nations on that is to confuse political realities with political tactics and to distort the life of a people and to give a wrong direction to their ultimate destiny.

The two-nation theory cannot be sustained on grounds of race, language and homeland, and has been admitted by most of the moderate advocates of the theory, and the only ostensibly valid argument is about religion and in matters of religion the differences are not so sharp and strong as they are generally made out to be. Even if they were, religion is not a decisive factor; Englishmen who became converts to Islam do not change their nationality. The great diversity of geographical, climate, religious, social, linguistic and racial features of India has been a favourite theme of British politicians, administrators and writers. The emphasis on diversity of life and division between the various communities and even within each community has been motivated by the desire to pursue the policy of 'divide and rule'. Not only is diversity grossly exaggerated but the essential unity of Indian life is slurred over, minimized and even safely forgotten. Indian society is a complex of races, languages, creeds and customs more variegated than that of Europe, yet India has imposed a certain community of living on all her children and there are factors making for unity which are stronger in India than in Europe.

✧ "Girt by the Himalayas and the sea the Indian sub-continent is a natural geographical unit. No real strategic frontiers cross it. It does not possess the broken coastline of those peninsulas and islands which have fostered the growth of separate nations in Europe. And there is a certain unity underlying all the diversities of Indian culture. The creeds and customs which age to age have been woven into that ancient civilization have acquired, so to speak, a local colour; some of them superficially others profoundly, they have all been "Indianized".⁶

Racial differences can be a strong factor against the evolution of a common nationality, such as the incomplete amalgamation of the Jews with the local population of the countries of their adoption, but fortunately racial differences distinguishing Hindus and Muslims do not exist in India. In the north-west, it is true, there are Muslims who have descended from the Arabs, Afghans and Turks who invaded India centuries ago, but during all these centuries the

comingling with the local population have eliminated all vestiges of a separate race, and elsewhere the vast majority of Muslims of India are converts from Hinduism and are of native Indian origin. Even a fanatic believer in the two-nation theory like "El Hamza", writing in *Pakistan : A Nation* has had to admit: "There is an important Hindu minority in Pakistan. The Pakistan Hindus are true children of the soil and are of the same race as their Muslim fellow countrymen", and added that, "Sikhs are typical Pakistanis". Again "A Punjabee", an equally strong champion of the two-nation theory, writing in *The Confederacy of India* has observed: "The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it". In any case Islam, as a universal religion, does not admit racial differences. Thus, speaking in terms of racial differences it is admitted by everyone that no claim to separate nationality can be made in India on this ground. Inasmuch as racial differences exist in India, racially Hindus and Muslims of one province have greater affinity than Muslims of two provinces. For example, Hindus and Muslims of the Punjab are physically more akin to each other than Muslims of the Punjab and Muslims of Bengal or Madras or even the Frontier Province.

As regards linguistic differences emphasis has been laid on Urdu being the current and Persian and Arabic being the classical languages of Muslims while Hindi is the current and Sanskrit is the classical language of the Hindus. It is true that lately political repercussions have made the use of Urdu in certain circles more Persianized and Hindi more Sanskritized, but this distinction is more theoretical than practical. It is a recognized and an established fact that 90 per cent of the Indian population is illiterate and with regard to this population it is irrelevant to talk of differences of current or classical languages. They speak the local dialect wherever they happen to be living, irrespective of the fact whether they are Hindus or Muslims. In rural areas Hindus and Muslims of the Punjab, speak Punjabi, of Madras speak Tamil or Telegu, of Bengal speak Bengali, of Bihar speak Behari, of N.-W.F.P. speak Pushto, of Kashmir speak Kashmiri, of Baluchistan speak Balochi, of Sindh speak Sindhi etc. Linguistically a Muslim Pathan is as alien to a Madrasi Muslim as he is to a Russian across the border of India. The linguistic problem concerns only the educated few living in

towns, otherwise linguistic division cuts right across all religious divisions. There have been great Muslim writers and poets in Hindi, just as there have been great Hindu writers and poets in Urdu. All the Hindus of India do not speak one language only, and all the Muslims do not speak a language different from the Hindus. Each province has its own language and almost all the people of that province speak that language irrespective of caste or creed. The popular identification of Urdu with Muslims and Hindi with Hindus is unwarranted because linguistically India is definitely provincial and local. This identification derives its inspiration from political motives and is not real. Leaving aside the rural masses, who form the great majority; the educated classes among Hindus and Muslims, who are most vocal about linguistic differences, do have a common language and that is English. Very often people from different provinces (*i.e.*, Madras, Punjab and Bengal), irrespective of the fact whether they are Hindus or Muslims, have no medium for the exchange of ideas except English, and it is a notable fact that while educated classes among Muslims show an aversion towards Hindi like the educated classes among Hindus who dislike Urdu, yet both have no objection to learn the English language, and its totally alien background, idiom, and syntax often at the cost of learning their own mother-tongue. This shows the extent to which material advantages and political considerations affect cultural matters. In any case, linguistic differences alone do not create nationalities and at the same time do not stand in the way of the creation of a common nationality. In Canada French and English is spoken, just as in Switzerland German, Italian and French is spoken, yet no one can deny that the Canadians and the Swiss constitute separate nationalities.

Next, religion is said to be the major distinguishing feature which makes Hindus and Muslims different nations. For this purpose the radically different principles of Islam and Hinduism are adduced to show the impossibility of reconciling the two to enable them to live side by side without being at war with each other. It is safely forgotten that Islam of the seventh century A.D. is not the Islam of today and the Islam as practised today in India is not the Islam of Arabia and still less the Islam described in books. A Chinese Muslim is not the same as an Indian Muslim. In religion they are one, but an Indian Muslim is every inch an Indian and a Chinese

Muslim a Chinese. It is the influences of Aryan culture that has made the Indian Muslim what he is. There are common features in the social and cultural life of Hindus and Muslims. Social life of Muslims is honeycombed with Hindu customs. For example, the Meos and Rajputs of the western districts of the United Provinces, though Muslims, retain Hindu names and keep their genealogies in the Brahmanic fashion. Common surnames are also found among Hindus and Muslims *i.e.*, Chaudhri, Mian, Malik, Sardar, etc. In matter of marriage certain Muslims follow Hindu customs and forms, and among some Muslims Hindu law of marriage, guardianship and inheritance is applied. In the religious sphere many Muslim Pirs had Hindu disciples and some Hindu Yogis had Muslim chelas. At Girot (Punjab) tombs of Jamali Sultan and Dyal Bhawan stand close to one another and are revered by Hindus and Muslims alike. Bawa Fathu, a Muslim saint, who lived about 1700 A.D., whose tomb is at Ranital (Kangra District) received the title of prophecy by the blessings of a Hindu saint Sodhi Guru Gulab Singh. Again, Baba Shahana, a Hindu saint, whose cult is observed in the Jhang District, is said to be the chela of a Muslim Pir who changed the original name, Mehra, of his Hindu follower into Mir Shah. Similarly, Mueen-ud-Din Chishti of Ajmer, Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din of Delhi, Ghazi Syed Salar Masood of Bahraich and Khusro's Sada Sohag cult have their Hindu worshippers and followers. In Islam God sends prophets and does not Himself take any shape or form, whereas the reverse is the case in Hinduism. But in India the mystic theory of the Sufis is quite in consonance with the vedantic theory of the Sanatanist Hindus, therefore, Muslim masses in religious practices resemble Hindus. If Hindus bow down before an image of a deity, Muslims bow down before the graves of saints and Pirs. Music and dance are prohibited by Islam, but in some Khanqahs you hear sweet music, and see elegant dancing. You will also see religious leaders dancing in ecstasy. Mysticism or vedantic theory has taken possession of the pulpits also, *i.e.*, mosque of Shah Mohammad Ghaus outside Delhi Gate, Lahore. Islam in India is an Arabic version of Sanatana Dharma, just as Sikhism and Arya Samaj are more or less Gurmukhi and Hindi editions of Islam. The impact of Indian Islam on the Hindu mind and the close sympathetic associations of the two peoples gave birth to that remarkable spiritual phenomenon, the *Bhakti* Movement represented by Chaitanya, Dadu,

Kabir, Nanak and others. Hindu-Muslim differences on the religious plane, therefore, are not as acute as they are made out by politicians. This is proved by the fact that religious organizations or organizations having a religious background are not opposed to the Hindus and the Congress. Aligarh students are pro-British and anti-Hindu, but Deoband scholars are anti-British and pro-Congress. Had the differences been religious the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Majlis-i-Ahrar would have been more vociferous than the League against the Congress and the Hindus.

✓ Mr. Jinnah asserts that Hindus and Muslims can never form one Indian nation because they neither intermarry nor dine together and have two different religious philosophies. Why, among the Hindus there are numerous different castes and they do not dine together and intermarry. Even among the depressed classed there are water-tight sub-divisions who do not inter-dine and intermarry. The Jains, the Buddhists, the Itinagayats, the Tamils and Telugus have different religious philosophies and worship different gods. The Shias and Sunnis have acute religious differences, resulting in sanguinary riot. Are all these to be classed and treated as different nations? Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the forefathers of a very appreciable number of Muslims were Hindus who got converted to Islam. In Bombay province, the forefathers of the present Khojas and Memons were Hindus (Lohanes and Bhatias), who embraced Islam 200 to 400 years ago. They have preserved to such an extent the customs and manners of their original community that till only three years ago, when legislation was passed to bring them fully under Muslim Law, the Khojas and Cutchi Memons were governed by the Hindus Law of property, inheritance and succession."

Minor differences among Hindus and Muslims have not made them different nations. Are the customs prevalent in Afghanistan, for example, the same as those in Turkey, Persia or Egypt, not to speak of other distant countries? Are their modes of living the same? Is not a Punjabi Muslim or Sindhi Muslim or Frontier Muslim infinitely more different from his co-religious of Turkey, Egypt or Persia or even Bengal or Madras than from a Punjabi, Sindhi or Frontier Hindu in dress, language and customs, mode of living except in the matter of his belief and mode of worship? On point of language, culture and race one province differs from another and

this is true of each one of the five northern provinces which are proposed to be included in Pakistan. If the French and British, who are culturally, linguistically, religiously and racially different from each other, can live together in Canada and find a solution in federation in spite of their having been 'two nations warring in the bosom of a single State',⁸ there is no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims cannot do the same in India. If the Boers and the British, who are culturally, linguistically, religiously and racially different from each other, can live together in South Africa, there is no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims cannot do the same in India. Again, if the Italians, Germans and the French, all recognized as belonging to different nations, can live together in Switzerland and form a new nation, there is no reason why Hindus and Muslims, even assuming their differences, cannot do the same. The true reason why Muslim countries could not retain their freedom for long is to be found in the policy of uniting religion and politics. As long as this idea was rooted in the minds of the Turks, they were puppets in the hands of European imperialism. It was only when the new Turkey under Ataturk divorced religion from politics that Turkey became a full-fledged State strong enough to defend herself against any aggression. Pan-Islamism is dead and other Muslim countries have followed the example of Turkey in fostering territorial nationalism. Similarly, in Russia there are two hundred languages and besides Muslims, Christians and Jews, there are other religions fundamentally different from one another. The concept of a nation and nationalism is wider than the ideas of race, religion, language, culture and territorial ties taken individually. It means the corporate life of a people, derived from its customs, laws, and institutions taken together, therefore, no one particular item such as religion can be singled out as connoting a claim to separate nationhood. According to this definition Hindus and Muslims are not two nations but are constituent parts (even though at times not altogether harmonious) of one nation.

The crux of the problem is that the Hindus are small-minded in the social field, and that has touched the Muslims to the quick. Hindus have treated Muslims as untouchables. Muslims treated the Hindus as a subject race, they became acutely conscious of the "touch-me-not" attitude of Hindus. You may be a pucca nationalist and four square Gandhite, yet you will be treated as an untouchable

as soon as you announce to a Hindu that you are a Muslim. Whatever reasons the Hindus may have, the Muslims cannot help being aggrieved by this attitude. The Muslims have felt that propaganda against untouchability is a political stunt, and does not indicate a change of heart and does not go beyond the top rank Congress leaders. The Muslim heartburning remains acute and engenders hate in the hearts of those who are humiliated by the Hindus. To this attitude of the Hindus is added the exclusiveness of the Hindus in the economic field. Muslims are shut out from business as well as social circles. As a counter move the Muslims cannot help developing the boycott spirit themselves. As a moneylender the Hindu treats his Muslim client harshly and as a countryman he considers him impure. The real problem is to have social unity as a result of economic equality which will bring national harmony and national unity. (Mr. Jinnah is not a religious man nor are Muslims inspired by religion. The present strife is social and economic which is called religious for political reasons. Where the Hindus are landlords and the Muslims exploited masses or *vice versa*, where the Prince is a Muslim and his exploited subjects are Hindus or *vice versa*, where the mill-owners are Hindus and mill-hands Muslims or *vice versa*, Hindu and Muslim communities often exploit the coincidence of economic or class divisions with communal divisions.) (In Muslim majority provinces the problem of Muslims is by no stretch of imagination a minority problem, it is an economic problem. Muslims feel they cannot withstand humiliating conditions and they would much rather live in the hell of Pakistan than serve in the heaven of Hindustan and its degrading social and economic treatment. The two-nation theory, therefore, is a myth—a camouflage to cover up humiliation in the social sphere and inequality in the economic sphere.

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4. THE CASE FOR PAKISTAN

It is difficult to state the case for Pakistan because Pakistan has never been defined in any specific terms. Mr. Jinnah, as the chief and the official spokesman of the All-India Muslim League, has refused to state concretely what he wants to be conceded to the Muslims of India. Several schemes for partitioning India have been put forward, some by the members of the All-India Muslim League and others by those opposed to the League. The oldest in point of time is the scheme of Choudhary Rahmat Ali for Pakistan. There are other schemes such as Dr. Latif's scheme of Muslim and Hindu culturally autonomous zones, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan's scheme of seven zones, the Pakistan Caliphate scheme of Maulana Abdul Wadood, Sir Firoz Khan Noon's scheme of five Dominions. "A Punjabi's" scheme of a Confederacy of India and the Aligarh scheme of Dr. Zafar-ul-Hasan and Dr. M.A.H. Qadri. The principal feature of the first and the last of these schemes is stated in the so-called Pakistan resolution adopted by the All-India Muslim League in 1940. It envisages that "the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States", in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". In other words, the Punjab, N.W.F.P. Baluchistan, Kashmir and Sind should constitute a federation of their own separate and distinct from the rest of India, and Eastern Bengal should likewise be an independent state. The former, generally known as Pakistan, may be with or without Ambala Division (of the Punjab), which is predominately Hindu, just as Eastern Bengal may or may not have added to it Sylhet District (of Assam), which is predominately Muslim. For purposes of stating the case for the against Pakistan, this definition would be taken as a working definition. In order to arrive at a convincing conclusion it is essential that the case both for and against Pakistan should be stated as comprehensively and honestly as possible.

The contention of the advocates of Pakistan is that India is not one country but several countries with immense diversities of every kind. The Simon Commission put the premises concisely in their study of the communal problem when they said: "Differences of race, a different system of law, and the absence of inter-marriage, constitute.....a basic opposition manifesting itself at every turn in social custom and economic competition. They (the Hindus and Muslims) may be said to represent two distinct and separate civilisation". Pakistan does not mean "vivisection of India", because India is already divided and partitioned by nature. "Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the physical map of India. Where is the country which is being divided? Where is the nation which is denationalised? India is composed of nationalities, to say nothing about the castes and sub-castes".¹ Pakistan possesses racial, religious, climatic and economic unity which makes it distinct from the rest of India. "The fact that the people of Pakistan eat wheat and the people of the South India eat rice is symbolic of the climatic, racial and cultural distinctions of the two regions....Probably the individuality of the north-west is indicated by no other single fact in so striking a manner as by the distribution of camels over India".²

What the Muslims are asking for is the creation of administrative areas which are culturally more homogeneous in order to give them freedom for the growth of their own distinctive culture. And Pakistan would not be a small unit. It would have an area roughly 75 times the size of Ulster, and equal to Spain, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, Albania, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Lithuania and Eire combined. It would contain as many people as Albania, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania and Switzerland together. (And none of these countries is considered too small to deserve an independent sovereignty).³ The Hindus say that Pakistan would break up the unity of India. 762 years of incessant Muslim invasions of Northern India have profoundly altered the culture and character of Northern India, which has now no unity with the rest of India, and in fact there is antipathy between the two. The invasions broke up the unity between the two, and it was severed from and attached to India several times according to the circumstances of the moment, therefore, there is no historic sentiment which can go against separation. The methods adopted by the invaders have left behind

bitterness between Hindus and Muslims which a century of political life has not succeeded in assuaging, not have the people forgotten it. Northern India is like Alsace-Lorraine, politically detachable and spiritually alien so far as the rest of India is concerned. There is no spiritual unity between Hindustan and Pakistan, and in fact there was more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma, which were separated.

True nationalism should mean the promotion and development of divergent traditions of different nations because some special quality in every group of men leads to the ultimate good of humanity. When a nation wins back its political independence, its contribution to the progress of humanity becomes substantial and effective in proportion to its own importance. Thus the Muslims in their heyday of glory in Spain made important contributions in medicine, science, art and literature, but when they were driven out of Spain, they lost their zeal and energy for the pursuit of learning. The same is true of Muslims of India under the Sultanates of Delhi and the Moghul Emperors. The present deplorable condition of Muslims is due to the loss of their political power and slowness to adapt themselves to changed circumstances. If the Muslims of India are again to make any contribution to the civilization of the East they must have the fullest possible scope for their individual and national development and this would be possible only if Pakistan is established, and they are not placed in a united India in a position of subservience to the Hindus. The world will be poorer if Hindus and Muslims are not permitted to promote and develop their respective cultures, creeds and laws on the lines of their own historic traditions and are forcibly united to develop a new culture or sense of unity which will be a mere imitation of the West and will lead finally to the extinction of all that is best in Muslim and Hindu systems of religion and polity.

This being so, Muslims should be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination with regard to those areas which are predominately Muslim and in which they wish to have their national home. There is no example in the world where a community as big as the entire population of Germany has ever been content with the status of a minority. There is further no example where a minority has such fundamental differences with the majority as Muslims have with the Hindus. National self-determination is the natural birth-right of all peoples of the world. The Hindu nationalists who

rely on this principle, and ask how Britain can refuse India what the conscience of the world has conceded to the smallest nation of Europe, cannot in the same breath ask the British to deny it to the Muslims. It is a well established principle that nationalism is itself a sufficient justification for the creation of a national state and other people have no right to pass a judgement on the propriety or usefulness of it. It may not be possible for Britain to prevent civil war after her withdrawal, but it is certainly not open to Britain, when retiring, to start a constitution on the basis of coercion of a large section of the population.

Muslims cannot and will not agree to a unitary or a federal Government for the whole of India. In any All-India Constitution Muslim majorities of five provinces out of eleven would be in the Centre a permanent minority. Whatever be the safeguards incorporated in the Constitution for the protection of the autonomy of the provinces, the encroachment of a powerful Centre, often imperceptible but none the less effective, cannot in the long run be resisted. The working of federal constitutions elsewhere, such as in the U.S.A. and Australia, where residuary powers were vested in the States rather than the Centre, have shown conclusively that the domination of the Centre cannot in the long run be prevented. During the quarter of a century before the Government of India Act 1935, Muslims thought in terms of constitutional safeguards, but experience of provincial autonomy has shown that constitutional guarantees will not be sufficient, and independent Muslim States are the only solution. The Hindu-Muslim problem in India, apart from being a religious and cultural problem, is a problem of political power, and Muslims fear that in a self-governing India, they will have to remain a permanent minority whereas in wide areas, before the British domination, they were the ruling class. For more than half the Indian Muslims, Pakistan eliminates the fear of Hindu Raj and all it might mean for them immediately and ultimately by cutting them clear out of its ambit. Moreover, it broadens their footing in the world. In an undivided India they belong to a country in which Hinduism predominates, but once separated, they would cultivate their natural association across the border and stand side by side with the Muslim states of the Middle East.

In a united India under the Congress inter-provincial migration will be a Central subject and Muslims of the North-West will not

be able to prevent Hindu immigrants from the U.P. and Rajputana from settling in their midst or acquiring lands in uninhabited parts. Once India is strong enough to pursue a policy of expansion and colonization abroad, all questions concerning foreign relations with Muslim countries or concerning emigration of Indians to the Muslim islands of East Indies or Muslim parts of Africa will bring into conflict the interests of Hindus and Muslims in the Central Government but the Muslims would be helpless. Again, United India may enter into an alliance with Russia and China to offer a united front on the minority question and use all their resources to suppress the Muslim demands in their respective countries for independence.

"We in India", says Pirpur Report, "have been brought up in the traditions of the British parliamentary democracy and the constitution foisted on us is also modelled, more, or less, on the British pattern. There is, however, an essential difference between the body-politic of this country and that of Britain. The majority and minority parties in Britain are interchangeable: their complexion and strength go on changing with the conditions of the country. Today a National Government is in power, but the Conservative, Liberal and Labour parties have an equal chance of running the government of the country. Here, in India, we have a permanent Hindu majority and the other communities are condemned to the position of a perpetual minority. Thus it is easy for the majority to assume a non-communal label and do things communal under the cloak of nationalism. The Indian National Congress conception of nationalism is based on the establishment of a national state of the majority community in which other nationalities and communities have only secondary rights. The Muslims think that no tyranny can be as great as the tyranny of the majority and they believe that only that state can be stable which gives equal rights and equal opportunities to all communities no matter how small. They attach great importance to this principle, which alone can safeguard the rights of the Muslims and other minorities. The Muslims have made it clear more than once that besides the question of religion, culture, language and personal laws, there is another question equally important for their future. They must secure definitely their political rights and their due share in the national life, government and administration of the country."⁴

Everywhere in the world, where the communities have failed to live together peacefully, separation was ultimately resorted to as the safest course. Ulster was separated from Ireland, and in the same way the British intended to divide Palestine to end the dispute between the Jews and the Arabs. History has shown many geographical tracts, much smaller than the sub-continent of India, which otherwise might be called one country, but which have been divided into as many States as there are nations inhabiting them. The Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as seven or eight sovereign States. The Dutch and the Belgians, the Swedes and the Norwegians have lived together respectively under united kingdoms in the past; their countries are separated by no real geographical frontiers and form a natural whole and the people are allied by religion, race and common outlook on life, yet they have chosen to have independent states. Likewise the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula. Hindus should learn a lesson from Europe. They should ask themselves that if the Greek, German, Czech, Slovak, Polish, Croat and Arab nationalism has blown up the Empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary and the Turkish Empire, and if Slovak nationalism has caused the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, what is there to prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the Indian State? Neither local autonomy nor the bond of religion is sufficient to withstand the force of nationalism. Pakistan is an anomalous excrescence on Hindustan and Hindustan is an anomalous excrescence on Pakistan. Tied together they will make India the sick man of Asia, just as Turkey became the sick man of Europe. Severed into two, each becomes a more homogeneous unit. Each has a cultural unity. Each has a religious unity. Pakistan has also a linguistic unity. Separated, each can become a strong and well-knit State. So long a Pakistan remains a part of India there can be no strong Central Government and as envisaged in the Government of India Act, 1935; the Central Government would be an effete ramshackle thing with very little life in it. Pakistan scheme would enable stable Governments to be established in both areas without any fear of violent resistance of communally organized groups. Divided India would be stronger than united India.

From 1930 onwards the Central Government was conceived in terms of a Federation of autonomous provinces, the advantages being that "(1) the Federation will give to the Muslims adequate

guarantees and effective power in the provinces where they are in a majority, (2) that the States under the sovereignty of the Princes will have their autonomy guaranteed and protected, (3) that ample scope will exist within the Federal framework for the provinces to be governed on a full democratic basis, which because of the size, population and complexity of India, it will not be wise to experiment within the same measure in the Central Government, and (4) a Federal system will enable a united India to be created by the association of the great States of India. Two dangers were not foreseen. It was then not realized that a Central Government for the whole of India, however constituted, would not be acceptable to the Muslims as it would reflect the will of a Hindu majority. Secondly, the consequences of a total war and total defence could not be foreseen.”⁵

The principle of residuary powers vesting in the provinces, for the express purpose of placating the Muslims, will weaken the Central Government and will lead to civil war and disruption, a repetition of the later days of the Holy Roman Empire, with all powers vested in the periphery and little but name in the Centre. The provinces will fall apart and the Centre will be unable to shoulder the responsibilities for all-India policies. The weakness of provincial autonomy on a federal basis in this direction at times of crises has been amply proved by the extreme ineffectiveness of the policy of the Indian Government in the recent handling of the problem of the food shortage in India. The inadequate powers of the Central Government greatly handicapped the pursuit of a strong and consistent policy in the matter resulting in unimaginable misery for the people at large. From the point of view of defence, international obligations; planned economic development, etc. a federation which will also be acceptable to the Muslims will be entirely inadequate. Objectively examined, it will be seen that Federation is a peace-time constitution. The experience of the present war has shown that both war and defence in the future are matters not for Governments but for nations as a whole. Without a Central Government capable of organizing the entire life of the nation, of mobilizing all its resources, of planning industrial development on the widest scale, no effective defence will be possible in the future. The whole theory of federations is against this conception.

A case has also been made for Partition from the standpoint of Hindu interests. The excision of the Muslim-Majority areas, it has been argued, would leave the rest of India more homogeneous. The Hindus might benefit from the loss of them as the Turks have benefited from the loss of their one time Arab Provinces. The minority problem would no longer obstruct the application of Congress ideology. The 'logic of democracy' could come into its own. Numbers could be given their due weight. A strong unitary Centre would at last become a practical proposition. Furthermore, Hindu India would be safer. Partition or no, the Moslem block in the North-West is a standing threat to Hindu India. 'Which then is better for the Hindus? Should these Musalmans be without and against or should they be within and against?' If within their disproportionate strength in the Indian army could not be easily or quickly adjusted. They are already afraid of such a change and will bitterly oppose it; and it would take time to build up new regiments in those Hindu areas in which the habit of professional soldiering has long died out. The frontier between Pakistan and Hindustan, it is true, would not be easy to defend; but is it better for the Hindus, asks Dr. Ambedkar, to have a safe frontier or a safe army?⁶

In matters religious, cultural and economic it is impossible to reconcile Hindus and Muslims. For example, Lala Hardayal advised Hindus: "If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert (them and) all the mountain tribes." At the Nagpur session in December 1938, the Hindu Mahasabha declared that "Hindi (not Hindustani—but Sanskritnishta Hindi) based on and drawing its nourishment from Sanskrit vocabulary is and rightly deserves to be the national language and Devanagri the national script of Hindustan." The activities of Hindi Sahaita Samelan are definitely aimed at forcing Hindi as lingua franca on the whole of India. The Hindu Mahasabha has repeatedly asked its followers economically to boycott Muslims and to patronize only Hindu business. In view of this attitude the only solution is segregation and separation. Hindus and Muslims are rivals for political power and the rivalry between them is bound to continue so long as one is not completely absorbed by the other. No power in the world can establish friendly relations between them and at the same time keep them as Hindus and Muslims. Their traditions have been built at each other's cost. The defeat of the one has been the

victory of the other and their past, at least for the last one thousand years, is dotted with incidents which do not signify the same thing to them both. The Muslims cannot divorce their religion from their politics. In Islam, religious and political beliefs are not separated from each other. They cannot be first Indians and then Muslims or *vice versa*. Their religion includes their politics and their politics is a part of their religion. The mosque constitutes a place of worship and also the Assembly hall. The mosque forms the centre of all aspects of their public life, religious, social, economic and political. Consequently they are not in a position to separate religion from politics, or to prefer one to the other. Hindu-Muslim unity or nationalism, signifying homogeneity between them in all not-religious matters, is unimaginable. The Islamic polity in which religion and politics are inseparably united, requires perfect isolation for its development. The idea of a common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam, and can never be fruitful. "Thus we see communalism is a natural heritage of the past and is not a new phase of political life. When the advocates of Hindu-Muslim unity say that the English are responsible for bringing into existence communalism, they only indulge in self-deception in order to retain their optimism about an impossible ideal of harmoniously fitting the communities into a single nation. Claiming the English for investing communalism as an instrument of division is denying the facts of history. The natural relationship between the Hindus and Muslims is communal, and not national."⁷ Pakistan would remove the canker of communalism from the body politic of both Hindustan and Pakistan. Both Hindus and Muslims want a peaceful home in which the conflicts between a ruling and a subject race can find no place to plague their lives. The only way of stopping communal aggression is to have Pakistan. Muslim demands have been increasing and there can be no end to their increase. The policy of appeasement, which the Congress has followed hitherto, and which means to offer to buy off the aggressor by concessions, can never solve the problem, the only way is to have a settlement which means laying down the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the aggressor. Settlement does. The policy of appeasement has increased the aggressiveness of the Muslims and would lead to the same situation which gave rise to Hitler.

Democracy can only be worked if there is unity of political parties upon its fundamental objects. In India representative and responsible Government cannot be worked because it presupposes a people fundamentally at one which is not so. Muslims believe that if a country is not under Muslim rule, in case of a conflict Muslims should obey Muslim law and defy the law of the land. They also believe that when the country is not under Muslim rule (Dar-ul-Islam) it is Dar-ul-Harb (abode of war). India, therefore, cannot be the land of Hindus and Muslims living as equals. Muslims must either perform Hijrat (as they attempted in the middle of the 19th century and again in 1920) or turn Dar-ul-Harb into Dar-ul-Islam by Jihad (as they attempted in 1857, or Afghanistan attempted in 1919). Finally, they believe that there is no such thing as territorial affinities, and affinities are really social and religious both of which are extra-territorial i.e., Pan-Islamism. Willingness to render obedience to the authority of the Government is as essential for the stability of Government as the unity of political parties on the fundamentals of the State. A Muslim treats Hindus as Kafirs, who are not worthy of respect, are low-born and without status, therefore, Muslims will not obey a Hindu Government. The basic feelings of deference and sympathy which predispose persons to obey the authority of Government do not exist. Further, Hindus are caste ridden and democracy cannot be worked in conjunction with them. Caste has proved to be the greatest fissiparous force known to politics, splitting politics into egocentric groups which find great difficulty in adjusting themselves to society. Caste contracts the sympathies of the people instead of expanding them and considerably circumscribes the social commerce between citizen and citizen.

Religious beliefs and social attitudes and views regarding ultimate destinies constitute the motive force which determines the lines of action, and in these Hindus and Muslims are irreconcilable, incompatible and incapable of forming one single nation or even two harmonious parts of one whole. These differences have the sure effect not only of keeping them as under but also of keeping them at war with each other. The differences are permanent and the Hindu Muslim problem is eternal. The record of riots, and failure of unity talks and unity conferences is painful and heart-rending reading. It is really a record of civil war between Hindus and Muslims. All attempts to bring them together have failed. The

concession of separate electorates in 1909 did not result in Hindu-Muslim unity. Lucknow Pact of 1916 did not bring unity. The attempt made in 1923 by the Congress and the Muslims to arrive at a settlement (Solan Pact and Bengal Pact) failed. Again in 1928 the Nehru Report was not acceptable to a large section of the Muslim Community. As regards social and religious questions such as cow slaughter, music before mosques, and conversion several attempts have been made to bring about unity without success. Attempts at Hindu-Muslim unity are based on the wrong assumption that a Central Government can mould diverse sets of peoples into one nation, and the satisfaction of Muslim demands will be a sure means of achieving communal unity. Even if political unity could be achieved, which is impossible, social unity cannot be achieved, and the antagonism will not end and real unity will never come.

Hindus and Muslims both suffer from social stagnation. If the Muslims in other countries have undertaken the task of the reform of their society and the Muslims of India have refused to do so, it is because the former are free from the communal and political clashes with rival communities while the latter are not. Hindus and Muslims regard each other as a menace, and to meet this menace both have suspended the cause of removing the social evils with which they are infested. The only way of bringing about progress among them is to remove this fear complex among them which can only be done by separation. Now they are constantly making "preparations" against each other, a sort of race in armaments between two hostile nations. If the Hindus have the Benares University, the Muslims must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start the Shuddhi movement, the Muslims must have the Tabligh movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must have Tanzim. If the Hindus have Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangh, the Muslims must have the Khaksar movement. Pakistan is the only means whereby the energies now directed towards civil war could be diverted towards internal reform of both the Hindus and the Muslims.

The economic interests of the Muslims of the North-West Muslim Bloc are different from the Hindus of the Southern and South-Eastern Hindu provinces. Muslims are wage-earners and Hindus are capitalists, interests of Muslims are mostly agricultural and interests of Hindus are industrial and commercial, Muslims are

debtors and Hindus are creditors, Muslims are consumers of foreign as well as Indian manufactures, and Hindus are either middlemen who sell foreign goods or the mill-owners who market their product in the North-West Muslim Bloc. Certain occupations such as shopkeeping and grain and cloth markets are almost entirely controlled by Hindus. In Bannu, for example, out of 2,000 odd shops in the city there are hardly a dozen Muslim shops. In a united India there is every danger that the Hindu industrialists and mill-owners of Bombay and elsewhere will exert their influence through the Central Government to enforce a policy of protection to shut out foreign goods from entering into competition with the products of their factories. This will leave the rural population at the mercy of Hindu India and deprive it of the right to exchange its raw materials direct with Europe on the basis of Free Trade. It will have to accept reduced prices for its land products as foreign markets will be closed to them and they will be forced to sell them at a loss in Indian Markets. Hence economic interests separate Hindus and Muslims. If India remains united Muslims will never gain economic parity with the Hindus because of so many handicaps and disabilities from which they are at present suffering at the hands of the Hindus. The Muslims cannot trust that the very community which is at present responsible for their economic enslavement will do justice to them, the moment it gains political power. There is bound to be conflict between the Agricultural North and the Industrial South. The capitalists and industrialists of Hindu provinces would want to reserve the raw materials produced by the Muslim Bloc of the North-West and secure markets for their finished goods. By controlling tariffs Hindus will effect the dependence of the present agricultural provinces on the industrial provinces and will prevent the industrialization of the North-West. The interests of agricultural and industrialized regions must clash in the formation of an All-India tariff policy, and in a country of small landholders the voice of big industrial magnates will prevail under a capitalistic democratic regime. By a protectionist policy industrial India (Hindu India) would benefit to the detriment of agricultural India (Pakistan). In U.S.A. when similar differences arose between the Industrial North and the Agricultural West and South, they ultimately led to the civil war of 1861-64, which resulted in a victory for the North. Again, in 1901, after the formation of the federation of Australia, the Commonwealth

used tariffs for the protection of Eastern Industries at the expense of agricultural Western Australia, which then wanted to secede just like the Agricultural States of U.S.A. These examples conclusively prove that the economic interests of the agricultural North-West are different from those of the rest of India, and the only way for Muslims to become prosperous is through complete economic emancipation. Pakistan must be treated as an independent political unit, responsible for its ports, communications and tariffs.

It is impossible for Muslims to gain an interest in trade and industrial concerns without separation. At present their interests are nominal because non-Muslim trade and industrial concerns are so well-organized and run on communal lines that Muslims cannot withstand competition against them even if they try to start any trade or industry. All the trading and industrial concerns are owned by non-Muslims, who prefer to borrow capital for industrial and trade purposes from Hindu insurance companies and banks, which means that there is no chance for Muslim concerns even if they are started. On the other hand, in the field of trade and industry where capital has often to be borrowed, the Muslims have little chance, the money-market being entirely in the hands of the Hindus, who will not advance loans to them for any of these purposes. Even if they did, it would not help because markets are in the hands of non-Muslims and Muslim manufacturing companies would not be able to sell their goods. Once a community secures a position of economic vantage over another it becomes highly difficult to drive it out of it. Had it been so easy the Germans would not have resorted to the drastic step of expelling the Jews from their country to escape from the economic stranglehold which they had secured over them. The economic condition of the Muslims in the Punjab can only be improved by Partition. At present they are like Turks prior to the inauguration of Modern Turkey when all internal and foreign trade and all the learned professions such as medicine, teaching and banking were monopolised by non-Turkish races. The Turk, like the Punjab Muslims, was either a peasant sunk deep in debt or was content to work as a soldier or a Government servant. A revolution was achieved by expelling Greeks and banning almost all professions to Jews and Armenians.

The argument that the Muslim States will require capital from Hindu India to be developed industrially and that Hindu capital will

not find an easy access to them is wrong. A modern country, which can maintain peace and order within its bounds and can guarantee payment of debt, can invite capital from foreign countries. The example of Turkey can be easily followed. If the State Government in Turkey can patronise and finance industries with the help of foreign capital, the Muslim States in India can adopt similar methods. The Muslims do not want that they should lose the major share of profits in business by leaving all initiative and control in industrial development to Hindu capitalists of Hindu India. They will rather prefer that the State should organise and promote industries and find work for the large number of workless people in cities and villages. Writing to Mr. Jinnah on the economic issue Dr. Iqbal said, "The question therefore is : how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve this question.....After a long and careful study of Islamic law I have come to the conclusion that if this system of law is properly understood and applied, at least the right to subsistence is secured to everybody. But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim State or States. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India."⁸

As regards the economic future of Pakistan it is argued that "though it (Pakistan) is poor in coal yet it has a number of snowfed rivers which descend from the mountains to the plains and form innumerable waterfalls which can be utilized in providing cheap Hydro-electric power. Mandi Hydro-electric works, alone capable of generating more than 120,000 kilo-watts of electric energy, are sufficient for the whole of the Punjab. With the development of such cheap electric power we shall be able to utilize the forest wealth and mineral resources of Pakistan which consist of iron, zinc, lead (Kulu hills), beauxite, Fuller's earth, Kaolin, copper, talc, precious stones (Kashmir), chronite, limestone, tin, etc., (Baluchistan). Only recently oil has been discovered in Sind and Baluchistan and it is estimates that the new oil resources, if properly exploited, will be sufficient to meet the demand of the whole of present India, i.e., India proper and Pakistan. Baluchistan is also a well-known fruit-growing centre and its Mekran coast is also famous

for fish, both in respect of quality and quantity. So far as the economic condition of Sind is concerned the Lloyd Barrage can stand its surety. It is estimated that within ten years of the commencement of the Barrage, Karachi will be able to export 1,133,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 bales of cotton, 4,477,000 tons of rice, 295,000 tons of Jowar-Bajra etc. 15,000 tons of pulses and 117,000 tons of oil seeds. These arresting figures speak volumes for the economic position of Sind. Pakistan, taken collectively, is in a position to develop to its great advantage herbiculture, floriculture and sericulture in the hilly districts. There is also a great scope for the development of new industries based on agriculture, such as the manufacture of strawboard from wheat stalks; paper from rice-stalks; alcohol from potatoes; cellular and artificial silk from maize-stalks and sugarcane refuse. It may be that an immense quantity of cotton stalks, unwanted in almost every district, may be treated so that they furnish the material for the popular dresses of Punjab women. If Japan with a total area of about 146,000 square miles, with 1/6th of land cultivable and having practically no mineral wealth can rise to the position of a great industrial power, surely Pakistan with about 450,000 square miles of area and with vast economic resources can stand on its own feet and compete favourably in the world market.”⁹

The vast majority of the population of India must always get its living from the soil, and it is easy to exaggerate the extent to which the relentless pressure of that population's growth on the productive capacity of that soil can be tempered by industrial development. The balance of Indian economy, therefore, they maintain, should favour agrarian interests. Already before the war the peasant had to pay the price for the tariff needed to protect the growth of large scale industry, and the maintenance of the industrial expansion prompted by the war will require similar protection in future. When British control at the Centre is withdrawn, is not the balance likely to be still further weighted on the industrial side? That ought not to be, of course, a communal issue. The vast majority of the Hindus as well as of the Moslems are agriculturists and in their common interest, as in that of the growing ranks of labour, lies the best hope that the lines of communal division in Indian politics may be some day cut across. But those common interests are not yet consolidated and organized, and in the meantime

agriculture versus industry must be largely a communal issue, because Indian industry is at present mainly Hindu. The North-West Muslim 'homeland' is overwhelmingly agrarian. Its population amounts to about 12.3 per cent of the population of British India, but, so far as can be estimated, the proportion of its industries is only 5.1 per cent. of those of British India and that of its mineral development only 5.4 per cent. Bengal as a whole is much more highly industrialised. It has 20 per cent of the population of British India and, to reckon by the number of workers employed in factories, 33 per cent of its industry. But the industrial area is mainly that of predominantly Hindu Calcutta and its neighbourhood; apart from Calcutta the North-East Muslim 'homeland' is even more dominantly agricultural than the North-West. Indian industry, in fact, is located mainly in Hindu areas; it is financed and owned mainly by Hindu capitalists; it provides a livelihood mainly for Hindu labour. Thus, though the protected growth of Indian industry compels the Hindu peasant as much as the Muslim to pay more for his spade and his clothes and his household goods, the general balance is heavily against the Muslims. In an undivided India it might be redressed to some extent by a Centre which deliberately planned a more even distribution of industrial development. But is there any hope of that, the Muslims ask, under a Hindu Raj? Will not their interests be increasingly and permanently subjected to Hindu capitalism? And is there any way of escaping from that stranglehold except by way of Partition? Pakistan at least could control its own economy. In the North-West, at any rate, it could establish and protect its own industries. Instead of sending its raw cotton to the mills of Bombay, it could build more mills of its own and protect their products with a tariff. And later on, if capital were available, it could apply its great reserves of water-power to further industrial development. Karachi, too, might be developed till it eclipsed Bombay as the port of entry for all north-west India. Impartial economists may deplore such a prospect. They may argue that the economic results of the political disruption of India are bound to be as bad for all concerned as the results of the disruption of the Hapsburg Empire proved to be in the interval between the wars. But what is the alternative? Muslims will reply. It would not be a balanced system of economic co-operation and reciprocity settled on equal terms. It would be more like Hitler's 'new order', which seeks to concentrate the

control and the profits of all industry in Central and Western Europe in German hands.

Whatever may be the economic difficulties of Pakistan it must not be forgotten that no State or nation was ever formed on economic bases, and no State on earth is economically completely self-sufficient. If they were, there would be no need or occasion for international co-operation. Nations grow and States are formed on other considerations, when they have been thus formed, they look around for means to satisfy their wants and will create an administrative machinery corresponding to their means and their requirements. Similarly, the minority problem may also exist in Pakistan in one form or another, but it is forgotten that the idea of Pakistan has not been conceived solely as a solution of the permanently recurring minority problem. The inspiration and the motivating force behind Pakistan is the consciousness and the irrepressible desire that the Muslim nation shall see its genius and its soul reflected in the glory of Government, all those institutions of social happiness which are a part and parcel of the machinery of a durable and lasting Government. The desire of the Indian Muslims to have a Muslim State of their own is a part of a movement for the unification of the Muslim World (Silsila-i-Jamia-Vahdat Umam Islam) started in Turkey during the lifetime of the late Ataturk under the patronage of the late Syed Jalil Ahmad Sinyusi. One of its aims is to create more Muslim republics in all those parts of the world which are predominantly Muslim, in addition to the Muslim States already functioning. Among the ten newly proposed republics one is to consist of Muslim Bengal, another is to be constituted by the Muslim North-West India and the third by the Hyderabad State.

In addition to the religious, racial, linguistic, and economic differences on account of which Burma was separated from India, other grounds also apply to Pakistan. They were that sufficient consideration was not given to the special circumstances and needs of the Province of Burma by the Indian Legislature and the Government of India, that the representation of Burma was too weak to exercise any influence in the Legislative Assembly and that Burma could never have any effective voice in shaping the policy in the Indian Legislature; that Burma's interests sometimes diverged considerably from those of India and protection of the Indian Industry was often to the disadvantage of Burma; that caste is one

vital structure of Hinduism and it is the negation of everything that constitutes a nation and the difficulties which caste system presents in India do not exist in Burma; that the Burmans in fact approximate far more closely to the ordinary conception of a nation than the Indians and the constitutional problem separated from India would at once reduce itself to manageable proportions and become far smaller, that so long as Burma was tied to the apron strings of India, her material and administrative development was impossible; that public opinion in Burma favoured separation and even those who believed that by maintaining the connection between India and Burma, Burma would get self-government more quickly than if it stood alone, desired merely to postpone the question of separation. All these arguments and many more apply to Pakistan and as Hindus did not oppose the separation of Burma, there is no reason why they should oppose the creation of Pakistan.

Pakistan has natural frontiers. High mountain ranges lie to the North and the West and have always sheltered Indian plains from the invaders from Central Asia and the cold winds of the North. The Thar desert in the South forms a formidable barrier between the Indus plain and the Deccan plateau, Pakistan will not weaken the defences of Hindustan because as a matter of history there has been no scientific boundary for India. There are three possible boundary lines to choose from : the Indus river, the present administrative boundary of the N.-W.F., and the Durand line. Lord Lawrence was an advocate of the policy of "Back to the Indus", and in fact the present frontier was fixed not for any strategic reasons, but to give protection to the people who were brought under British rule. Pakistan will bring the boundary to the Sutlej or to Jumna as the case may be, but geographical conditions are not decisive in the world today and modern technique has robbed natural frontiers such as mountain barriers and rivers of much of their former importance. Countries are not wanting which have no natural boundaries and create impregnable artificial fortifications as barriers. In modern warfare the foundations of a country's defence are truly laid in the hearts of its people. If, for instance, a federal government were established and a foreign people tried to invade India through the North-West, hundred to one the North-West would rise in revolt against the federal Centre and throw in its lot with the invaders. In fact partition will ease the problem of Defence for all

India. Since the Japanese assault from the South and East, the North-West frontier can no longer be regarded as the only dangerous frontier. Besides, 'the north-west frontier', writes a Muslim publicist, 'will lose all importance once a Muslim State is established in the North-West. The tribesmen and the people beyond the frontiers are all Muslims. They will lose all religious and political fervour for Jihad against non-Muslims, once they find that they have to reckon with their brothers in Islam. If the frontier between Afghanistan and Persia or that between Persia and Turkey can be easily defended by comparatively small armies, there is no reason why the same should not be possible in the case of the frontier between Afghanistan and the Muslim North-West State'.¹⁰ The position could be stabilised, moreover, by non-aggression treaties or full scale alliance between Pakistan and her Muslim neighbours. Why should she not make a fifth subscriber to the Pact of Saadabad which bound together Turkey, Iraq, Persia and Afghanistan for mutual security in 1937? Is not that the natural focus of the international relations of Moslem India? Since it is only her unnatural marriage with Hindu India, that has hitherto compelled her to turn her back on it, should she not seek a divorce? It is said that the Muslim States will be helpless against Hindu India which will isolate them from each other, but it is forgotten that mere numbers do not count in the defence of a Modern State.¹¹ So far as military traditions go, Muslim areas, particularly the provinces of the North-West, are far stronger than Hindu India. Again the resources of the new Muslim State in men and money will be far stronger than those of Afghanistan or independent tribes beyond the Frontier Province and hence it will experience no great difficulty in keeping peace and order on its side of the frontier.

It is true that in Sind and in the N.W.F.P. the Hindu minority is 26.8 and 9.3% respectively and in the Punjab as high as 44%. In both the former provinces there is no district in which the Hindus predominate, but they are evenly spread all over the province. The position is further complicated by the fact that in Sind out of 28 towns the Hindus are in an overwhelming majority in 20 towns. In N.W.F.P. out of 26 towns the Hindus predominate in 11 towns. Communal peace in these two provinces, therefore, cannot be established by merely altering their boundaries, and the only remedy is to shift the population. This is not difficult because Turkey,

Greece, and Bulgaria carried out an exchange of populations involving millions of people. Exchange of populations in India appals some people but desperate ills require desperate remedies. To save lives, serious surgical operations are necessary.

The argument that the non-Muslim minorities will be a source of constant danger to the stability of Muslim States will lose all importance in face of the preponderance of Muslim voice in the Government. In the North-West and the North-East, with adjustments in frontiers, the proportion of the Muslim population will be raised to 80% and the minorities will be reduced to 20%. These minorities will be given full protection in regard to their religion, language and culture like the Muslim minorities in Hindu India, and will no longer cause unnecessary annoyance to Muslim Governments for fear of provoking Muslim minorities in Hindu India to similar action. The Muslims outside Pakistan need not be apprehensive and in fact they say : "We are not weakened by the separation of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected by the existence of separate Islamic States on the Eastern and Western border of Hindustan than we are by their submission in Hindustan. Who can say that they are wrong? Has it not been shown that Germany as an outside State was better able to protect the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia than the Sudetens were able to do themselves? Apart from the possibilities inherent in the 'hostage' principle, the existence of a strong and independent State not far away, wherein Islam is securely and permanently enthroned, would give them the requisite moral support to enable them to hold their own against the rising tide of Hinduism. Since Islam transcends frontiers, Pakistan would, so to speak, belong to them as much as to its own inhabitants." In an undivided India, where military organization is mainly in Hindu hands, the proportion of Muslims in the Indian Army is bound to be reduced. There would be nothing to prevent the realisation of the principle, so vigorously upheld by the Mahasabha, that the composition of the Army should reflect the communal composition of the people. In that event the proportion of Muslim soldiers, which in 1939 was more than one third would fall to less than one quarter only affect the standard of living in the Punjab, which, as has often been pointed out, owes so much to the pay and pensions of Punjabi troops. It would give a Hindu Raj the ultimate guarantee of military power. It would strengthen the

consciousness of inferiority in Moslem minds. It would make them less able to resist the moral pressure of Hindustan.¹²

Whatever the reasons, there is a strong sentiment among Muslims for Pakistan and this has to be faced. "If we cannot", writes C. Rajagopalacharia, "persuade one another to agree to a united Central Government of some kind, it is surely better for the growth of freedom and democracy in this vast country that those who insist on a separate existence should be allowed to try it out. Why, even if the six provinces of Madras, Bombay, Bihar, the U.P., the C.P. and Orissa decide to start together, it will not be an insignificant union and the law of political gravity must inevitably bring the others into its fold provided the union has patience and goodwill." On similar lines pleads "El-Hamza" : "The Union of South Africa became possible since the people of the various South African States were allowed to try self-determination. After some time the pressure of common interests was sufficient to bring them together, and there were few rancorous memories to hinder the union. The South Africans learnt in their independent States to use and value their freedom and with that they also learnt to respect others' freedom and co-operate among themselves as equals. Had South Africans wishes been disregarded and South Africa started as a political unit with a closely centralized Government, hatred would have hardened and the struggle would have continued till the different States ultimately separated probably never again to unite."¹³

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. "India : Problem of her Future Constitution,"—Edited by H.M. Saiyid—1940: page 19.
2. "El Hamza"—"Pakistan : A Nation"—1941: pages 56, 70.
3. Today they are. The arguments from Europe are pretty weak these days!
4. Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces, 1938.
5. *The Future of South-East Asia*, K.M. Panikhar—1943, page 84.
6. *Thoughts on Pakistan*, B.R. Ambedkar, 1941, p. 98.
7. *Confederacy of India*, "A Punjabee"—1939, page 54.
8. Letter dated 28th May 1937. *Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah*—1943.
9. *The New Times*—Lahore, 27th November, 1938.
10. *India's Problem of her Future Constitution*, Edited by H.M. Saiyid, 1940, page 40.
11. World War II has shown that numbers are not an inconsiderable factor.
12. *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1943, page 77.
13. "El-Hamza" : *Pakistan : A Nation*, 1941, page 130.

5. THE CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

The case against Pakistan can be argued from various points of view, Hindu, Sikh and Muslim. It is the last which is most important and which has hitherto received the least attention. From the purely Muslim viewpoint it has not been realized that the partition of India would be damaging to the whole of India and all its inhabitants, but more damaging to Muslims themselves than to anyone else. It is extra ordinary how propaganda war waged with modern weapons can, for a short period at any rate, make people believe in the incredible against their own interests and better judgement. Pakistan is a political slogan of great potency in the rape of the Muslims masses, and this makes it all the more imperative that its meaning, its significance and its implications are fully understood in order to lessen, as much as possible, its devastating effects.

It is wrong to say that India is not one country. Physically, naturally and geographically, India is one country. It is marked out and separated from other countries by unmistakable and almost unsurpassable natural boundaries on all sides. It is a peninsula and on three sides of it there is the sea, on the North are the mighty Himalayas—on the North-West and the North-East there is a natural fortification provided by hills which ought to prove to a great extent unsurmountable. It is true that within the country itself there is a variety of soil, climate and natural scenery. These are found to a larger or smaller extent in every country. These were at one time, undoubtedly, kingdoms within the country more or less independent of each other. But the country of every great king was to extend his suzerainty over the whole of India. This has been the case since the mythical days of Ram Chandra, all through the periods of Chandra Gupta, Ashoka, the Gupta Emperors, the Pathan Kings, the Moghul Emperors, right down to the present day of the British Empire. No one has treated any part of the geographical India as constituting a separate country. Occasionally and for short periods, the boundary line on the North-West has varied according to the

strength of the rules; but at no time has it been accepted by anyone—Hindu, Muslim or the British that any part within the physical boundaries set by nature was a different country. The common interests of the people—economic, political and defence—demand that India should remain undivided and united. A united free India has been an inspiring ideal before the people for generations. The proposition that the natural boundary of India is up to the River Jumna or Sutlej is wrong and erroneous. Without the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. the geography of India is incomplete and inconceivable. During the palmy days of the Aryan civilization, Kandhar and Afghanistan were included in India, and when Alexander the Great invaded, the Punjab was a part of India. The Pathans and the Moghuls also included the Frontier Province within their Empires. If any portions were conquered by the Afghans and other tribes, the Mughal Emperors did not rest content until these were reannexed to their kingdom.

The political and economic unity of India is natural because it is the natural response to its geography. The familiar contrast with Europe is as instructive on this point as it is on several others. For, whereas the physical configuration of Europe—its long indented coastline, its peninsulas and inland seas and islands, its mountain ranges—has fostered the growth of separate nations and their seclusion from one another in separate States, geography seems to have marked out India, though not much smaller than Europe, to become in due course a single political and economic unit. On two sides it has set the sea and on the third the greatest mountain-barrier in the world; and, while it has thus cut the peoples of India off from other peoples, it has not cut them off from one another. The only large island, apart from Ceylon is Cutch, the only large peninsula is Kathiawar. Elsewhere the long seaboard is singularly unbroken. And across the land there is only one substantial natural frontier, the Vindhya mountains and their offshoots, which, though nowhere of any great height, interpose between the northern plains and the Deccan a stretch of rugged, rocky, inhospitable ground. In old days this was a sufficient obstacle to make it difficult for the masters of the North to extend their conquests southwards, but the Moguls crossed it, and the Marathas also from the other side and for the British it soon ceased to be an obstacle at all. Mere distance in fact, not any natural frontier, was the chief impediment to the

expansion of the British Raj all over India, and, long before the coming of the aeroplane, distance had been conquered by the railway, the telegraph, the telephone and the all-weather road. No soldier or administrator now-a-days would say that the physical character of India makes it hard to hold or govern it.

The comparative ease and speed with which India was unified by the strength and science of a Western Power has obscured to some extent the magnitude of the change it brought about in India's life. When British rule was expanding over India, Madras had no more in common with the Punjab, Bengal no more with Bombay, than Germany had with Spain, or Italy with Poland, when Napoleon dominated Europe. As late as 1877 John Bright contemplated the 'nations of India drawing together under British rule into a group of States which would be able to stand by themselves when British rule was finally withdrawn'. But in the course of another generation so profound was the effect of the British Raj that those who were acutely conscious of the diversity of India ceased to think of it as comparable with Europe. In addition to the unifying forces of British rule the unification of India took place as a result of the break-up of the old feudal system in the same way as in most European countries smaller units gave way to large organized states. By the end of the nineteenth century India has come to mean more than the name of a sub-continent. The differences of race and language were still there. The communal divisions still cut deep—how deep we know today. Yet educated Indians, whatever their race or creed, had acquired a consciousness, such as they had never had before, that they were all of the Indians. One supreme government, the adoption of English as the *lingua franca* of the intelligentsia, the ease with which it was now possible to visit or correspond with any part of India, the growth of higher education and of common interest and collaboration in scientific and literary research, the spread of commerce and industry over a vast free-trade area, the linking of production in one part of the country with markets in another, the relief of famine by Inter-Provincial co-operation—all these major factors were welding India together, aided by the forging of innumerable minor social and economic links and the making of innumerable personal contacts and relationships. No one can travel through India today without becoming aware of the extent to which it has acquired common life, a common society,

in which its educated elements are freely commingled. He may share his carriage in the train with a Bombay merchant who had been visiting a branch of his business at Lahore, a lawyer from Bengal with a brief at Nagpur, a Madras scientist attending an academic conference at Calcutta, a Punjabi officer going to join his regiment at Bangalore. Such countless common social, economic and intellectual activities were enough in themselves to create a sense of community; and, when with the beginning of self government Indians began to share in common political activities also, that sense of community was inevitably coloured by the idea or the ideal of nationhood. Thus the unifying process was accelerated by the growth of nationalism; and though nationalism itself, because its objective was the government of India by Indians, was bound sooner or later to precipitate a conflict between the forces in Indian life that made for unity and those that made for disruption, the unifying forces, at any rate up to 1937, had kept the upper hand. In 1937 it was still taken for granted that the free national status now coming into view could only be attained by one united nation. So far had the India of Brights' day been transformed. If Indian society was not yet national, it had ceased to be merely continental. If India was not and never could be comparable with relatively homogeneous European countries like Germany or France, she was no longer comparable with Europe.

There is also the unity among Hindus and Muslims of India inspired by their present common enemy—British Imperialism. This fact has given rise to innumerable common interests among them, and these common interests and the need for a united front are the basis on which the concept of India as a nation must be based. Pakistan will diminish to a dangerous degree the strength of India to give a united fight to foreign powers present or potential. As separate nations they cannot survive as a free people.

Apart from religion the basic idea of Pakistan is preservation of Muslim culture. If culture means the improvement achieved by training of intellectual development an average Indian at present cannot have any claim to culture. 90% of the Indian people are living from hand to mouth and are illiterate. Cultural and spiritual progress is impossible without leisure and material prosperity. What does Muslim culture mean to a Muslim peasant or a labourer? Is not his pressing need two square meals a day, clothing and housing?

One of the most important items of cultural differences is the script question. It is hotly debated whether the Persian or the Devanagiri script should be used; a question relevant obviously only to the minority of Indians (less than 10% and among Muslims only 8%) who are literate. For the mass of the people of India, the problem is not one of which script they shall use, but of building a society in which they and their class may read at all. India must first prosper materially and only then can it mediate upon holy things. The Hindus and the Muslims should first become an able nation by gaining physical and mental vigour through independence. Some people, however, argue that culture is generally an affair of the upper classes. Even accepting this the cultural protection of Muslims cannot be secured by partition of India, or in other words, segregation of Muslims from other communities, it can only be secured by rehabilitation of Muslims through improving their economic condition vis-a-vis other communities. Constitutional safeguards and legislative measures may afford some protection but the real protection must come from the inherent strength of Muslims developed through better education and greater facilities for participating in the economic development of India. Parsis are an insignificant minority in India yet they do not need and have never demanded any protection for their cultural development. Muslims must, therefore, face rival communities and prove their worth rather than confess their weakness and look for an asylum behind the closed doors of Pakistan.

It has been repeated *ad nauseam* since 1937 that the All-India Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative political organization of the Musalmans of India who number 100 million strong. This has made some people identify the Pakistan demand of the All-India Muslim League with the Muslims of India, but the fact is that it is difficult to say that the League represents the majority of the Muslims of India and the demand for Pakistan is (apart from the fact that it should not be) the demand of the majority of the Muslims of India. There has no doubt been a phenomenal development in the strength and popularity of the League, and the League can now be said to be the largest single party of the Muslims, but older Muslim organizations have persisted and new ones have grown which do not agree with the demand for Pakistan and there is nothing to show that they do not represent the majority of Muslims opinion. The assumption underlying the League attitude

seems to be that all who belong to a religious group whether by the accident of birth or by the fact of choice, must because of their common religious faith also hold the same political opinions about the form of government or structure of society they wish to have. This assumption is without any basis. Almost all the peoples of Europe are Christian by faith, but political and economic conflicts there are perhaps more virulent than in any other continent. Arabs are Muslims like the Turks, but they did not hesitate to co-operate with Britishers who are Christians to throw off the Turkish yoke. Religious conformity is one thing, identity of economic and political interests is another. The League has never had the courage to publish its membership figures, has always been opposed to the proposal of a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal adult suffrage with separate electorates, because it has never been confident of winning a majority of Muslim votes. The present hesitation of the League to accept a plebiscite of the whole population in predominately Muslim areas shows its weakness, and lack of faith in the acceptance of its demand by the vast majority of Muslims.

It is a notable fact that the league is the weakest where the Muslims are in a majority and where Pakistan is to be founded. The Watan Party of Baluchistan has a majority of the people behind it as against the landlords who support the League. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference led by Mohammad Abdullah has undoubtedly the support of the overwhelming majority of the population and is opposed to the League. In N.W.F.P., in spite of the fact that Hindus are only 6-1/2% of the total population, Khudai Khidmatgars, owing allegiance to the Congress, are the most powerful party. The present League Ministry, set up and assisted by Government, has been made possible because a majority of the Khudai Khidmatgar members of the Assembly have been detained under the Defence of India Rules. In Sind until recently, when the Governor unconstitutionally dismissed the Premier, the League had no chance of success against the Muslim Nationalist Party of Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh. In the Punjab the Unionist Party, which is a non-communal party and is organised on an economic basis, has been supreme since 1937. Almost all the Muslim members of the Assembly were, until recently, members of the Unionist Party, and were only nominally members of the League under the Sikander-

Jinnah Pact. The recent attempt of Mr. Jinnah to disrupt the Unionist Party and to form a Muslim League Coalition Ministry has failed and resulted in placing the Muslim League in opposition with not more than twenty members out of a total of 89 Muslim members of the Assembly. It is an admitted fact that in the Punjab the League has never been a success, so much so that it has not even been able to curb the anti League Ahrar Party. In Bengal, until recently when the Governor unconstitutionally forced the Premier to resign, the League was in a hopeless minority against the Proja Party, a non-communal party with an economic programme. The present League Ministry is almost entirely dependent on the Governor and the European Bloc.

Among All-India organizations the League has several rivals. The congress still carries the allegiance of a considerable number of politically conscious Muslims and before 1942, was also beginning to have an increasing influence among the peasants. Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind has little sympathy with the present programme of the League. The Shia Political Conference covers Shias almost all over India, estimated to be no less than 20% of the Muslim community. The Momin Ansar Conference claims to represent the 'Depressed Classes' of Muslim India, spinners and weavers and artisans. The Azad Muslim Conference, founded in 1940, was a congregation of all Muslim organizations in India, except the League and the Khaksars, and since then even Khaksars have decided to oppose the policy of the Muslim League. Finally, the recently founded All-India Muslim Majlis is an increasingly popular organization.

The Pakistan demand is not the demand of the Muslim masses nor is it in their interest, and the power of the League is only directed towards the advancement of the interests of the Muslim aristocracy—the landlords and the middle classes, whom it represents and who look for their class aggrandizement and want a larger share than they have had hitherto in the administration of the country and the capitalistic ventures of the future. The Muslim capitalist is unable to flourish in competition with the more powerful Hindu capitalist, and in the name of religion wants to capture governmental machinery to further his own interests and to keep the masses in their present state of poverty and subjection. Middle class Muslims feel that their chances of success, on account of their having entered the capitalist game much later than the Hindus, are at

present pitifully meagre and perhaps, as individuals, none too bright even in a free capitalist India, but they could be immensely increased if they would stand together as a united middle class and fight for power in the name of religion. If Pakistan were achieved, they would have an opportunity of investing their money, of dominating commerce, the professions and government service, and of raising tariffs to foster their own industries. That is why the League is most vocal and strongest in the provinces where Muslims are a minority but economically fairly strong. Where the Muslims are in a majority and constitute the masses the League is not so strong because Muslims of those provinces are as a whole preoccupied with economic questions and the religious cry of the League does not appeal to them overmuch though they cannot help being impressed by its emotional appeal. In the Muslim majority provinces the majority of the Muslims belong to the rank of have-nots. Their only hope lies in a reconstruction of society which would secure to them a more human standard of life. This accounts for the strength in Bengal of the Proja Party which entered the legislature with a programme of the abolition of the permanent settlement and landlordism. This accounts for the strength in the Punjab of the Unionist Party which has a programme of helping backward areas and backward classes and reducing the burden of indebtedness. This accounts for the strength in the N.W.F.P. of Red Shirts who have a radical social and economic programme. This accounts for the Congress and A'ah Bakhsh combination against the League in Sind. The religious appeal of the League has been successful in preventing attention being directed to the specific demands and grievances of the proletariat and the peasant but the demand for adult franchise might easily raise such issues and thus destroy the very basis of the power of the League and probably that is the reason why Mr. Jinnah has repeatedly said that India is unfit for democracy.

The acceptance of Pakistan as its goal destroys the very basis of the League. Hitherto the League stressed the identity of interests of all Muslims in India irrespective of their economic, political and geographical differences. Pakistan marks a belated recognition that such interests are in fact different. Programmes and policies for Muslims in areas where they are in a majority will be different from those in areas where they are the minority. In the one case, they

must undertake the responsibility of administration and offer safeguards and protection to the minorities in their charge. In the other, they must themselves seek safeguards against possible oppression by a hostile majority. The League has thus abjured by implication if not directly, its accepted creed till now that Muslim interests are indivisible and identical for the whole of India. It follows that the League as at present constituted with a preponderance of Muslims from outside Pakistan should cease to exist. The Council of the All-India Muslim League consist of the following members : Delhi : 15, U.P. : 70, Punjab : 90, Bombay : 30, Sind : 25, Madras : 20, N.W.F.P. : 20, Baluchistan : 65, Bengal : 100, Bihar : 30, Orissa : 10, Assam : 25, C.P. and Berar : 25, Ajmer : 5. In other words, out of a total of 465 members the North-West (Pakistan) has only 140 representatives or 30 per cent of the total and the Eastern State has another 100 representatives or both together a little over half of the total. It is but logical that the All-India Muslim League has no right to exist as such and, in 1940, Choudhary Rahmat Ali rightly said : "We must scrap the All-India Muslim League as such and create instead an alliance of the nations of Pakistan, Bengal and Usmanistan. For this alone would set the final seal on our separation from 'India', inspite the Millat, and impress the world as nothing else would".

Can it be said that the so-called constituent units of Pakistan really desire a union ? The North-West region is, undoubtedly, an extensive tract, but apart from this and a common religion of a majority of the inhabitants there is nothing that is common. There are at least five distinct and separate languages spoken within this area; and historically it can hardly be claimed that as a territorial unit it has ever been one unit detached from the rest of India. Those who will constitute this State, the Sikhs, the Hindus, the Muslims, the Pathans, the Punjabees, the Baluchis, the Sindhis and the Kashmiris have more bitter memories of each other's dealings in the not very distant past than what perhaps exist in any other part of the country. More recently the spirit of provincialism has been significantly strong, as may be noticed from the resentment in Sind, Bahawalpur, Kashmir and N.W.F.P. against the Punjab on account of its dominating representation in their services to the detriment of their own people, in the same way as at one time the Punjab resented the preponderance of the Bengalee element in their services.

In the N.W.F.P. the Khudai Khidmatgar movement is a strong Pathan nationalist movement which will militate against domination by the Punjab. Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh once remarked : "The N.W.F.P. Baluchistan and Sind which now enjoy comfortable majorities in autonomous provinces helped by the Centre financially and on the matter of defence, would not care to exchange their present position for a minority in another unit, though overwhelmingly Muslim."² The Punjabees would, for somewhat different reasons, refuse to be included in Pakistan. The Punjabees would never agree to be financially bled white for feeding deficit provinces like N.W.F.P., Sind and Baluchistan. Further, at present the Punjab thrives on its vast share in the army, and if separation takes place, the rest of India would naturally not employ alien nationals (*i.e.* Pakistanis) to defend 'Hindustan'. In 1930 the Indian Infantry was drawn to the extent of 58.5 per cent. From the Punjab, and although the present figures have not been made available to the public, it is supposed to be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds the total strength. Pakistan will not only cease to have any share in the army budget of India, but would have to pay for their army themselves.

Irrespective of the fact whether the people of the North-West desire Pakistan, the next question is how to bring it into existence. Pakistan is not being demanded from the Hindus because they are not in a position to concede it, it is being demanded from the British, who are still the Masters of India. Are the British going to be guided by considerations for the good of the Hindus or the Muslims ? Would they not be interested more in preserving their own interests ? Is it not a fact that the British have alternately talked of the unity and the disunity of India as it suited their own requirements from time to time ? Is it not true that the attitude of the British Government has been vacillating from one position to the other according to the exigencies of the situations and imperial needs ? When in October 1939 there were chances of Congress co-operation in the war effort, the Viceroy could "reaffirm his belief in the essential soundness of the 1935 Act" (which means a federation and a strong democratic Central Government), but on 8th August 1940 when the war had progressed unfavourably and the chances of Congress co-operation had preceded he said that it "could no longer serve the purpose for which it was originally

designed," and the next step did not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it was based, and added that "it goed without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in Indian national life. Nor could they be parties to coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government." In order to postpone transfer of power (contemplated in the idea of federation and democratic parliamentary self-government) Mr. Amery in his speech on August 14, 1940, while approving of the Pakistan resolution of the League said : "It may, indeed, prove to be the case, it is by entirely novel departures from the existing scheme that an agreement may be reached, while is unattainable within the framework of the existing Act." On 18th November, 1941, he said : "Rightly or wrongly, the experience of Provincial Self-Government on British parliamentary lines has convinced the Muslims and the States that they cannot submit to any Central Government for India in which the executive is directly dependent on a parliamentary majority, which if provincial experience is any guide would be an obedient mouthpiece of the Congress High Command." Finally, Cripps proposals conceded Pakistan in principle. The tide turned when C. Rajagoaplaacharia led a movement for settlement with the League on the basis of Pakistan and saw Mr. Jinnah and thought there were reasonable chances of settlement and wanted to see Mahatma Gandhi. Governme:t refused the interview and the Calcutta speech of the Viceroy of December 17, 1942, to the Associated Chamber of Commerce, emphasized the need for maintaining the geographical unity of India and having a strong Central Government and added that the British were unfavourable to separatism because if India spoke with two voices, she would not be able to play her part effectively at international discussions. Recently, British solicitude for the Unity of India has increased in proportion to the propects of a Hindu-Muslim settlement on the basis of partition.

The motive behind the British support for Pakistan was tactical rather than genuine and was the same which inspired the partition of Bengal. It is most unrealistic for some Muslims to believe that the British would support Pakistan not for the advantages that would accrue to them but for the benefit of Muslims. The fact is

that the Pakistan scheme has created and will further create a countrywide agitation which would embitter the feelings of the people, and estrange a large number of Muslims from the struggle for freedom. It has frustrated the Congress demand for a Constituent Assembly and will create anti-Congress feelings in the Muslim majority provinces where the League was the weakest and non-communal parties the strongest; *i.e.* Sind, N.W.F.P., Punjab and Bengal. It is to start internal quarrels and to wound non-Muslim feelings and to make Hindus acutely antagonistic to Muslims. In the present struggle it needs to be recalled by Muslims that the annulment of the partition of Bengal Clearly showed the result of the dependence of one community upon a foreign Government for support against sister communities, and also showed that the British are not interested in genuinely helping either one or the other community.

It has been repeated by Mr. Jinnah on several occasions that the British are not honest in their solicitude for the Muslims and whatever regard they show for Muslims is in the interest of their traditional policy of "divide and rule." In other words, the British do not desire a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim problem and if one became imminent they would try their best to prevent it. It follows that if Pakistan is a solution of the communal problem, the British in their own interests would not desire it, and they would join hands with Hindus, who are opposed to it, thereby making it difficult for Muslims to fight on two fronts. If Muslims wish to achieve Pakistan it would be easier for them to wrest it from the Hindus alone than from the Hindus and the British together. It is, therefore, inopportune for the Muslims to raise the cry of Pakistan at this stage. They should first co-operate with the Hindus to expel the British and then demand Pakistan from their countrymen. The insistence at this stage on the acceptance of the principle of Pakistan as a condition precedent to any form of settlement is proving harmful both to the Muslim demand for Pakistan as well as to India as a whole. The absence of some form of national government in the fifth year of the war affords the fullest scope to British Imperialism economically to exploit the country in a most unscrupulous manner and if the Muslim League continues to persist in its present attitude till the end of the war, all possible chances of co-operation with non-Muslims on economic and other issues would be lost and the British would in the meantime not only cripple the movement for freedom but

would also create economic fetters for the whole country of lasting value to them. It is, therefore, imperative that even if the Muslim League does not give up its ideal of Pakistan that ideal should not stand in the way of an interim war time co-operation with other parties without prejudice to the ultimate partition of India. On the other hand, if Pakistan is not a solution of the communal problem, then it is a folly to demand it.

It is possible that considerations of foreign policy may ultimately cause the British Government to concede or to refuse partition. Whatever it may be, the British will certainly not incur the wrath of the three-fourths of India to please the Muslims of the North-West. If so, the demand for Pakistan is likely to raise false hopes which may never be fulfilled and instead only fill the country with religious fanaticism and bitterness which can easily be avoided. By raising the Pakistan issue, are Muslims not making a negative move, and weakening the existing offensive by diverting public interest from the main antagonism—"British *versus* India?" Apart from the fact that Pakistan would be harmful both to Muslims and Hindus, the demand for Pakistan postpones the day of India's political deliverance. The British are using and will use the difference of opinion on the Pakistan issue to postpone transfer of power in the same way as differences of opinion on communal safeguards have caused the British to withhold the Reforms from time to time. The British would let the threat of separation always hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of the Congress in order to restrain it from doing anything harmful to the Imperial interests in India. When the British find the threat unprofitable they would, in the last resort, carry out separation partly as a measure to save their interests, at least in as much of the country as may be possible by this method (*i.e.*, North-West India), and partly as a further threat to the Congress in order to restrain it from breaking the British connection altogether. British commercial interests in the rest of India could be saved by threatening retaliation through the Muslim State in the North-West of India. The separation, as a weapon of coercion against the Congress, will create another Ulster, and the Muslims will not achieve independence. That the British want to use Hindu-Muslim antagonism for retaining a firm hold on a part of India and thereby keep it in partial subjection is clear from the Cripps proposals which said: "His Majesty's Government undertake

to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so desires. With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire. His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution, giving them the same full status as the Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down." Considering the economic weakness and strategic vulnerability of Pakistan British domination in Pakistan would have accordingly become more or less a permanent feature, and they might even have used Pakistan as a spring-board to create trouble for the rest of India and thereby prevent India achieving full independence. Pakistan would become another Egypt and whatever independence it would have, if even that, would have been only in name. Pakistan will never be a free gift from the magnanimous British but only the conditional transfer of insignificant power. Burma did not become free because it was separated from India. Aden did not become free because it was taken away from the control of the Government of India.

To think that other Muslim countries will come to the aid of Pakistan to help them against the British is moonshine. Turkey is far off and has no desire to indulge in activities outside its borders. Egypt is equally far off, weak and impotent and enslaved by the British. Persia is dominated by the British and has no extra-territorial ambitions. Afghanistan is weak, lacks resources in men and materials and is incapable of giving any effective help even if the British permitted it to do so. If anything Afghanistan would like to have access to the sea through the port of Karachi by annexing the whole of Baluchistan and Sind. There is no Pan-Islamic sentiment left which would urge Muslim countries to come to the aid of Pakistan. Afghanistan is going to go the path of secularisation as Iran and Turkey have done and all of them have enough to do within their own territories to have extra-territorial ambitions. Indian Muslims have only to recall the horrors of the Hijrat Movement during the Khilafat agitation to realize how empty Pan-Islamism proved and how unwelcome they were to the Afghans. Some fervent advocates of the partition of India believe that the Pakistan solution has made an irresistible appeal to the Pan-Islamic feelings of the Indian

Musalmans and the establishment of Pakistan would bring their dream of a Muslim Confederacy of the Islamic countries in the Near East within the range of practical politics. The truth of the matter is that the Weltanschauung (world vision) of Pakistan is antiquated and out of date. The Ottoman Empire which combined in the Khalif the Emperor and the high Priest foundered on the rock of nationalism. Even after the rebirth of Turkey under Ataturk no attempt was made to unite the Arab States. Ataturk said : "Islam is not only a religion but also a fatherland." The rivalry of the Middle Eastern States and their inability to come together even in the face of danger proves that to the Muslims of Central Asia their separate political identity as Turks or Persians, Afghans or Egyptians, arabs or Syrians is more important than their community of faith. This fact is even more pronounced in China and Russia. The accent has shifted from religion to territorial nationalism. The days of theocratic states are gone. In the modern world of nation-states, a theocratic state will always be at a disadvantage. And today in a world governed by "Real Politik" where and how can any Islamic State find that "perfect isolation" needed "for its development"? The existence of a theocratic state postulates a world revolution on Islamic lines which is now an impossibility.³ In the context of the military and political forces of today, Pakistan is an impossible adventure. To refuse to learn from the fate of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan is to mortgage the future of 90,000,000 men so that a few may get the chance of playing with politics. Far from sounding the tocsin of Islamic imperium, Pakistan, once separated from the rest of India will become a pawn in the struggle of the Great Powers. The Versailles Treaty formed petty "nation states" and now all of them have been wiped off the map of Europe. Independently of Hitler's ambitions Austria could not exist as a separate economic unit, and in any case would have had to be united with Germany. Some small European States have found it impossible to develop their resources without financial help from other countries e.g. U.S.A. The present age is not the age of small nationalities, it is the age of Great Powers. Pakistan in the stress of the modern world will not meet an imperial destiny but a vassal's fate. Some Muslims are thinking of bringing back the conditions which existed before sea-power (wielded by the British) changed them. When India was dependent on Central Asia (Afghanistan and

Turkestan), from which raiding armies and conquerors swept down. this is obviously impossible and completely disregards modern conditions, modern developments, political, economic, technical and military.

The chief *raison d'être* of the Pakistan scheme is that it solves the communal problem, and yet it has been admitted by Mr. Jinnah himself that this would not be so. That the so-called two nations will continue to plague India even after partition is evident from the following conversation with Mr. Jinnah reported by Edward Thompson : "Two nations, Mr. Jinnah ! confronting each other in every Province ? Every town ? Every village ?" Two nations confronting each other in every province. Every town. Every village. That is the only solution." "That is a very terrible solution, Mr. Jinnah !" "It is a terrible solution. But it is the only one."⁴ Pakistan would not put an end to the Hindu-Muslim problem, or the problem of safeguarding the rights and interests of Muslims and other minorities. Partition, far from solving them, would complicate them and bring no balm for the sores of the body politic but pour upon them acids of disintegration and strife. The example of Ulster, the often quoted precedent, must not be forgotten. "The partition did not solve the minority problem, since while the Protestant minority of 6 per cent in Eire may acquiesce in the new regime, the same cannot be said of the Catholic minority of 33 per cent. in Northern Ireland."⁵ Pakistan far from clearing the intercommunal atmosphere will thicken the miasma of misunderstandings, open a prospective of hate and fear, and intensify her political and social malaise. "If a federal State cannot solve the problem of minority safeguards within its component autonomous units, what guarantee is there that two independent federations will succeed any better in solving them ?"⁶ On the contrary, with powerful minorities in each. the risk of constant friction between the two federations cannot be ruled out. This is bound not only to lead to undesirable repercussions within each of the two federations but also to provide cause to powerful foreign States for intervention in the internal affairs of the federations as well as their component units."⁷

Pakistan would merely reproduce on a smaller scale the very problem which it claims to set out to solve. The scheme that does most for reducing the total figure of communal minorities is "Punjabis" "Confederacy of India"; it would leave 58.6 millions,

of whom 29 millions would be Muslims. The Aligarh Scheme (of Zafar-ul-Hasan and Qadri) would leave about 70 millions, of whom 28.1 would be Muslims. In an undivided India, there are 79.3 millions in the communal minority of Muslims. What these proposals would achieve, therefore, is not the partition of India along communal lines, but the distribution of communal minorities and majorities. The "Confederacy of India" Scheme would create a separate "Muslim" Bengal Federation with a Muslim population of 66.4 per cent and the Aligarh Scheme visualizes Pakistan with 60.3 per cent Muslims, and "Bengal" with 57 per cent Muslims. In short, Muslim federations will have two-thirds or more of non-Muslim populations. According to the much vaunted principle of self-determination, how can one visualize a Pakistan with non-Muslim minorities of 40 per cent. or more ? Surely, the Pakistanis ought to be the first to let these minorities secede back to 'Hindu' India.

If the principle of separation is logically pursued then predominately Sikh areas should be excluded from the Punjab to make Pakistan more "Pak" than it would be otherwise. This is almost impossible. Of the six million Sikhs in all India, 3.8 million are domiciled in the Punjab and 1.4 million in the Punjab States. The geographical situation of the Sikh area in the Punjab is such that they cannot be easily excluded from it in the same way as Ambala Division. Their exclusion cannot be effected without sacrificing a large number of Muslims because the Sikhs are dispersed all over the province and there is not a single district where they are in a clear majority but in some districts Sikhs, although small in number as against the Muslims, compared to their own population in other districts, are sufficiently strong. The important shrines of the Sikhs are in the Central Punjab and if this was to be excluded, it would mean the exclusion also of the Muslim intelligentsia, which incidentally is concentrated in this area, and the best soil in the entire Indus regions, because after their exclusion, a federation of the remaining Muslim tracts will be a federation of the sandy tracts of Bahawalpur and Khairpur States, barren and rocky soil of Rawalpindi Division, sandy stretch and colony area of the Multan Division, which are already becoming water-logged, poor soil of N.W.F.P., and the sand dunes of Baluchistan and Sind. The Sikh-Muslim question will, therefore, remain and in fact will become more important because the exclusion of Eastern Hindu tracts of Ambala Division

will raise the percentage of Sikhs (in the Punjab excluding the states) from 12.9 percent to 15 per cent. The Sikh-Muslim problem will be an acute problem. The typical sikh is reputed for his energy, toughness and courage and great fighting qualities and the Sikh community is well organized and a strong minority, and since the British seized the Punjab from them less than a hundred years ago, they still have memories and hopes of Sikh domination in the Punjab. the relations of the Sikhs and Muslims, before the annexation, were embittered and there was strong distrust on both sides, and eventually the Muslims welcomed the British as liberators from the tyranny of "Sikhashahi" rule. The Sikhs are opposed to partition. The advocates of Pakistan say that the rights and interests of Muslims of Pakistan cannot be allowed to be trampled underfoot in a federation which is bound to be dominated by the non-Muslims, merely because a minority take it into their head to oppose it. This argument is fallacious because the Hindus can say that the rights and interests of 75 per cent. Population of India cannot be allowed to be disregarded for the sake of a minority of 25 per cent or even less because the Muslims of Pakistan (N.W.F.P., Sind, the Punjab, Baluchistan) are only 4.5 per cent or including Bengal are only 11.5 per cent of the total population of India. Sikhs demand from Muslims what Muslims demand from Hindus.

Mr. Jinnah, of course, has been well aware from the outset of his campaign that of the many problems raised by Partition the Sikh problem is one of the most thorny; and a few days after the passing of the Lahore resolution he made a public statement expressing his respect for the Sikh community and his conviction that it had nothing to fear from Pakistan, and added : "It is obvious that, whereas in a United India they would be mere nobodies, in the Muslim homeland...the Sikhs would always occupy an honoured place and would play an effective and influential role." But the Sikhs are more concerned with their position in North-West India than in India as a whole, and it is the prospect of a Muslim, not of a Hindu, Raj that alarms them. Their reaction to Pakistan as conceived by the Muslim League is the exact counterpart of the Muslim's reaction to a Union of India as conceived by the congress. Just as the Muslims, remembering the Mogul Empire, refuse to be subjected to a permanent Hindu majority at an all-India Centre, so the Sikhs, remembering that only a century ago they ruled the

Punjab, refuse to become a permanent minority in Pakistan. Thus, when Sir Stafford Cripps submitted the British Government's proposals in 1942 to the various party leaders, the Sikh All-Parties Committee was the first to reject them, on the ground that the option of non-adherence to an all-India constitution was to be exercised only by majorities in the Provinces. 'Our position in the Punjab', they declared, 'has been finally liquidated... Why should not the population of any area be given the right to record its verdict and to form an autonomous unit ?... We shall resist by all possible means separation of the Punjab from All-India Union.'

It seems probable, that rather than allow themselves to become a minority in an independent Muslim State, the Sikhs would insist on their own right of self-determination, and would demand that the area in which they are mainly settled, including the Sikh State, should be separated from the Punjab and become—since it could scarcely form an independent State by itself—a province of the neighbouring Hindu State. Is that a practicable proposition ? At first sight such a bisection of the Punjab seems natural enough. The Two Western Division (Rawalpindi and Multan) are overwhelmingly Muslim. The two Eastern Division (Ambala and Jullundur) are substantially non-Muslim. The Central Division (Lahore) is mixed : its three western districts (Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikhupura) have a Muslim majority; in the three eastern districts (Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Lahore) Muslims and non-Muslims are roughly equal. It would seem, therefore, to meet the needs of the case if the Province were divided into two roughly equal parts by a line drawn from north to south through the Central division. But to determine exactly where that line should run is far from easy. The two principal cities of the Punjab, Lahore the administrative capital, and Amritsar, the commercial capital and sacred city of the Sikhs, are both situated in the middle of the Province between the rivers Ravi and Beas and only thirty-five miles distant from each other. To fix the boundary at either of the rivers is plainly impossible : it would mean the inclusion of both the cities in either the Muslim or the Hindu State. Between the two cities there is no natural dividing line of any kind. Any boundary set between them would be wholly artificial, geographically, ethnographically and economically. *Inter alia* it would cut in two the systems of canals on which the productive capacity of the whole area largely depends. It would

also leave the capital city of each province exposed and defenceless, right up against the frontier. Such an artificial dividing line, despite its obvious disadvantages, might serve, if it were to be merely the boundary between two provinces in a single federal State. Administrative difficulties, such as that of the canals, might in that case be overcome. But it is no mere inter-provincial boundary that is contemplated. It is to be a regular international frontier between two separate independent national States.

The exclusion of the Sikh areas from Pakistan thus looks so difficult as to be well-nigh impossible. And the Sikhs seem determined to fight, if need be, rather than stay as a minority in a Punjab that would be a province of Pakistan. The Muslim partitionists for their part have continued to assume that no more than the Ambala Division would be cut away and that somehow or other the Sikhs might be persuaded to acquiesce; and Mr. Jinnah still maintains that an understanding can be reached provided that the problem is treated as a local problem for Muslims and Sikhs and not complicated by the intervention of all-India influence from outside. On what lines he hopes to base such an understanding is not known. It seems at present as if the attitude of the Sikhs is a major obstacle to the realisation of Pakistan. That they could be coerced into it seems unthinkable. To attempt coercion would mean a civil war, and a war which, once it had broken out, could certainly not be confined to North-West India.

“As regards North-East India,” says Professor Coupland, “the partitionists assume that Assam, which was linked with Eastern Bengal when the old Province was divided between 1905 and 1911, will similarly form part of the Muslim State, and that Western Bengal (i.e. the Burdwan Division) will be excluded from it. The population-figures in 1941 were as follow :-

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Moslem percentages</i>
	(000)	(000)	
Bengal	60,307	33,005	54.72
Eastern Bengal	50,020	31,575	63.12
Western Bengal	10,287	1,430	13.90
Assam	10,205	3,442	33.72

“It will be observed that only about one-third of the population of Assam is Moslem. Only in the district of Sylhet, where the Moslem percentage is 61, is there a Moslem majority. If Partition were voted on by Provinces and if it were carried by a majority in Bengal, the position of Assam would be very difficult. If its geographical situation were different, its Hindu majority would presumably choose to adhere to the Hindu State. But the geography being what it is, would such a division be practicable ? Could Assam exist as a detached Province of the Hindu State, completely cut off from it by Moslem Bengal, with no access of its own to the sea, and with a frontier of which the danger has been revealed in the present war ?

“The exclusion of Western Bengal raises again the question of self-determination for a provincial minority ; for Bengal has long acquired a kind of nationality of its own, based on the Bengali language and an old and rich literary and artistic tradition, and centred both culturally and economically on Calcutta. The Hindu agitation against the partition of the Province in 1905 was so violent that, despite the assurance that had been given to the Moslems, the Province was reunited in 1911. Can it be assumed, then, that the eight million Hindus of Western Bengal would choose, if they had the choice, to be severed from their motherland ? *Bande Mataram* was a Bengali patriotic song before the Congress adopted it as an all-India ‘national anthem’—and grouped in a separate Hindu state with the Hindi or Bihari-speaking people of Bihar and the Oriya-speaking people of Orissa? Above all, is it to be supposed that they would willingly be cut off from Calcutta ?

“Just as the Sikhs are the crux of Pakistan, so Calcutta is the crux of North-East India. In both cases the Partitionists apparently take inclusion in the Moslem State for granted. Yet the population of Calcutta and its neighbourhood is predominantly Hindu. The city itself contains 1,531,512 Hindus, 79,844 other non-Moslems, and 497,535 Moslems. It lies in the Twenty-four Paraganahs District, which, excluding the city, contains 2,309,996 Hindus, 78,210 other non-Moslems and 1,148,180 Moslems. Thus both in the city and in the district, the proportion is over two to one in favour of non-Moslems. And this balance is reflected in the city’s cultural and commercial life. All Bengalis, whether Moslem or Hindu, may well be proud of the fact that Calcutta both in culture and in commerce

is the queen of Indian cities, but in both, apart from the great contribution of British enterprise to the latter, the Hindu share predominates. Moslems have substantial business interests in the area, but the Hindu interests are unquestionably greater. There is a Moslem College in the huge University of Calcutta, but the great majority of the 37,000 students in the University as a whole are Hindus. Communal discord has long been provoked by the fact that a Hindu-majority city is the capital of a Moslem-majority Province. Would it not be greatly aggravated and exacerbated if it became the capital of a Moslem State cut away from Western Bengal and the rest of Hindus India ? Would not such an arrangement beget at least as much bitterness and friction as any article of the Treaty of Versailles has begotten in Europe ? The trouble at Danzig, Vilna and Lvov was caused in each case by the association of the majority of their local populations with a foreign State. Yet, deprived of Calcutta, North-East India would become a rather dubious proposition. For economic reasons, it could not maintain itself as a separate independent state. It could only exist as a detached and backward Province of Pakistan, separated from it since a corridor across the breadth of Hindus India is plainly impracticable—by more than 800 miles of land and air and more than 2,500 miles of sea.”⁸

In order to make populations more homogenous, territorial adjustments have been suggested. The exclusion of Ambala Division from the Punjab means the exclusion of 3,099,000 Hindus, 240,000 Sikhs and 1,138,000 Muslims, thereby raising the Muslim majority from 57.1% to 62.7%. North-East India is to comprise most of Bengal and Assam, the territorial adjustment in this case being the exclusion of the Hindu-majority districts which constitute the Burdwan Division in Western Bengal. This Division contains 8,125,185 Hindus and 1,429,500 Muslims. By their exclusion the present Muslim majority of 54.7% in Bengal would be raised to 65%. The proposed exclusion, to begin with, of those Hindu-majority districts from the Moslems State would seem to deny them the right of self-determination enjoyed by their neighbours. Can it be taken for granted, for examples, that the people of Ambala Division would prefer to belong to the U.P. rather than remain within the Punjab ?

It is arguable if the increase of Muslim majority is the best way of dealing with the communal problem. Until quite recently its

Moslem leaders have maintained that the fact that the balance is not too uneven has made for communal harmony rather than against it. The majority report of the Punjab Provincial Committee, which was appointed in 1928 to co-operate with the Simon commission, affirmed that any large disparity between the communities in the present circumstances is undesirable in the interests of the province and good government. "As the communities are at present balanced," it went on, "there is not even a remote chance for any one community to form a cabinet on communal lines."⁹ Partition, whatever its frontier lines, will not abolish the communal problem. With Ambala gone there would still be 8.8 million non Muslims in the Punjab. It is natural enough that the Muslims should welcome the idea of increasing their majority in the Province, but would they find it easier to deal with the minorities if their traditional policy was abandoned and the existing balance of communities upset ?

According to the scheme prepared by the Foreign Sub-Committee of the All-India Muslim League in 1940 to implement the League Resolution, the Northern Muslim zone was to consist of the Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan and Delhi province which arrangement would give the Muslims a majority of 63%, and with State federating or confederating only 61.54% majority. The North-Eastern State consisting of Assam and Bengal (excluding Bankura and Midnapur Districts) and the district of Purnea from Bihar would give a majority of 54% which with the Bengal States would be reduced to 53.15%. By this arrangement two Muslim zones would give protection to 74.07% of the Muslim population of India. This naturally raises the question if Pakistan will be able to protect Muslim minorities from the "oppression" of accentuated "Hindu India"? Ultimately they will have to fall back either on the Hindus or on an alien power. What special safeguard and special protection can you give them ? If the protection and safeguards under the Communal Award are not sufficient, then what more assurances and safeguards can you give these Muslim minorities ? Would not the Hindus insist that they would agree to Pakistan on condition that in 'Hindustan' the duality of culture and nationality are given up in order to enable Hindus to enjoy fully the right of self-expression in the Hindu State ? Thus the brunt of the separation will fall on the Muslims outside Pakistan. It is safely forgotten that the communal problem does not concern so much the Muslims of those parts

where they form a majority (and on that account can look after themselves),¹⁰ as it concerns the Muslim minorities from Delhi, Lucknow, Patna downwards to Cape Comorin, who would be rendered eternal orphans under Mr. Jinnah's plans. Besides, Hyderabad, the stronghold of Muslim culture and rallying point for the Indian Muslims, will be permanently segregated from the current of Muslim life in India, and, who knows, eventually smothered for ever. A solution of the minority problem has been suggested by Mr. Jinnah, who says : "The non-Muslim minorities will be given full protection with regard to their religion, language and culture like Muslim minorities in Hindu India, and will no longer cause unnecessary annoyance to Muslim Government for fear of provoking Muslim minorities in Hindu India to similar action." Obviously the implication is that the hostage principle can be brought into play more effectively between independent States than between federated Provinces. In reply Savarkar is reported to have said that "when we will be in a position to retaliate and do retaliate the Muslims will come to their senses in a day. We shall not only save Hindu rights and honour in Hindu provinces but in provinces where we Hindus are in a minority, knowing that every attempt to tyrannize the Hindu is sure to recoil on themselves and react for the worse on Muslim interests in all India—the Muslims will learn to behave as good boys." This argument is fallacious. Even today there are four Muslim majority provinces, yet if the story of oppression broadcast by the Muslim League in minority provinces is partially true, what protection have the minorities received on account of their co-religionists being in a majority in other provinces ? The whole theory of retaliation has a wrong psychological basis. And even if it was correct the idea of treating minorities as hostages for the fair treatment of one's co-religionists in another State implies a clear shift of the basis of politics from civilization to barbarism.

The crux of the matter is that whatever the demarcation of boundaries there would be a substantial Hindu minority in predominately Muslim areas and an appreciable Muslim minority in predominately Hindu areas. In order to make populations religiously more homogeneous, exchange of populations has been suggested on the analogy of exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece at the end of the last Great War. While the precedent is frequently quoted it is safely forgotten that it concerned Greeks

(orthodox church) who went and settled in Anatolia and Turks (Muslims) who had gone and settled in Greece, while Hindus and Muslims are racially in no way different to each other and both have lived together in this country for about a thousand years, the conversions from one religion to another taking place from time to time during their common history. It is also forgotten that the exchange concerned only 1,300,000 Greeks and 4,00,000 Turks, and no less than £ 10,000,000 pounds were spent by Greece alone in settling their repatriates, and their country was underpopulated and possessed the potentially rich territories of Western Thrace and Macedonia.¹¹ Pakistan, on the other hand, can in no way be said to be underpopulated nor has it the financial resources for meeting the cost of an exchange of population. An added difficulty would be that the Hindus of Ambala Division who are mostly Jat agriculturists will have to be replaced by Muslims from minority provinces who are engaged in commercial and industrial occupations, which have no counterparts in the Punjab, and would find it extremely difficult to adjust themselves to an agricultural economy. It should be remembered that Indians, largely Muslims, have preferred to continue to live in South Africa under the most humiliating conditions rather than return to India and be economically badly off. The exchange of populations has never been officially emphasized by the All-India Muslim League but some writers have advocated it with misgivings while others have advocated it with the greatest possible boldness. Dr. Latif in "Muslim Problems in India" wanted an exchange of populations involving nearly two-thirds of the total population of India, uprooting humanity on a scale unattempted in history which would cause popular opposition and tremendous misery.¹² Even if a Pharaonic *tour de force* was not contemplated, the diversity between the people of various parts of India is so great, that an exchange of population on even a smaller scale would not be acceptable to the people concerned. People of different provinces have their own language, dress, culture, and social usage, and live in the climate and economic conditions peculiar to their respective provinces. They would strongly object to going to a different province even if it meant going to a province with a preponderance of their co-religionists. Both Hindus and Muslim in rural areas cling to and are deeply attached to their land, their neighbours and local shrines and temples and would be loath to migrate to a different

territory. On the other hand, some of the most important Muslims shrines such as those of Mueen-ud-Din Chishti and Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din are situated in Hindu India and the Muslims would not like to be deprived of free access to them. In U.P. alone the Aligarh Muslim University, Deoband, Azamgarh and many other places are the centres of Muslim religion and culture while Roorki, Banda and other places are sacred to Muslim memory. The Indian peasants like peasants anywhere are reputed to be thoroughly conservative in such matters even to the extent of foregoing better economic prospects. The socio-religious life in rural areas is deeply rooted in their environment. This being so an exchange of population on any large scale in India is unthinkable. Numbers and distance alike forbid it. Mass transfer would involve not hundreds of thousands but millions or tens of millions, and in many cases it would mean an unbearable change of climate and of all the ways of life which climate has dictated. Nor would it bring about in India, as it could in the Balkans, the union of homogeneous folk. The transferred multitudes would find themselves among peoples of a different stock, speaking a language they could not understand. It would be like a wholesale migration of French Protestants to Norway. During the stormy days of the 17th and 18th century when the Central power was shaken to the bottom, there grew up several independent petty States, some of which were ruled by Hindu princes and some by Muslim princes. Just as there were many Muslim subjects in Hindu States, so also there were many Hindu subjects in Muslim States. And the subjects stood faithfully and loyally by their rulers and fought against the rulers of their co-religionists. But the idea of interchange of populations on religious lines never occurred to them. Mr. Jinnah perhaps realizes all this or at least realizes that for whatever reasons Muslims would strongly resent any large scale exchange of population and therefore in a statement to the press on 1st April 1940 said : "A wrong idea and false propaganda appear to be set in motion in order to frighten the Muslim minorities, that they would have to migrate *en bloc* and wholesale. I wish to assure my Muslim brethren that there is no justification for this insidious misrepresentation. Exchange of population, however, on the physical division of India, so far as practicable, will have to be considered." The fact is that by now Muslims all over India have expressed themselves so strongly against the idea that it has ceased to be

mentioned by the League as a solution of the lack of homogeneity of the population of India. F.K. Khan Durrani, an ardent advocate of Pakistan, says : "The continued residence of these Muslims in Hindustan, even if they are exposed there to undue hardships, is indispensable for the security and well-being of Pakistan, and exchange of populations will be harmful not only to Pakistan, but also to the ultimate purposes of Islam."¹³

The exchange of populations, however, does not exclude a large non-Muslim element in Pakistan. Since the League demands statutory minority rights and mandatory safeguards for Muslims in Hindu India, it follows that similar rights and safeguards will have to be conceded to Hindus in Pakistan. In other words, the existing minority problem in India would continue to hamper the evolution of an Islamic polity. It follows that if Pakistan is to miss that final consummation why vivisect India ? On account of the impossibility of making any sharp division between Hindu India and Muslim India, although religion is the basic idea of the two-nation theory and Pakistan, yet it is not considered of any vital importance within Pakistan, itself. "El-Hamza", for example, says : "The Pakistani Hindus are true children of the soil and are of the same race as their Muslim fellow-countrymen. They have a fine and liberal religion, and practise very little of the caste exclusionism and untouchability of the orthodox Aryo-Dravidian Hindu." And again, "Sikhs are typical Pakistanis. They are of pure Indo-Aryan race ... the Pakistani Muslims look to their Sikh brethren for co-operation in their efforts for liberation of the fatherland."¹⁴ Thus racial doctrines and territorial nationalism are brought in to bolster up the idea of segregation of people belonging to two different religions.

Before the demand for Pakistan can be accepted or supported by the future Pakistanis, they have a perfect right to know, what Mr. Jinnah consistently refuse to tell them, namely, what Pakistan has in store for them. Geographically, what will Pakistan consist of ? Will Ambala Division be excluded ? Will Sikh areas be retained ? Will Calcutta be included in the Eastern State ? Will Pakistan be democratic (Mr. Jinnah has repeatedly said India is unfit for democracy), autocratic, socialistic, feudal or fascist ? Will it be riddled with native States or would those States be liquidated ? What will be the rights of a citizen of Pakistan ?¹⁵ What will be the duties of a citizen of Pakistan ? Will Pakistan be theocratic or

temporal ? What is meant by "Hukumat-i-Ilahia"? Since religion is the main reason for demanding Pakistan, presumably Pakistan will be a theocratic State. It is for the Muslims of the North-West to ask if they would like to live in a theocratic State. Would they be prepared to be ruled by Islamic law? Would they be ready to be purged of un-Islamic influence ? Would they be prepared to give up all the influences they have developed by centuries of contact with non-Muslims ? Would they be prepared to give up customary law? Would they be prepared to establish Bait-ul-Mal and regularly pay Zakaat ? Would the Muslims of Sind, *i.e.* Khojas and Kuchi Memons give up Hindu law ? Would the Punjab Muslims give up the protection of the Land Alienation Act? Would the Muslim landlords of the Punjab follow Shariah and share inheritance with their sisters rather than follow the existing infidels' system ? Would the landlords be willing to apply Shariah to agricultural land ? Has not Choudhary Rahmat Ali warned : "Bi-nationalism is only the first half of the movement's Fundamental Creed; they must, if they are in earnest, adopt also the other half—the de-Indianization of the Millat's territories. For only by its full adoption can the Millat be saved." In absence of answers to these questions, every person paints the future in colours most attractive to himself, and draws from the resultant picture the enthusiasm of the converts. As it stands Pakistan is negative, based on hate and fear rather than any constructive and positive ideal or programme. Once Pakistan ceases to be a roseate and undefined ideal, it would at once lose its attraction for the millions who would then be obviously left out of its benefits or would not like to enjoy its benefits !

The whole history of Muslims has been a story of expansion and colonizations, physical as well as cultural. There is a fine poem of Iqbal in which Tarik, the Conqueror of Spain, rebukes worldly-wise counsellors, who plead for retreat from a foreign land on account of their numerical weakness. "Foreign Land"? retorts Tarik, "where can we find a land that is foreign to God, whom as Muslims we must serve ?" The contrast of this attitude with that of Mr. Jinnah and his league is too glaring to require comment. Pakistan, which is today declared to be the goal of the Muslim League, is thus against the teachings of Muslims history. It is in fact against the teaching of history in every land. No race or people have ever prospered by seeking to conserve itself. Nations as well

as individuals have triumphed only when they have sought to expand themselves in all directions. Cultures live by expansion. The attempt to withdraw in narrow shelters and maintain purity or integrity has invariably resulted in decay and death. Indian Muslims can also survive only by a spirit of expansion and growth."¹⁶

It is said by ardent advocates of Pakistan that Hindu Muslim differences can never be resolved and the struggle for power would never cease till one party completely dominates the other or partition delimits spheres of domination. That the Hindu Mahasabha has been carrying on a virulent campaign against the Muslims is true enough but demonstrations of this character, and this applies equally to the League, arise out of the hopes which are inspired by a third dominant power interested in keeping the two apart. As long as the two communities do not exactly know what measure of authority needs to be divided between themselves they would go on clamouring for a larger share than they deserve or would accept for fear that they may not be disregarded when the time comes for their failure to pursue their claims. The art of British political man oeuvring consists in keeping the goal at a sufficient distance and thereby encourage claims and counter-claims. Hindu-Muslim settlement, therefore, will not be difficult when the British Government declares or is forced to declare the extent to which they are prepared to withdraw their authority from India. Similarly, social stagnation, which is said to be the result of perpetual civil war between the two communities, would give way to internal reform as soon as the present atmosphere of antagonism disappears. It is a recognized fact that the British Government in India has since the Mutiny been opposed to social reform with the excuse that they do not wish to interfere in religious matters. In fact Government has thereby encouraged reactionary forces in each community and prevented social reform. The refusal of the Viceroy in 1933 to permit the removal of untouchability by legislation in Madras is an excellent example of how reformist elements have been defeated by Government. Another aspect of social stagnation is that the fear of denationalization on account of an alien Government prevents reforms which would otherwise have come rapidly in a free India.

In the world of today economic and financial considerations are vital. Professor Behre has made a careful study of India's Mineral wealth, and has come to the conclusion that "India's

mineral deposits will determine in considerable measure her place in the world; and the way in which that wealth is distributed will affect the relationship not only of each part of the country to the other parts but also of the country as a whole to the world outside. Moreover, it seems to have been demonstrated by history that any general rise in a country's standard of living affects favourably the relations between the various peoples inhabiting its component parts. As they become better fed and better housed they also become better educated, better informed and more understanding and more tolerant towards each other in spite of racial or religious or other cleavages .. India, exclusive of Burma, now is or promises soon to be important in world trade as a source of coal and petroleum, iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gold, bauxite, salt, magnesite, mica, gypsum, various gemstones, monazite and certain refractory materials... Industrial power in the modern world is based on the trinity of coal, iron and oil. Together coal and iron are the foundations of industrialization in our present steel age... Oil, though also valuable, is far less essential ; in times of peace, a state rich in coal can do entirely without oil deposits if exchange in mineral commodities is free. Even if it has no oil, it may convert its coal to liquid fuel, as Germany does. Oil is of little direct value in the making of steel, and cannot as yet be substituted for coal in the steel industry. Coal remains essential. Both in aggregate value and in distribution the most important single industrial resource in India is coal. More than 98 per cent has been and will be taken from the moderately old (Tertiary) rocks found chiefly in three provinces : Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.... That fact in turn affords a glimpse into the future of India and makes possible a reasonably safe forecast as to the foci of industrialization. The economist would say that India is fortunate because her vast coal deposits are in close proximity to her great iron deposits. The iron production of India comes likewise chiefly from the deposits of Bihar and Orissa, again running northward into Bengal.... It will be seen that all of India's leading iron districts are in Hindustan. There are many small iron deposits in the western part of Pakistan but none that would sustain a large steel industry. It is apparent that India's minerals are so distributed between the parts of India in which Hindus and Muslim people preponderate that if India were divided on the basis of religious population the Hindu State would be rich and the Muslim State would be conspicuously

poor. This disproportion is sufficiently great so that, speaking generally, it does not even seem to be cancelled out by differences in population density. Not only is this fact of Hindustan's relatively greater mineral wealth true for the present, as judged from a comparison of the minerals now produced; it will doubtless be an even more striking fact of the future, as the industrialization of India advances.¹⁷ The significant conclusion as to the question of Pakistan and Hindustan is corollary to this fact. Hindustan has great reserves of coal and iron; it has excellent reserves of the more important ferro-alloy metals and of the non-metallic minerals and gold; it has considerable reserves of bauxite and some copper. Pakistan has a small amount of coal and iron : few ferro-alloys; and little bauxite. But Pakistan has as much of the ferro-alloys, other than manganese and chromium, as has Hindustan; it has adequate reserves of the other subsidiary minerals, except magnesite; and it has most of the oil. The leading feature of the complicated picture is, that Muslim Bengal is geologically a continuation of Hindu Bihar and Orissa. Speaking very generally, about 90% of India's coal and 92% of her iron would be in hindustan ; the remainder would be in Pakistan, but the grade (and rank) of the latter is relatively poor. Hindustan would have most of the important ferro-alloy and subsidiary minerals which complete the requirements of a relatively autonomous industrial realm; yet Pakistan would have some of them. Under conditions of moderate industrialization and with fairly high living standards, India as a whole would have less oil than she needed for her internal combustion engines ; most of what she had would be in Pakistan. The Hindu and Muslim areas of India are interdependent. Not only would Hindustan need some of the resources of Pakistan; for industrial life, Pakistan would desperately need great quantities of the resources of Hindustan. In a closed trade system the Pakistan State of Bengal would, industrially speaking, die. In such a situation one would expect violence. And it is permissible to note that the Muslim State which would thus be strangled would contain the people who are considered more aggressive and warlike than their richer neighbours. The economic position of the Muslim State of Assam, adjoining Bengal on the east, would be also unfavourable. It has no outstanding mineral wealth; petroleum and chrome ore are its only noteworthy mineral resources. In a divided India, then, it would seem to be even more

hopelessly situated, economically speaking, than Bengal. Division or no division, there would be little need for change in the economy of the Punjab, Kashmir and the Muslim States to the West. They would remain as they are now, pastoral and agricultural, economically tributary to Hindustan. A division of India strictly on religious lines would seem to destine all of Pakistan for such a status."¹⁸

In short, economically both the states will be worse off because of separation and more particularly Muslim areas. India's economy is a composite one. The resources of one state (Western Bengal) e.g. coal, will be needed to utilize fully the resources of the other (Eastern Bengal) e.g. jute. Only by combining all the resources of India can the problem of poverty be solved. India is so rich in economic diversities that there is no need either of conquest or of *lebensraum*. But that need will arise the moment India is split into a number of small states and the satisfaction of that need will not be realized except in terms of war. At present the North-Western zone possesses 15% of the seasonal and only 9.7% of the perennial industries. Of these the former employ 15% of the workers engaged in seasonal factories and the latter only 4% of those engaged in perennial factories all over India. The Statistical Abstract for British India from 1930-31 to 1939-40 shows that the average daily numbers of workers employed by different industries in Pakistan are only 6% of those employed in British India, although Pakistan has 12.3% of the population of British India. The Eastern zone too, after the predominantly Hindu Calcutta area is removed from it, will be no better situated than the North-Western State. In agriculture, the area under cultivation per head in "Hindustan" will be one acre, while in Pakistan is very deficient in oil seeds, Hindustan has substantial advantage in sugar, cotton and food grains. Thus Pakistan would be poor industrially as well as agriculturally.

Professor Behre concludes : "The pressure of industrialization is a pressure for unity, in India as elsewhere. But does India want industrialism ? ... Among the things in the Indian village which it would seem difficult for anyone to overlook from any angle is poverty... A possible form of amelioration is certainly the manufacture on a grand scale of consumer goods, whereby prices may be lowered and purchasing power increased. Industrialization, if not the trigger by which this happy result can be assured, is at least one means that may be used, once that desirability of it is

recognized. The war has given a tremendous impetus to the process of industrialisation of India, and, although the history of industrialism is still in its early chapters, there is nothing in the record of man's experience with this unruly genie—to suggest that once unloosed it can never be bottled again. India not only has coal and iron for the machine. She has a superabundance of the final resources on which the machine is based—manpower. And the distinguishing characteristic of India's immense manpower is its low per capita consumption, in a word, again, its poverty. Given the natural resources, given the manpower, given the need for an increase in the standard of living of the people of India, an increasing degree of industrialization of India would seem inevitable. India's decision as to the terms of her political future will determine whether that advance towards industrialism is relatively easy or difficult. The experience of "new" and financially weak South American States bears on India's problem. "New" nations, in the process of industrial development, have customarily paid stiff prices in terms of concessions and franchises, for needed capital, when they have been forced to seek that capital from private entrepreneurs. A united India would be in a position to command the sympathy and confidence of other governments, and to ask for loans under international auspices on some such terms as those for which China will ask. But an India, and yet more two Indias, using newly-won sovereignty to erect tariff walls around the national borders, would be a poor economic risk. Possible investors would demand the gambler's percentage. Once committed to a programme of industrialization, India would rapidly find herself confronted with the problem of controlling the programme in the interest of all her people rather than of a few—the familiar task which has agonized Western nations for a century and which, of course, is already a present component of the Indian situation. Divided into economic fragments, India would find this unavoidable issue doubly painful of solution. In a united India, the problem would seem to present the spur urging the country to the higher degree of social consciousness which her friends within and outside would wish. With her coal, her iron, her manpower, India could share Asiatic leadership with China or perhaps assume the outstanding role in the industrial development of Asia. External factors press her toward unity no less than does the logic of her economic resources, Buddhist Burma, on her eastern frontier, aspires toward nationhood.

From Burma, India must have nickel, tin, tungsten, lead, zinc and probably petroleum. Economic relations with Burma would be more fruitful for a united India than for a fragmented one. As China develops her own heavy metal industries in association with her coal deposits in the north-east, near the coast, India's iron ore, travelling by water, will be her most easily transported and least expensive source of supply. The present restrictions of British imperial policy would, however, have to be removed before this inter-development of Chinese and Indian resources could progress... Chinese leaders have shown statesmanship in recognizing that it is to the advantage of China that her great neighbour on the south be a strong and unified nation. It is likewise to the advantage of Hindus and Muslims within India."¹⁹

It is often alleged by supporters of Pakistan that the economic interests of Muslims and Hindus are different, that Hindus are capitalists and Muslim wage-earners, and that the interests of Muslims are mostly agricultural and interest of Hindus industrial and commercial. This facile classification is unwarranted because the vast masses of both communities are the exploited workers, whether industrial or agricultural, and both communities have a small section of capitalists, landlords, industrialists, etc. and the most that could be said is that the Hindus have a comparatively larger percentage of capitalists, but that does not alter the problem for 90% of the population of India. In fact Muslims are now rapidly turning towards capitalistic ventures and industry is developing more rapidly in predominatingly Muslim areas than in the rest of India. As far as capitalists are concerned there is nothing to choose between Hindu capitalists and Muslim capitalists, they both join hands wherever there is scope for exploitation. Birla, one of the biggest Hindu industrialist is Chairman of the United Commercial Bank, and Ispahani, one of the biggest Muslim capitalists is Vice-Chairman of the same Bank. All that can be said is that Hindu capitalists would like to have the whole of India as his field for exploitation while the Muslim capitalist would like to carve out the North-West and the North-East as his special preserves for his adventures. There is no doubt that in order to acquire power both would do exactly the same under the cloak of religion. The danger that in a united India Hindu industrialists are likely, by virtue of having stolen a march over the Muslim industrialists, to be a dominant

factor more than their numerical superiority would justify, is a real one, but it presumes that the present economic system would continue and that the future Government would be in no way different from the existing regime which is the creation of British imperialism and does not aim to promote the good of the people of this country. If the future Government of India is a National Government and promotes the greatest good of the greatest number it is bound to curb unrestricted capitalism by one form or another of state control under which the Muslim will not need to fear the economic domination by non-Muslim communities. Any attempt at solving the problem of the poverty of the masses must inevitably strike at the very roots of Hindu capitalism and thereby remove the menace of which the Muslims have a justifiable fear. The truth of the matter is that if poverty is to be removed and the standard of life of the masses is to be raised India must move towards industrialisation, increased production and better distribution, both of which would become difficult in case of partition because the intensification of the communal issue would impede the organisation of peasants and labourers on a purely economic basis. The only hope, therefore, lies in shifting the plane of politics from communal to economic.

The financial implications of partition also deserve consideration. The majority of the constituent units of Pakistan-Sind, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan are deficit areas, and the others, the Punjab and Bengal are not surplus provinces. The Eastern State with its teeming population and slender resources has been described by Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh as "an isolation quarantine". The financial stability of the deficit provinces depends on the subvention from the Centre, and after partition, the Pakistan Centre, the Punjab, will have to bear the whole of the burden. Sind gets a cash subvention of Rs.105 lakhs and N.W.F.P. gets Rs.100 lakhs and the entire cost of the administration of Baluchistan is borne by the Central Government. According to liberal calculations Sind will not be self-sufficient till 1984. At present Pakistan contributes Rs.7,13,76,594 to the Central Revenues, while Hindustan contributes Rs.51,91,27,729 with which the Government of India is carried on, but after separation Pakistan will have to do without the help of financial contribution from the rest of India. Any fresh taxation not for the nation-building departments of the provinces, but to supply

the deficit amount to other provinces seems suicidal. The most significant fact is that the Government of India spends nearly Rs. 52 crores out of its total revenue of Rs. 121 crores on defence, one half to two-thirds the army being drawn from Pakistan, (the Punjab provided nearly 58% of the fighting men of the Indian Army before the war) and a large portion of this expenditure shall have to be borne by the Punjab. It is still more significant to note that per capital burden of taxation in Pakistan is already higher than the corresponding figure for 'Hindustan' Rs. 7.5 as against Rs.5.3 and the trappings of statehood will greatly enhance this burden.²⁰

With the separation of the predominantly Hindu areas from the Punjab and Bengal, the position of Pakistan will be worsened. Accordingly to Dr. Ambedkar's calculations, their revenues will be halved.²¹ To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Pakistan and the Eastern Muslim State will be Rs. 60 crores minus Rs.24 crores (revenues of predominantly Hindu areas *i.e.* Rs.36 crores, the revenues of 'Hindustan' will be Rs. 96 crores plus Rs.24 crores *i.e.* Rs. 120 crores. Not only will the revenues of Pakistan be limited, but their main sources will be inelastic, like land revenue, while elastic and expanding sources, like customs, and income-tax, will be meagre.

Bengal, as it is now, with 20% of the population of British India, possess 33% of its industry. In Eastern Bengal without Calcutta, the percentage of British-Indian industry falls to 2.7% Assam has valuable tea-gardens and is one of India's two sources of petroleum, but has virtually no industrial development. Thus north-east India without Calcutta would be an almost wholly agrarian appendage, served by the one minor port of Chittagong. If Calcutta were given an autonomous status, it could doubtless be arranged that the customs duties on goods imported *en route* to North-East India or the Hindu State would be credited to the State to which the goods were consigned ; and if Calcutta were included in North-East India, a similar arrangement would presumably be made, since otherwise it would be open to the Hindu State to import goods through Bombay. In either case the share of North-East India would be relatively small, for the bulk of the goods would continue to go, as they go now, not eastwards, but westwards, to Western Bengal. Orissa, Bihar and the Eastern areas of Central and United Provinces. Customs-barriers inevitably that some Hindu firms would evade the

barrier and also perhaps the difficulties of double income-tax by shifting their quarters to the Hindu State.

The cultivation of jute has been the mainstay of Bengal's revenue. Under the Act of 1935 the export duty on jute is at present appropriated by the Central Government, which distributes 62.5% of it to those provinces in which jute is grown. In 1938-39 Bengal's share was 130 lakhs, but North-East India would presumably levy its own duty and take the whole of it. Most of the jute is grown in Eastern Bengal, and North-East India, without Calcutta, would be able to levy duty on raw jute exported from Chittagong, but its diversion thither from Calcutta with the existing system of communications would not be easy. Moreover three-fifths of the duty in 1938-39 were levied on jute manufactures, and this industry is located in Calcutta. For North-East India to levy export duty on raw jute crossing the frontier to Calcutta would be dangerous for two reasons. First, the Hindu State would probably levy an export duty on its jute manufactures and since the price in the world market would have to compete with that of substitutes, this second charge would inevitably reduce the cultivators' profits almost, if not quite, to nil. Secondly, a duty on raw jute at the frontier would be a direct invitation to the Hindu State to extend its own area of jute cultivation and so threaten North-East India with the loss of its nearest and largest market.

All these economic and financial difficulties, however, do not seem either to concern or to deter the advocates of Pakistan. They do not ask if the north-western and the north-eastern states will attain self-sufficiency and develop enough military, economic and political power to enable them to resist the pressure of external aggression. They do not ask how they will fare in the competitive world in the matter of international trade and protection of the rights of their nationals. They do not ask if they will or will not be able to alleviate the grovelling poverty of the masses of their population. Their attitude seems to be typified by the answer which Mr. Jinnah gave in an interview to Herbert L. Mathews, appearing in the "New York Times" of September 21, 1942 to the effect : "Afganistan is a poor country, but it gets along, so does Iraq and that has only small fraction of the 70 million inhabitants we would have. If we are willing to live sensibly and poorly so long as we have freedom, why should the Hindus object ? ...The economy will

take care of itself in time." It seems, therefore, that Pakistan having no other sources of revenue, and being deprived of the help of the rest of India will have to depend on contributions from the British Exchequer at London. In other words, Pakistan will have to be subservient to Britain like Egypt, Iraq, etc. enjoying independence only in name and not in reality.

In discussing the consequences of Pakistan we enter the penumbra of both Muslim and Hindu irrationalism. In the heat of partition no side may be expected to maintain a sense of proportion. In the dust of violent controversy raised by claims and counter-claims, by threats and warnings, reason will be dumb. The fate of the country will not be decided by sober statesmen but by extremists on both sides, intoxicated with one idea. The faith of the Muslims in a separate sovereign state will be countered by an equally strong faith of the Hindus in the essential unity of India. Such faiths cannot be reduced to the test of cold reason and logic. At innumerable points it touches the irrational fringe of human consciousness and it is quite possible that once the irrational gets control of their thoughts men will rather agree to suffer the shame and misery of foreign rule than compose their difference and derive strength in unity. That is a prospect which no Indian worthy of his salt can contemplate without being deeply moved by what this great country is, has been ever more will be.

There is yet another complicating factor. In the Muslim zones capital is concentrated mostly with the Hindus. The Hindus of N.W.F.P. for instance, contribute 80% of the income-tax. In Bengal, nearly three fourths of the revenue comes from them, while approximately 87% of the legal, 80 per cent of the medical and 83 percent of the Banking, Insurance and Exchange business is in Hindu hands. The predominance of Hindus in the major cities of the proposed state or Pakistan has its own significance.²² The pivotal position of Hindu moneylenders in the villages of the Punjab has been noted and deplored for over half a century.²³ Of course, it can be said that these Hindu moneylenders and capital holders will be expropriated, although that would be contrary to the basic tenants of Islam. But any move for expropriation will bring Pakistan into conflict with 'Hindustan' which will be anxious to guard the interests of the Hindu minority in the Muslim State. Limited resources, lack of capital, and shrinkage of credit caused by the break up of India

as a whole, will make it well-nigh impossible for Pakistan to start an industrial programme or so to reorganise its economy that it would be able to combat and overcome the challenge of corrosive poverty. It will create a legacy of bickering and estrangement between the two communities. It will plunge the two States in a sea of hatred and fear from which they will find it difficult to emerge. The determination of new boundaries will create a crop of difficulties. Vital differences will arise on which both the sides are likely to be adamant. Will Calcutta, with the industrial ring around it, be included in the Hindu State or the Muslim State ? It was in the Hindu zone in the last partition (1905) of Bengal. Or take the question of Hyderabad. Will the Hindus ever agree to the League's demand of setting it up as a Muslim State? There is no hope of solving these questions amicably. Each community will consider the demands of the other as extravagant and impossible and each will be astonished at the wilful denseness of the other in not appreciating its most reasonable demands. This will lead to repeated crises. Moderates in both the camps will yield place to extremists. Even after partition, enclaves of the other community will remain in both the Hindu and the Muslim States, whose peace and safety will be jeopardized by the ever present danger of irredentism. Fear and distrust, with their child, terror, will rule the land. The strain of irredentism will be inescapable because even after partition, the League hopes to organize and lead the Muslim left in Hindustan. The Hindus are sure to counter this demand with a similar claim. Both States will thus be cursed with a well-knit minority of doubtful loyalty to the State. It will need more than human wisdom to resist the temptation of using this weapon to undermine the strength and cohesion of one State by the other. Both the states will try to foist the responsibility of every failure on the alien group within the state. It will inevitably become the personification of the demonic forces of all the ills that the State will be unable to cure. Every estrangement between the State and the minority will have unfortunate repercussion on the relation between the two States. The new States, Hindu and Muslim, born in conflict, living in a climate of hostility and cursed with dangerous Fifth Columns will have to spend their substance on military preparations. Partition will destroy the natural and scientific frontiers of India and substitute instead highly vulnerable frontiers which history testified to have constantly shifted. The open

frontiers, in a climate of hostility, will be a source of fear and a temptation to aggressive action. War will be Nature's revenge on man for breaking up an organic whole. Partition cannot be carried out without conflict, separation cannot be maintained without friction, and in such an atmosphere no state can hope to achieve the ends it seeks to realize. To cure a wind we are calling a whirlwind.²⁴

"It is not only in the claims and the character of its nationalism," observes Professor Coupland, "that the doctrines of Partition seem reactionary. The cause of international unity in the world at large is necessarily linked with cause of democracy—necessarily because without a sufficient measure of international unity it is difficult under modern conditions for any nation to maintain a democratic system. The greatest enemy of civic freedom is insecurity. How the growth of liberty in England was fostered by her insular safety, how Prussian militarism was the natural offspring of the open plains of Central Europe all that is a familiar story of the past, and present experience has underlined its lesson for the future. Modern warfare is so 'totalitarian', so elaborate and so costly, that, unless some effective means can be devised for preventing its frequent recurrence, the free civilisation which goes by the name of democracy is evidently doomed. Too much time and money and wealth will have to be given to preparations for defence, and too little to the solving of social problems, the raising the standard of living, the extension of social services, especially of education—to those things, in short, without which democracy can never come into its own. Nor will it only be impossible to realise its ideals. The ideals themselves will wither in the perpetual shadow of war. Given time, democracies can organise for war and fight it through at least as well as military dictatorship. But in modern war, as the world nearly learned to its cost in 1940, time may not always be given; and it is obvious enough that those temporary sacrifices of freedom which war forces on democracies are likely to become permanent unless some security can be provided against its constant repetition. Militarism, not democracy, is the natural costume of a war-ridden world. That is plain enough to the free peoples of the Western world today, Is it so plain in India ? Is it realised that to press too far the claims of nationalism is to darken the prospects of democracy? Insecurity in the West means that democracy may die. Insecurity in India means that it may never come to life. A vast

amount needs to be done before Indian society can be called democratic in the same sense as the free societies of the West. A great effort must be made to increase the productive capacity of the country and to improve the livelihood of its innumerable poor. Huge sums must be spent on health and education. A United India, with such internal security as only union in some form can provide, could hope to make at least some progress in achieving those essential tasks, in bringing about the social conditions in which alone democracy can thrive. For a disunited India would it be even possible. The loss of security involved in partition would be at least as serious as that involved in a breakdown of international co-operation in the West, and the burden of armaments which it would impose on the independent States would be relatively heavier."

It is generally not realised that partition would bring the same fate to India from which Europe has suffered, and from which India has been completely free since 1858. Since 1848 Europe has been stricken by upward of ten wars; and the intervals of peace have been haunted by the fear that they could not last for long. Social progress, the possibilities of which had been enlarged by modern science far beyond the dreams of any previous age, was greatly impeded by the cost of preparing for war and brought to a stop, if not reversed, by the coming of it. From that terrible experience India has been saved. She has been brought within the scope of the last two wars, but had they been fought within India and between Indian peoples the sacrifices and devastations would have been infinitely greater. The cost of defence against danger from without has weighed heavily on India, but it would have been infinitely greater had Indians been divided, like Europe, and compelled to set up their defences not only against the outer world but also against each other. It is true likewise that industrial development has been held up by foreign competition, but the whole economic life of India would have suffered more if, like Europe, her territory had been criss-crossed by the fiscal frontiers of jealously competing and potentially hostile States. India, unlike Europe, has not had to pay the disastrous price of economic nationalism. Between the independent states of disunited India, unable to dispense with revenue from customs-duties or forced into protection by industrial competition with each other, customs barriers would inevitably

have been built up with the inevitable injury to the economic welfare of India as a whole.

Partition would throw India back to something like the state she was in after the Mogul Empire had collapsed and before the British Raj replaced it. For, once the frame of unity was broken, once the process of disruption had begun, it would not be likely to stop at the separation of a Moslem State or States from Hindu India. Already there is a talk of a Dravidian State, a Maratha State, a Rajput State, a Sikh State etc. Many Indians may think it inconceivable that after so long a period of peaceful progress India could relapse into the bloodshed and barbarism of a half-forgotten past, but that is what most civilised Europeans thought about Europe a few years ago. It is indeed ironical that Indian separatists should be seeking to tread the road that Europe has trodden at the very moment when the end to which it has brought Europe and might so easily bring India is plain for all to see. All thoughtful Europeans are now aware that the principle of unrestricted or at least of uncoordinated national sovereignty is dead and that without the widest practicable measure of inter European combination the prospects of the new post-war Europe will be darker in the long run than were those of the old. It is impossible now to conceive of the future without some sort of close economic collaboration and unity between contiguous states to the detriment of unrestricted sovereignty and self-sufficiency in economic matters. The 19th century economic individualism and nationalism has no future. Yet India is now threatened with a repetition of the same sombre story as if it had never been told, and Mr. Jinnah wants the creation of independent states on the analogy of states in the Balkan peninsula.

As calculated by Professor Coupland in *The Future of India* the financial position of Pakistan (N.W.F.P. the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan) after receiving its share of revenue and expenditure from Hindustan would be as follows:

Revenue (in thousands of rupees)

	<i>Centre</i> <i>1938-39</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>
	Rs.	Rs.
Customs	405,053	44,806
Excise	86,573	10,092
Corporation tax	20,372	1,528
Other income-tax	137,444	12,110
Salt	81,204	7,665
Opium	5,085	—
Railways	13,732	15,000
Posts and Telegraphs	1,898	237
Currency and Mint	2,242	280
Other heads	10,320	1,887
Total	763,927	93,605

Expenditure (in thousands of rupees)

	<i>Centre</i> <i>1938-39</i>	<i>Pakistan</i>
	Rs.	Rs.
Direct Demands on Revenue	42,360	5,149
Irrigation	924	702
Services (less interest receipts)	133,854	18,600
Civil Administration	98,854	14,556
Civil Works	21,958	1,083
Miscellaneous	20,432	3,313
Defence	461,800
Contribution and adjustments	30,632	20,500
Total	810,419	63,903

Excluding defence, Pakistan emerges with a credit balance of about 297 lakhs of rupees. If every possible economy is exercised a saving of 37 lakhs could be made thereby reducing the expenditure

to 602 lakhs. Raising more money by increased taxation would be no easier or less unpopular than saving it by economies. However, increasing the taxes in force in 1938-39 by 25% could yield 169 lakhs; maintaining increased freight charges at 12.5% on commercial railways could give 113 lakhs; profits on Posts and Telegraphs could be increased by 24 lakhs, new inland customs could give 150 lakhs, thus in all raising the credit balance at the very outset to 790 lakhs. This amount would obviously be insufficient for purposes of defence. It is generally believed that, when the Axis Powers have been defeated and disarmed, the United Nations will succeed in establishing some system of collective security for maintaining peace and preventing aggression. How strong and coherent that system will be remains to be seen, but no one supposes that mankind will have reached a stage of civilization in which peace can be regarded as unbreakable and the nations can safely turn their swords into ploughshares. Nor does the argument that the North-West frontier of India will be more secure if a Moslem State occupies the South-East side of it seem incontestable. Moslem States have been known to fight each other, and a sense of Islamic solidarity is no more likely to induce the hungry Pathans to abandon their ancestral custom of raiding the rich plains than to prevent the pursuit of the blood-feud among themselves. Nor is the frontier exposed to attack from Moslem only. It must be remembered that North-West India is barely separated from interested countries. In short, it must be assumed that the problem of financing the defence of India will be at least of the same extent as in 1938-39. It was at that time 4,618 lakhs. Even assuming that the Indian Army will no longer be required to maintain internal security in the sense of repressing attempts to subvert British rule, and that the re-enlisted and re-modelled Army will be less expensive than under British management, even then Pakistan would not have sufficient funds to keep even a small army. It has been suggested that since an invasion of the Punjab would open the way to the conquest of the whole sub-continent, after Partition the security of the North-West will be regarded as a common interest of the separated States and defensive alliance will be concluded to jointly finance a single policy in foreign affairs and defence. This harmonious outcome is a big presumption, because Hindus are bitterly opposed to Partition, and the relations between the Hindu and Moslem States would be anything but cordial. In any

case the separated States would have their separate forces; for it is inconceivable that the Hindus would pay the Moslem to defend them. Dr. Ambedkar says that Partition would give Hindu India more security because it would enable her to have a wholly Hindu Army, but the fact is that Partition would be brought about by the conviction that Hindus and Muslims cannot live at peace in one state, and it would offer no guarantee whatever that they would be to live at peace in two or more. There will be chances enough of friction. Without large-scale exchanges of population the claim that Partition would solve the minority problem cannot be sustained; and the fate of Europe shows that, if a minority problem can be difficult enough within one State, it is far more difficult when it is shared by neighbouring States. Nor, If Partition comes, is the old gulf likely to be narrowed by a common economic interest and policy. On the contrary any attempt of Pakistan to attain economic self-sufficiency would be at the cost of Hindu industrial India. If war is possible anywhere in the world, it would be in partitioned India. The defence of Pakistan, therefore, would be greatest and the gravest difficulty. It would have to face the prospect of defending the North-West frontier without the help of Hindu India, and to do that on anything like the same scale as it was done before the war, even without considering the increased cost of modern armament (and this war has made modern armaments an absolute necessity) would be impossible. Even to raise a substantial fraction of the money needed would require such extra taxation on the one hand and such drastic cutting down of administrative costs and social services on the other as would greatly lower the general standard of living and not only render the backward masses of the people still more backward but doom them to that state for generations to come. And that might not be all. Might there not be some anxiety as to the safety of Pakistan's eastern frontier too?

"Pakistan would face the rest of India across and indefensible as to the safety of Pakistan's eastern frontier too?"

"Pakistan would face the rest of India across and indefensible frontier that for the most part runs over flat levels. Can any sound state be created except along the line of strong natural boundaries? Look at what happens to Belgium continually. Consider how much mischief has followed from the fact that 'Prussia' slopped all over the map, with no strong natural borders and with possessions in other parts of Germany."²⁵ On the other hand, "it is well-known that all the strategic positions for the defence of India lie in these

five North-West provinces. Once an enemy crosses the hills near Lalamusa, he has no natural obstacles to face him right up to Calcutta. We know that the Muslims took more than 300 years to conquer the Punjab, but once they had become masters of the land of five rivers, the conquest of the rest of India was an easy job. Within ten years after the defeat of Prithviraj at Taraori, the whole Northern India north of the Vindhya was subdued, and became a part of the Muslim Empire. If a Muslim federation for the five North-Western provinces is established as is demanded by some Muslims, the federal Government for the rest of India would not be worth the paper on which its constitution may be drawn."²⁶

The position of the Eastern Muslim State would be no better. The present war has shown how serious the problem of defending India on the North-East may become. The new State like Pakistan would be open to attack on two sides, and though it seems unlikely that the hillmen of the Chinese and Burman frontiers would prove as dangerous in peace time as the Pathans the resources of the North-East India, even if it included Calcutta, would not be able to safeguard its frontiers. Without Calcutta, North-East India would be desperately weak and could expect no help from Pakistan. Pakistan and North-East India, while able to support themselves from their own resources for other purposes, would find it impossible to maintain the security they enjoy at present. The provision of minimum needs of peacetime defence would be impossible without a fall in their standard of living and a substantial sacrifice of social advancement.

Hostile India on one side and Japan or Afghanistan on the other, the separated Pakistan is no match for any foreign invasion. It is bound to become a subject province of an Asiatic power. By partition India would become again what it was at the time of the British annexation. How the British won the battle of Arcot in the Deccan and Plassey in Bengal would serve as an eye-opener to those who are dreaming of partitioning India on religious lines. Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan were crushed with Mahratta help and the Mahrattas were crushed with the help of the Muslims and some of the Mahrattas themselves. Are we in the name of self-determination—just as was done in Europe after the last war—to Balkanize India, to create nothing but a jumble of weak states which will be a prey to outside forces ? The separation of Burma and its consequences

in spite of the fact that Burma was receiving the fullest help of the British Empire are too obvious to need comment. By separation instead of creating a strong Asiatic power we shall be creating a breeding ground for fresh wars. The complexities of the relations between Pakistan and 'Hindustan' concerning delimitations of boundaries, defence or borders, financial adjustments, intercommerce and communications would afford ample scope for perpetual warfare. The realities of the security question call for only one answer—Unity of India.

"The primary cause of the unrest and discontent among the Indian intelligentsia has long been diagnosed. It is their sense of humiliation and resentment at the subjection of their great and ancient country to alien rule, at the inferior footing it was thus compelled to occupy beside other countries, at the denial of its natural right to equality. 'It is a great deal more than a personal feeling', said the authors of the Simon Report in 1930; 'it is the claim of the East for due recognition of status.' But there is still more in it than that. A constitutional settlement, whether it be based on Union or Partition, would free all India from British control. The Draft Declaration of 1942 offered to non-adhering Provinces the same Dominion status as it offered to an Indian Union. Whether as one State, therefore, or as a group of States, the people of India would obtain their independence and with it an equal status with that of any other people in the world. But status is not everything. Equality before the law is only one kind of equality. And that psychological complex, that sense of degradation, cannot wholly be removed from Indian minds by freedom. Indian must also be given the opportunity through their freedom to redress their past. If India could recover the position she once held in the world, if she could become again a great Asiatic Power, not only taking the lead in political and economic strength but setting new standards of social life and culture, then indeed the memories of her period of subjection might fade out, and her historians might ultimately come to regard the era of British rule in the same sort of light as British historians regard the era of the Norman conquest.

"Such a prospect is by no means fanciful. A United States of India might reasonably expect to take rank in years to come among the great political units of the world. If greatness is still to be judged in the last resort by military power, she has the potential

strength and wealth required to achieve it. Geography has given her a safer strategic position than any other country of comparable size. Her soldiers have proved themselves second to none. Her natural resources would enable her to attain at need a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. She possesses an inexhaustible labour force, and her industrial output for the purpose of the present war shows how easily she could develop an 'industrial potential' capable of arming her own forces with modern weapons. Even in her present relatively backward state, the strategic and military strength of India would enable her to play a leading part in building the new order of the post-war age. And if, in a freer, more coherent, more co-operative world, India could turn her great resources to the needs of social progress and the arts of peace, she would bid fair to regain the place she occupied in the history of civilisation in the days of Ashoka or of Akbar, a place worthy of the ancient homeland of more than one-sixth of mankind.

"But all that is such stuff as dreams are made of if the Indian homeland is fated to be split up into several independent 'national homes'. India cannot be 'Balkanized' without reducing its component 'nations' to the Balkan level. The severance of the Moslem areas alone would gravely impair the strength and wealth of what was left, and reasons have been given for supposing that the residual Hindu India would remain united. In such a disrupted India the Indians could never achieve their natural destiny. Their states would rank not with the Great Powers of the world but with Egypt or Iraq, with Burma or Siam."²⁷

The main concentration of the Communist Party of India in support of the present policy of the All-India Muslim League is that it is today an urgent and pressing necessity to solve the present national crisis, to win national Government from the hands of the British imperialist bureaucracy and to defend India against the fascist aggressor.²⁸ The first step towards this is the formation of a joint Congress-League front, which can only be brought about either by the League giving up its present demand for Pakistan or by the acceptance of this demand by the Congress. The Congress should accept this just demand because the principle of self-determination is a sound principle which has always been accepted by the U.S.S.R. and has recently been extended in its scope. Every section of the Indian people which has a contiguous territory as its homeland,

common historical traditions, common language, culture, psychological make-up and common economic life should be recognized as a distinct nationality with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian Union and should have the right to secede from it if they so desire. The communists also supports the League on the ground that communism is preceded by some sort of liberal revolution. The league is beginning to be an organization of the masses, a fact which is notable in that political consciousness among the masses is essential for bringing about communism. Once the masses are awakened political leadership is bound to pass from the middle classes to the real representatives of the masses.

The immediate objects which the communists have set before themselves are unexceptionable but the means of achieving them are misconceived. The Congress is being asked to agree to Pakistan in order to secure the co-operation of the League. It is presumed that it is easier to persuade Hindus and Sikhs, who are 44% of the population of the Punjab, and non-Muslims who are 75% of the populations of India to agree to Pakistan than to convince Muslims that the partition of India would not be in their interest or in the interest of the whole of India. The reason adduced in favour of persuading the Congress to accept Pakistan is that the principle of self-determination requires the acceptance of this demand. The fact is that principle of self-determination as enunciated by U.S.S.R. cannot be applied to conditions in India or pleaded as a precedent. The concessions to communities and national minorities are so granted they do not impair the strength of the Union as a whole. As observed by the Webbs : "The State as a whole maintains its unity unimpaired and has, even like other federal states, increased its centralization of authority." In India there is no territorial unit which contains a homogeneous population who could be permitted to exercise the right of self-determination. If self-determination is to be exercised by Muslims, then other communities such as Hindu and Sikhs should be able to demand the exercise of a similar right. Secondly, U.S.S.R. could afford to concede the right of secession to their constituent units because :

(a) there is no strong separatist feeling in most of the Republic and elsewhere every expressions of it is ruthlessly suppressed. During the Purge of 1937-38, there were several references in the

Press to men who were accused of plotting to bring about secession of some territory from the Union. Such activities have been invariably interpreted by Soviet Courts as treasonable and counter-revolutionary. The exercise of the right of secession, therefore, is effectively prevented by the structure of the Soviet State and the communist Doctrine that governs it;

(b) every republic has a socialistic economy and would find it almost impossible to exist outside among capitalist countries without a radical change of its economic system ;

(c) the communist party is the key organization of the U.S.S.R. and it controls every sphere of political activity in the republics and would never permit the secession of any part of the existing Soviet territories. In 1917 Stalin stated : "When we recognize the right of oppressed peoples to secede, the right to determine their political liberty, we do not thereby settle the question whether particular nations should secede from the Russian State at a given moment... Thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against the secession according to the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution."

Needless to say that no such conditions exist in India and the talk of self-determination in terms of the recent Soviet declaration shows an extraordinary lack of political realities. Most political pronouncements from Soviet Russia have no application to other countries because of the vital differences of a capitalist and socialistic economy. Unless and until India adopts the same economy and the politics of the country is controlled by a well-organized Communist Party, we must talk of cultural autonomy rather than of self-determination. A still more important objection to the communist view is that while advising the Congress to accept Pakistan they do not answer two questions, namely, whether after the acceptance of the Pakistan demand Hindus and Muslims would be able to live together amicably, and also whether the partition of India is from a purely economic and financial point of view desirable and in the interest of the Muslims or the Hindus or the Muslims and the Hindus together. They are interested in promoting the economic interest of the masses yet they do not enquire if the partition of India would be conducive to the achievement of such an object and would not hamper the industrial development of India. In other words, communists advocate Pakistan without deciding whether it

is something desirable in self and whether it has any justification beyond that of a sentimental slogan.

Next, Pakistan is approved of as a short-cut to political awakening of the masses. It is not considered what effect this type of political awakening would have on the masses, nor is it considered what repercussions this awakening would have on the future of the country. To awaken religious bigotry is the surest way of confusing social issues and the continuance of the economic and the political *status quo*. The Indian nationalist movement would suffer and the country prepared for civil war. Separatism and religious fanaticism among the Muslim masses would bring about further division, bitterness and conflict. To appeal to the masses in the name of religion is easy enough and can produce quick results, but to direct such energy once released into useful and productive channels in the tangled social atmosphere of India would be almost impossible. The forces of aggressive religious frenzy can lead nowhere except to religious strife. The leadership would indeed pass from the middle classes and the landed gentry, but it would pass to religious fanatics and demagogues who flourish in times of stress and strain of religious wars. To avowedly make a religious appeal for political purposes is not only morally indefensible, but otherwise inexpedient and full of the gravest dangers.

In short, Pakistan offers no solution of the Indian problem. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is a psychological escape from the stern realities of the situation. It is a milestone on the separatist road to security. It is a confession of failure of all devices hitherto adopted to solve the problem. In the logical sequence, it is only a half-way house; if persisted in, it cannot escape the corollaries of exchange of populations and finally a desire towards the complete domination either of the Hindus by the Muslims or of the Muslims by the Hindus. These implications are not mere obstructions; they inhere in the idea and cannot be overlooked. As the sky clears and the implications of partition are perceived, the good sense of both the communities as well as the pressure of events is likely to give a new direction to politics. But so long as the idea endures, whether as a bargaining counter or a serious proposition, the danger of it is in the estrangement that it may create. Every political idea evokes an appropriate technique of propaganda and often a corresponding mutation in a whole programme. The idea of separation propagates

itself naturally by seizing on existing differences and magnifying them into fundamentals. It grates on the patriotic sentiments of millions and drives the iron into the soul. All this weakens the will to agreement. That indeed is the most alarming difference between the present situation and that in 1916 or even in 1930. There is another risk in using separatist pleas as political feelers or levers. They may inflame the imagination of an extensive and immature public and make retreat awkward. That the idea should have been adopted even temporarily by a great political organization cannot but disturb the complacency of the others and prepare the country for chaos and civil war.²⁹

To summarize :

(1) India is physically, naturally and geographically one country and throughout its long and chequered history it has been treated as such, and the common interests of the people-economic, political and defence demand that India should remain undivided.

(2) Since the collapse of the Moghul Empire India has acquired a more vigorous kind of unity, and its diversity cannot be compared with that of Europe. There is also the unity among its inhabitants inspired by their common enemy British Imperialism.

(3) The problem of the preservation of Muslim culture, if it needs protection, concerns only a microscopic minority of the Muslim population. Muslim culture can be preserved not by partitioning India but by strengthening Muslims through education and economic rehabilitation.

(4) The Pakistan demand has not been put forward by the majority of the Muslims and the All-India Muslim League is not the only authoritative and representative political organization of the Muslims of India. Older Muslim organization have persisted and new ones have grown, and the League is weakest where the Muslims are in a majority and where Pakistan is to be established.

(5) The Pakistan demand is not the demand of the Muslim masses. The League is making this demand in the interests of the landlords and the middle classes who will have better chances for exploitation and class aggrandizement in a Muslim state.

(6) The acceptance of Pakistan as its goal destroys the basis of the League, namely, the common interests of the Muslims of India, and provides for different aims and objects for the Muslims

of Pakistan and the Muslims of the rest of India.

(7) The proposed constituent units of Pakistan do not desire a union and are opposed to it.

(8) Pakistan is being demanded from the British who will not be guided by the interests of the Muslims but by their own, namely, the continued domination of India. Their support is tactical and has varied according to imperial requirements. Indeed, recent events have shown that they are opposed to it.

(9) Even if Pakistan is something desirable it is inopportune to raise the demand at this stage because it is opposed both by the British and the Hindus. It should, if at all, be raised after both the communities have turned out the British from India and Muslims have only the Hindus to contend with.

(10) If the British ever concede Pakistan it would be with a view to dominate Pakistan like Egypt and to retain an indirect hold on the rest of India. It is unrealistic to expect help from adjoining Muslim countries because accent has shifted from religion to territorial nationalism and Pan-Islamism is dead.

(11) The Pakistan scheme does not solve the communal problem and will reproduce on a slightly smaller scale the same problem which it claims to set out to solve.

(12) The Sikh problem in the Punjab is almost impossible to solve and if Sikh areas are excluded, the most fertile tract of the Central Punjab will have to be excluded to which the Muslims would never agree. The Sikhs are emphatically opposed to an independent Muslim State and coercion would mean civil war.

(13) Just as the Sikhs are the crux of Pakistan, so Calcutta, predominantly Hindu, is the crux of North-East India, and its exclusion from either one or the other part of Bengal would be a great loss and its exclusion from both would mean the creation of another Danzig.

(14) In order to make populations more homogeneous territorial adjustments have been suggested, i.e., exclusion of Ambala Division from the Punjab. It is arguable if the increase of Muslim majority is the best way of dealing with the communal problem.

(15) Muslim minorities in Hindu India will have to bear the brunt of separation. The supporters of Pakistan rely on the hostage principle which will either not work and if it does, it would shift the basis of politics from civilization to barbarism.

(16) Exchange of populations has been suggested but Indian conditions render it economically and otherwise impracticable. All communities of all provinces are opposed to it.

(17) Large scale non-Muslim elements cannot be excluded from Pakistan. These would hamper the evolution of an Islamic polity and in view of this it does not seem worth while partitioning India.

(18) Pakistan is undefined in geographical, constitutional, political, social, economic, etc., terms which makes it impossible to judge its merits, if any. Pakistan has been left undefined for propaganda purposes.

(19) Social stagnation is not the result of communal friction as much as it is the outcome of the reactionary policy followed by the British Government and the fear of denationalization on account of an alien Government.

(20) The distribution of India's mineral wealth is such that economically both the State will be worse off because of separation and particularly Muslim areas. Pakistan would not be able to develop industries essential for solving the problem of poverty of the masses.

(21) The economic interests of Hindus and Muslims are not different from each other. Muslim capitalists support Pakistan in order to diminish competition of Hindu capitalists and to have freedom to exploit the masses. The economic improvement of Muslims is possible not by separation but by a vigorous programme of a socialistic economy throughout India.

(22) Financially, the position of Pakistan and Eastern Bengal would be absolutely untenable and it would not be possible to meet the expenditure for defence.

(23) A large number of points of dispute, i.e., economic, political, etc., would keep Hindu India and Pakistan at war with each other. Pakistan will find it difficult to exist with out worsening the economic position of the Muslims.

(24) Partition will make India tread the path of economic nationalism and periodic wars as in Europe. Insecurity, militarism and war within India would damage the cause of democracy and international unity in the world.

(25) From a military and strategic point of view the creation of separate States in the North-West and the North-East would prove fatal to the security of the Muslim States as well as to the rest of India.

(26) A united India can be the most important Power in South-East Asia while a divided India would have to play a subservient role.

Muslims need to recall the advice which Abraham Lincoln gave his countrymen when the North and the South were at war with each other. "Physically speaking," he said, "we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other ; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always ; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you."³⁰

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1944, pages 50-51.
2. *The Indian Annual Register*, Volume I, 1940, page 326.
3. "There is another point," says Professor Coupland, "on which the ideology of Partition seems out of date. The nationalism it preaches is based on religion. It is because they are Moslems that the Moslems of India are entitled to political independence. It is because they are Moslems that the trend of their future international associations should be turned away from India and towards the Middle East. Such ideas are the natural outcome of the old Islamic philosophy of life in which Church and State were indivisible. Not long ago they were a commonplace of the Moslem world. But one of the most remarkable results of the war of 1914-18 was the change it brought about in Moslem political thought. For the new tide of nationalism which it set running through all the Moslem countries from Morocco to Afghanistan was not dominated by religious fanaticism. If it was directed against Christian Governments it was not primarily associated with the notion of a 'holy war'. How far the Moslems in their desire to be free from European domination had adopted the European conception of the national State was finally demonstrated by events in Turkey. The dramatic recovery of the Turks from the disasters and humiliations of the war was followed by the fall of the Ottoman Sultanate, the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, and the complete

secularisation of the Turkish State. Thus political Pan-Islamism was deprived at a stroke of its main foundations. In other Moslem countries—in Egypt, Persia, Iraq, Syria—nationalism, though nowhere so secularist as in Turkey, assumed a similar Western complexion. Observers in the West began to ask if the words 'Islamic World' had not lost their political meaning, if the role of Islam in Moslem countries was not destined sooner or later to be assimilated to that the Churches in Christian countries.

Indian Moslems can scarcely have forgotten the reaction of those developments on Indian politics. The Caliphate movement, in which the left-wing Moslems combined with Mr. Gandhi and the Congress against the British Government, was completely exploded by the abolition of the Caliphate. Yet in inverting the dictum of *Cujus regio, ejus religio*, in looking forward to creating a political nexus between Pakistan and the Moslem countries of the Middle East, still more in extending the idea of a consolidated Moslem zone to embrace the Dutch East Indies, are not the Partitionists inviting a repetition of what happened twenty years ago? If Pan-Islamism was dead then, can it be resuscitated now? Can the philosophy of the Caliphate movement be revived without a Caliph? Are Moslems at Ankara or Cairo or Bagdad likely to feel that their political interests are closely linked with the prospects of Pakistan? The members of the Turkish Press Mission which visited India early in 1943 were reported to have shown "scant interest in or sympathy with the Pan-Islamic aspirations of the Indian Moslem League, thinking these to be anachronistic."

—(*The Future of India*, 1944.)

4. *Enlist India for Freedom*, page 52, 1941.
5. *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1943, page 15.
6. On the other hand, Dr. Latif's recognition (as also the recognition implied in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940) of the principle of safeguards to be religiously followed both in Hindu and Muslim zones cuts at the root of his argument about its inapplicability to the "cultural safeguards" promised in the Congress resolution on Fundamental Rights adopted at Karachi in 1931. If an individual or group or groups of individuals can be guaranteed safety of cultural individuality in the future Federation of India as adumbrated in Dr. Latif's pamphlet, "The Cultural Future of India," it is difficult to understand why the 60 to 70 lakhs of Muslims at present living in the U.P. cannot live securely under the same or identical guarantees, and the one crore and more of Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab. If the principle is valid in the case of a few, it can be or ought to be valid in the case of millions.
7. *Muslim Politics*—Humayun Kabir—1943, pages 24-25.
8. It has been suggested that in the event of Partition, Calcutta should be given a separate autonomous status akin to that of Delhi Province. This would doubtless ease the communal position—though Danzig is again a discouraging precedent—and such a compromise would be clearly better for North-East India than the inclusion of Calcutta in the Hindu State: but it would still inflict on North-East India an irreparable economic loss.
9. *Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. III, pages 410-411.
10. At present 74% of the Muslim population is under "Muslim Government," and 26% under "Hindu Government." The corresponding figures for Hindus

- are 19% and 81%. Also 22% of the Hindus voters are under "Muslim Government", and 23.6% Muslim voters are under "Hindu Government."
11. *Survey of International Affairs*—1925—Volume II, page 259.
 12. He has since recanted and now recognizes that under Indian conditions an exchange of populations is unthinkable.
 13. *The Meaning of Pakistan*—1944, page viii.
 14. *Pakistan : A Nation*—1941, page 52.
 15. When, in 1942, Dr. Khan Sahib's daughter married a Christian officer of the Indian Air Force, the following comments appeared in the Pakistani Press: "If the criminal law of Islam be established in India, such sensualists who, for the gratification of their own carnal appetites, trample on the law of God and Islamic honour, will be, as a warning to others, publicly stoned to death and their dead bodies will be thrown in the field to feed the kites and crows. But now, when we are ruled by an infidel Government, everybody has "freedom," to do and say as he pleases, and our helplessness is so extreme that we cannot even turn out these hypocrites and vipers from Islam and Muslim society." Bareilly, volume 9, triple no.3-4-5 (Rabi-ul-Awwal to Jumadi-ul-Ula-1361 A.H.) page 16. Quoted by W.C.Smith—*Modern Islam in India*—1943, page 308.
- Similarly, the pamphlet *The Present Crisis in Islam and Our Future Educational Programme* by Muhammad Fazlur Rahman [1944] elaborates an educational programme for Pakistan Which is thoroughly reactionary in its tendencies and shows that in view of some of its advocates there would be no liberal education in Pakistan for Muslims nor any education for non-Muslims.
16. *Muslim Politics—1906-42*, Humayun Kabir—1943, pages 44-45.
 17. The Statistical Abstract for British India from 1930-31 to 1939-40 states that the total value of the chief minerals produced in 1938 (including Petroleum) was Rs.1238.54 lakhs for British India and 67.17 lakhs for Pakistan. On the production basis Pakistan supplies only 5.4% of the mineral wealth of India.
 18. *Indian Mineral Wealth and Political Future*—C.H. Behre : *Foreign Affairs* — October 1943.
 19. *India's Mineral Wealth and Political Future*—C.H. Behre : *Foreign Affairs*—October 1943.
 20. *The Communal Triangle in India*, Ashoka Mehta and Achyut Patwardhan—1942, pages 215-20.
 21. *Thoughts on Pakistan*, B.R.Ambedkar, page 65, 1941.
 22. The percentage of non-Muslim population is 70.8 in Hyderabad (Sind), 53.1 in Karachi, 60.1 in Sukkur, 66.7 in Bannu and 45 in Dera Ismail Khan.
 23. Cf. S.S. Thorburn : *Mussalmans and Money-lenders in the Punjab* (1882).
 24. *The Communal Triangle in India—1942*, Ashoka, Mohan and Achyut Patwardhan, page 215-20.
 25. *Enlist India for Freedom*—Edward Thompson, 1941, page 58.
 26. *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore—19th August 1934—Professor Gulshan Rai.
 27. *The Future of India*, R. Coupland, 1944; page 108-109.
 28. *Pakistan and National Unity*, G. Adhikari, 1944 : page 14.
 29. *The Hindu-Muslim Questions*—Beni Prasad, 1941, page 86-87.
 30. *Speeches and Letters of Abraham Lincoln* (Everyman's Library), page 172.

6. CONCLUSION

It is amply clear that much as Mr. Jinnah wants that the Pakistan States should remain in isolation and should have no constitutional relations, geographical, economic or political with the rest of India, his attitude is suicidal from every point of view. It would mean sacrificing economics and wider strategic considerations to politics—the politics of pride and fear. Consideration of safety would be disregarded in the same way as was done by Belgium (Catholics) against the Dutch (Protestants) on the outbreak of the Napoleonic war with fatal results to both. The European Settlement of 1815 considered national independence and not economics with the result that in the end national independence itself was lost and brought the agonies of another world war. Besides, partition would make the economic development of India as a whole difficult, and thereby postpone the solution of the poverty of the masses in Hindustan, and throw the Muslims of Pakistan into the throes of hunger and destitution. Dr. Laid, one of the staunchest supporters of Muslim culture and the two-nation theory, writes to Mr. Jinnah: "I must repeat that the Pakistan Scheme in its latest form will neither establish Muslim States, properly so-called, nor get rid of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh problem nor afford any security to the Muslim minorities in the proposed independent Hindu India, unless a wholesale exchange of populations is effected which no one favours."

The need of some sort of a Centre is essential, if for nothing at least for such matters as Defence, External Affairs, Currency, Communications and Customs. The schemes proposed by Dr. Laid, Sir Sikander Hyat, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, "A Punjabi", and Syed Razaullah of Lucknow all envisage some form of union against an All-India background. There is no reason why Muslims should not develop the vision of a future which should secure for them autonomous zones where they could live a life of their own and follow their own culture and yet work for the good of the country as a whole. This could be achieved in a loose federation in which the units possess the largest measure of autonomy, residual powers

and the right of secession, all three demands which the Congress has already conceded. The Centre could deal with a minimum of subjects indispensably common to the whole of India as mutually delegated to it by the different units, so that no community or combination of units dominate the rest. General safeguards could be provided for minorities in a Declaration of Rights in the same way as in the Polish Treaty of 1919, the Greek Treaty of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. These could be supplemented by political safeguards. In the constitution of legislatures reservation of seats, weightage, and separate electorates could be included, and to prevent domination by the majority, it could be laid down that if three-fourths of the Muslim or of the Hindu delegates (as the case may be) objected in the legislature, no subject involving communal representation in services could be maintained till Muslims attain the Hindu level. Cultural safeguards such as the "Millat" system practised under the old Ottoman Turkish Empire could be evolved with useful lessons from the constitution of the U.S.S.R. which has conceded the largest measure of cultural autonomy to its minorities. In addition to the protection of minorities a share in the exercise of power, and the administration of the country could be provided by introducing a system of coalition Governments and partially independent executives. In short, if Muslims recognise that partition of India is harmful to them as well as to the whole of India, there is no reason why it should not be possible to devise measures whereby Muslims not only enjoy the largest measure of cultural autonomy, but also have a legitimate share in the governance of the country as a whole and a predominant share wherever they are in a majority, so that they share power and authority without the evils of partition.

So much for the future general political structure of India. The fight for freedom will never be successful and the British will continue to exploit Hindu-Muslim differences, unless and until there is an agreement between them on this. Those who believe that the Indian Muslims can make some contribution to the progress and the strength of future India, and also wish to preserve the individuality of Muslims as an important element in the national life of India, they should devote themselves to the improvement of the economic position of the Muslim masses. The improvement of the economic condition of the Muslim masses is not an isolated measure, it

concerns Hindu masses as well as Muslim masses, and calls for a reorientation of the entire economic policy of future India. Rehabilitation of Muslims will come not by foolish appeals to the wealthy or the vague appeal of Pakistan but by vigorous measures of a socialistic economy, by making the State pay for it through taxation of the upper and middle classes. So much the worse for them if they are brought to a lower level for that is what is happening in highly civilized countries, otherwise there is no hope for the masses of the people. Only radical economic reorganization can reduce the gulf between different sections of the people and eliminate extreme poverty, hunger and nakedness.

It is time for Muslim leaders to realize that the Pakistan slogan has served its purpose. It has made the League powerful and strong and roused the necessary political consciousness among the Muslims. But that consciousness now needs to run into practical channels, and the League stopped from persisting in an overstatement of its case any longer. This would not be possible if a discussion of the Pakistan demand is taboo and instead of being treated as a political demand it is looked upon with religious sanctitude. Mr. Jinnah is reported to have said : "My demand is for Pakistan and before I can discuss that or any other matter with anybody that demand must be met. No discussion about that, no arbitration either." Mr. V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, speaking at Bangalore on the 24th January 1944, and disapproving of this attitude of Mr. Jinnah rightly said: "All that I am asking for is not that Mr. Jinnah should give up his demand for Pakistan, but that he should agree to argue it out with the Hindus, Sikhs and other communities. This question is not beyond agreement. Why should discussion be barred about Pakistan when even God comes within the pale of discussion ? This seems to me a very unfortunate position taken up in our politics. I mention it now as a signal instance of the evil spirit of Hitler and Mussolini who would not come to discuss matters, but would settle everything on the field of battle. This is not proper and this is the kind of feeling which we want to end."

The Pakistan demand is a political demand but its appeal is religious. To exploit religion for political purposes is fundamentally dishonest and vicious and has no justification whatsoever. In such matters an appeal to religion is not an appeal to its higher objects, but to the lowest forms of religious obscurantism. Ends cannot

justify means. To arouse religious fanaticism among the ignorant masses is the surest way of preparing the country for civil war, which no Indian, Hindu, Muslim or Sikh, can look upon with equanimity. Some pessimists argue that civil war is almost a necessary incident in the process of achieving a single nationhood. A settlement attained by force cannot be a valid or a durable settlement, and is the surest means of perpetuating strife and bitterness among generations of Hindus and Muslims.

The recent proposals for a Hindu-Muslim settlement in the form of the 'C.R. Formula' are based on the acceptance of the principle of partition, thereby clearly showing that the Congress though convinced of the evils of partition is willing to concede the principle of Pakistan for the sake of attaining freedom for India. There may be irreconcilable differences about the mode of partition and interim arrangements for the duration of the war, but there is no doubt about the principle underlying the proposed settlement. It is evident, as explained in the last chapter, that partition will be infinitely more harmful to the Muslims than to the Hindus, and that is perhaps why Hindus have not hesitated overmuch to concede it. This should make responsible and thinking Muslims seriously ponder over the wisdom of pressing the demand for partition. Hitherto, since the Pakistan slogan has served to popularize the League, and for lack of definition has given unity of purpose to the Muslims, the slogan instead of being regarded as a means towards an end has become an end in itself and is being considered synonymous with the League itself. It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to belittle the League, the intention in the main is to convince the Muslims of India of the grave dangers of partition. While rejecting partition as harmful to those whom the League represents, the League can still fulfil a most vital role by striving for the protection and legitimate rights of the Muslims of India. The League has never been stronger than it is now to achieve this end, and it would be most unfortunate if the League in the pursuit of a harmful though more spectacular aim fails to achieve for the Muslims rights of a more lasting value.

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APPENDIX I
DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION IN BRITISH INDIA

British Provinces		Total Population	Muslim Population	Percentage of Muslims to Total
1.	Ajmer-Merwara	560,292	97,133	17.3
2.	Andaman and Nicobar Islands	29,463	6,719	20.6
3.	Assam	8,622,251	2,755,914	31.4
4.	British Baluchistan	463,508	405,309	87.0
5.	Bengal	50,114,002	27,497,624	54.1
6.	Bihar	25,727,500	3,689,954	12.0
7.	Orissa	5,306,142	124,463	1.9
8.	Chhota Nagpur	6,643,934	450,373	6.1
9.	Bombay	17,916,318	1,583,259	8.3
10.	Central Provinces	15,507,723	682,854	3.8
	C.P.	12,065,885	383,174	2.5
	Berar	3,441,838	299,680	8.7
11.	Coorg	163,327	13,777	6.1
12.	Delhi	636,246	206,960	33.0
13.	Madras	46,740,107	3,305,937	6.2
14.	N.W.F.	2,425,076	2,227,303	65.8
15.	Punjab	23,580,852	13,332,460	56.5
16.	Sind	3,887,070	2,830,809	73.7
17.	United Provinces	48,408,763	7,181,927	14.1
	Agra	35,613,784	5,318,077	14.1
	Oudh	12,794,979	1,863,850	8.0
Total		256,732,574	66,442,766	25.9

APPENDIX II
DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION IN INDIAN STATES

Indian States and Agencies		Total Population	Muslim Population	Percentage of Muslims to Total
1.	Assam States	625,606	24,600	3.3
2.	Baluchistan States	405,109	392,782	97.5
3.	Baroda	2,443,007	182,630	7.2
4.	Bengal State	973,336	312,476	32.1
5.	Bihar and Orissa States	4,652,007	19,516	4.1
6.	Bombay	4,468,396	414,931	9.0
7.	Central India Agency	6,632,790	376,637	4.6
8.	Central Provinces Agency	2,483,214	23,254	9.4
9.	Gwalior	3,523,070	204,297	5.9
10.	Hyderabad	14,436,148	1,534,666	10.4
11.	Jammu and Kashmir	3,646,243	2,817,636	77.7
12.	Madras States and Agency	6,754,484	467,396	6.0
	Cochin	1,205,016	87,902	6.8
	Travancore	5,095,973	353,274	6.0
	Other Madras States	453,495	26,220	4.5
13.	Mysore	6,557,302	398,628	6.1
14.	N.W.F. Agencies	46,451	23,086	50.0
15.	Punjab States	437,787	40,845	9.1
16.	Punjab States Agency	4,472,218	1,556,591	35.2
17.	Rajputana Agency	11,225,712	1,069,325	9.7
18.	Sikkim	109,808	104	0.1
19.	United Provinces States	1,206,070	352,131	25.0
20.	Western India States Agency	3,999,250	545,569	13.0
Total		79,098,008	10,657,102	12.7

APPENDIX III

PUNJAB

PROPORTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION BY DISTRICTS

Districts where Muslims are above 50 per cent	Actual Proportion of Muslims	Districts where Muslims are below 50 per cent	Actual Proportion of Muslims
1. Lahore	59.9	1. Hissar	27.6
2. Sialkot	62.1	2. Rohtak	17.1
3. Gujranwala	70.7	3. Gurgaon	32.1
4. Sheikhpura	84.8	4. Karnal	30.5
5. Gujrat	63.7	5. Ambala	30.6
6. Shahpur	82.8	6. Simla	15.8
7. Jhelum	89.0	7. Kangra	5.0
8. Rawalpindi	82.8	8. Hoshiarpur	32.8
9. Attock	91.0	9. Jullundur	44.3
10. Mianwli	87.0	10. Ludhiana	35.1
11. Montgomery	69.1	11. Ferozepur	44.8
12. Lyallpur	62.5	12. Amritsar	46.9
13. Jhang	83.1	13. Gurdaspur	50.0
14. Muzaffargarh	86.5		
15. Dera Ghazi Khan	86.1		
16. Biloch Transfrontier Track	99.9		
17. Multan	80.2		

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